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The dissertation is an investigation into several of
the epistemological problems involved in the study of human
action. I have assumed that what a person does - as opposed
to what happens to her - involves a conceptual component.
This assumption has lead me to three questions » 1) how are
political concepts linked to political action; in particular,
what is the relation between moral concepts and political
action; 2) how do persons acquire political concepts; 3) what
is the significance of some political concepts being essen-
tially disputed.
I have attempted to show that political concepts are
linked in one direction to explanatory theory - concepts such
as 'liberation' involve an explanatory theory of what a liber-
ated life would look like and what inhibits liberation - and
in another direction to the passions. I have explicated two
contending theories of concept acquisition - the inductionist
approach in which persons learn those concepts and rules al-
ready embedded in social practise, and the cognitive develop-
V
mental approach which attempts to explain the acquisition of
critical consciousness. I have linked these contending images
of concept acquisition with contending conceptions of the
justificatory term ' liberation.
•
I have termed these alternative approaches to political
action the True Believer and Moral Agent models. Each carries
within it a contrast model which serves to highlight desirable
and undesirable features of human action. The True Believer
contrast model is the model of rational liberal politics - a
politics of self-interest constrained by the rules of liberal
democratic procedures. The Moral Agent contrast model is
heteronomous political action, or action guided by an uncritical
acceptance of existing norms and rules.
Finally, I have applied these alternative images of pol-
itical action to the Women's Liberation Movement in an attempt
to both illustrate the importance of conceptual disputes in
politics, and to demonstrate the manner in which our under-
standings of what can be a rational basis for human action can
blind us to alternatives to which other understandings are open.
I have attempted to show that the problem of interpretation is
not a problem for political analysts alone, but also for Move-
ment activists. If analysts do not share the concepts deployed
by actors as justifications for action, those actions will re-
main opaque. And for actors, rational political discourse will
be impeded to the extend that conceptual frameworks are not
shared.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over fifty years ago Sigraund Freud asked the question
"What do women want?" Freud raised this question during an
earlier period of feminist activity, and although he has
subsequently been held responsible for the counter-reformation
which followed upon the heels of nineteenth century feminism,
his question remains a vital one. Today, in this second wave
of American feminism, we need to ask once again i "What do
women want?"
At root this is an epistemological question i how can we
know what motivates other people's actions? My assumption
is that what we do is to bring to bear our understanding of
what we think can motivate any person in our attempts to
understand what a specific person has done or says she will
do. We bring to bear on any specific action we encounter
our understanding of what we think persons* interests, reasons,
purposes, wants, intentions, etc. can be.
I also assume that every attempt to understand political
motives must come to grips with at least the following elements
i
1) Because political action is often justified by an
appeal to moral concepts (e.g., interests, justice, equality,
1
freedom), every attempt to understand political action must
reach some understanding of what these concepts mean and how
V, Both perspectives I develop are theories of action as
opposed to behavior \ i.e., both treat persons as rule-
followers. The difference between them rests on their
understanding of how persons learn and follow rules. I have
excluded other possible modes of explanation, in particular
a thorough-going behaviorist explanation.
2persons acquire them. Human action always includes a con-
ceptual component! distinguishing between what a person does
and what happens to her involves us in investigation of the
reasons that lie behind the activity. In a limited sense,
"thinking makes it so," or at least possible. What a person
does in part depends on what she believes is possible for
her to do. Her beliefs are the conceptual tools she
brings to bear on her own understanding of the circumstances
in which she finds herself and in which she must decide and
act. Action, then, is delimited in part by the concepts
which one can deploy in understanding, reasoning about and
deciding among alternatives. I shall argue that the con-
cepts we use, especially our moral concepts, are embedded
in our social relationships, are bound up in the way persons
interact and thereby learn to view each other and themselves.
I shall also argue that different theories of concept acquis-
2
ition pick out different features of the same concepts. The
example I shall use in the final chapter of this dissertation
is the Feminist concept of •liberation 1
. I shall want to
3
show that 'liberation' is an essentially disputed concept,
and that this dispute revolves around different explanations
2~, There is another side to human activity which analysts
like Freud have pointed to - the unconscious side. Indeed,
our conscious reasons may be rationalizations of our uncon-
scious ones. I want to be clear that the notion of action
does not exclude unconscious motives, that the focus on justi-
fication in this dissertation does not preclude rationalization.
3. William E. Connolly, "Essentially Contested Concepts in
Politics," Amherst, Massachusetts, 1973 (Mimeographed.)
3of human development, different images of human flourishing
which flow out of the two perspectives on action I shall
develop. We need to see how different conceptions of
•liberation* are rooted in different understandings of what
can be a political motive f in different understandings of
persons and their possible interests, and in different images
of social life.
Human action implies consciousness, a knowing agent.
It is tied to our understanding of persons and their reasons,
wants, interests, purposes. If persons are social and historic-
al creatures, if their reasons, wants, interests are rooted
in their social life, then actions embody a social and his-
torical dimension. Both the idea of the person and of the
activities in which persons engage change with time and place.
Human action takes place within history and at the same time
human beings make history through their actions. Our reasons,
wants and purposes are both rooted in social life and guide
our efforts to change that life.
Wl I am indebted to several writers for helping me to clarify
this aspect of action. In particular, I have found the
following most useful i Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action
(New York, Viking Press, 1959) I Alasdair Maclntyre, "A Mistake
about Causality in Social Science," in Peter Laslett and W.G.
Runciman, ed., Philosophy, Politics and Society , second series,
(New Yorkt Barnes and Noble, 1962). and Against the Self-
Images of an Age (new Yorki Schocken, 1971); R.S. Peters,
The Concept of Motivation ( London t Routledge and Kegan Paul,
I958) ; Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Science of
Man," Review of Metaphysics 25 (September, 197D»3-51» and
"Neutrality in Political Science," in Laslett and Runciman, ed.,
Philo sophy. Politics and Society , third series; Peter Winch,
The Idea of a Social Science (New Yorkt Humanities Press, 195o)i
G.H. Mead, Mind. Self and Society (Chicago 1 University Press,
1962).
kIf there is some relationship between social life and
individual consciousness, we need to understand how it is that
persons in the same society come to have different ideas,
including moral ideas. How do persons change their minds,
develop new interests, and new reasons for action? How is
critical thought possible?
2) Because moral concepts have reference to the idea
of injury, political action always draws upon an explanatory
theory which fleshes out this idea and establishes whether
and how the injury can be remedied. Understanding the ex-
planatory theory adopted by political agents is essential to
understanding their actions,
3) Political action also includes an affective element.
Although action involves reasons, we need to have other kinds
of commitments in order to carry through on our reasons for
action. (I want to be careful to point out that having both
reasons and affective commitment does not entail action.)
To understand political action, then, requires that we
understand the relationship between reason and passion.
What I shall do in this dissertation is to illustrate
how two contemporary perspectives on political action treat
these issues. These two perspectives are what I am calling
the True Believer and Moral Agent images of political action.
Each of these perspectives assumes that there is some re-
latinnship between social life and political consciousness.
5Each is concerned to show how persons change their minds,
develop new interests and new reasons for action. And
each establishes the kinds of interests which can form
the basis for rational political action.
These alternative perspectives are neither mutually
exclusive nor are they exhaustive of the possible explan-
ations of political action. They are meant to be suggestive
of the thesis that political action can be and is conceived
of in quite different ways and that there are serious
implications in these differences.
The True Believer perspective is derived from Eric
Hoffer's work but it is also found in the work of such
widely respected social scientists as William Kornhauser
and Gerhard Lenski. It rests on what I call the induction
approach to socialization, an approach which posits a pre-
existing social order into which persons must be inducted
in order to become human. This socialization occurs in
two stages - primary and secondary - each of which makes its
special contribution to political motivation. Secondary
socialization which occurs in multiple and open groups is
especially important in the development of those egoistic
interests and liberal moral-political reasons and rules which
form the basis of autonomous, rational political action as
conceived from this perspective. These interests, reasons
and rules delimit what constitutes an injury and establish
legitimate channels for redress of grievance. When these
6multiple and open groups are absent, persons lack the
clearly articulated interests and the liberal values
which undergird rational politics. When society breaks
down, persons lack standards i these are potential True
Believers, non-autonomous persons who may seek meaning in
political movements which encourage blind obedience rather
than critical choice, authority rather than freedom,
movements which satisfy irrational rather than rational 'needs 1
.
The True Believer perspective assumes either that
action flows directly from the passions - under anomic
conditions - or that egoistic reasons produce action guided
by the rules of liberal politics - under ordered, pluralist
conditions. The Moral Agent perspective posits a different
range of social relations and of human motives.
Theorists in the Moral Agent mode have a clear interest
in explicating the ways in which consciousness develops
.
They do not assume that persons either join a radical
political movement because of irrational 'needs 1 or else
engage in rational political actions utilizing norms already
embedded in social practice as their justification. They
assume that persons can develop ideal standards which establish
new and rational 'needs 1 or 'interests* and which they may
utilize to evaluate existing norms.
This perspective is heavily indebted to the work of Jean
Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, especially to their theories
of concept acquistion. Piaget 's and Kohlberg 's theories of
7of moral development help us to understand how persons can
be socialized not just to know the content of social rules,
but to understand the purpose of these rules and therefore to
be able to criticize those rules which help to constitute
their social life. Persons can learn that rules are not
immutable facts, that they can be altered in light of
developing needs, wants and purposes, in light of developing
interests and moral principles. As we shall see in Chapter
II, this perspective allows us to see rational political
interests which move beyond the egoism of the True Believer
model tov/ard what I shall call a 'social interest'. It
provides ideal standards for evaluating existing social
practises, standards which flow from the principle of
respect for persons. New reasons for action need not be
the product of a conversion induced by emotion, but may be
the product of new cognitive abilities - abilities to take
new factors into account in our reasoning - coupled with
new emotional or affective commitments. Indeed, the per-
spective assumes that our cognitions, including our cogni-
tions of what constitutes an injury to persons, can develop
and that this development is internally linked to our
emotional development. For example, perceiving injuries
where once we saw none gives rise to feelings of resentment
arid indignation where once we felt none. Moreover, our
perception of an injury often entails that we have certain
feelings about persons.
8I should like to be clear that when I refer to the
True Believer or Moral Agent perspectives, I am also
referring to contrast models either implicitly or explicitly
built into each. Built into the fundamental assumptions
of any theoretical model is an alternative conception of
how things could be and ought to be. It is this alternative
which sets off, or highlights the crucial features of the
model being developed. This is what is called a contrast
model. It is always used either implicitly or explicitly
in political discourse i there is no way to avoid its
use since every model and every argument contains within it
a conception of its opposite.
The selection of a contrast model is possibly one of
the most important choices one can make in political analysis
and discourse, not only because the contrast model acts as
a standard for evaluating the model under consideration, but
also because it sets the limits within which phenomena can
vary. Thus, for example, in his work on social stratification
and class conflict, Ralf Dahrendorf argues the inevitability
of class conflict because he cannot conceive of alternative
social structures in which there would be no such conflict.
He has no model of a classless society, a society in which
there is no subordination-domination structure. Arguments
favoring the establishment of such societies are delegitimized
by the very terms in which his theory is couched. In a
similar manner, models of political action can delegitimize
9certain types of motives or miscategorize them in terms
the model establishes.
In political analysis or argument, then, we need to
be particularly clear about both the fundamental assumptions
undergirding the argument and the range of possible alter-
natives which the model opens up. As we shall see in the
next two chapters, the choice of a contrast model of rational
action sets off and highlights the undesirable features of
alternative modes of action. If, for instance, we accept the
True Believer model and its built-in contrast, we delimit
the range of rational political action in such a way as to
delegitimize possible rational motives and actions picked
out and highlighted by the Moral Agent model.
There ere several important implications of the thesis
that political action can be understood in different ways.
First, the perspective one adopts undergirds a specific
interpretation of social movements, both in terms of the
social and psychological roots of these movements, and the
demands made by movement adherents. It delimits a range of
possible rational motives for political action and excludes
other motives as either irrational or as not really ad-
dressing the problem. The perspective we adopt also
establishes an image of the ways in which ideas are held and
acted upon which has serious implications for our under-
standing of the openness and developmental possibilities
of a political movement. In Chapter IV I shall attempt to
10
illustrate how these phenomena operate with respect to our
understanding of the contemporary Women's Movement.
But it is not only theorists who bring to bear alter-
native conceptions of political action in their analysis
of political movements i activists also bring different con-
ceptions to bear in action itself. They fall subject to many
of the same conceptual distortions and limitations as their
counterparts in the social sciences, but theirs are obviously
more important in terms of the development of movement
strategies and tactics. Therefore, it is necessary that we
look not only at different explanations of the Women's
Movement, explanations which flow out of the theories of action
developed in Chapters II and III, but also to look at the
ways in which political agents deploy these same intellectual
tools in shaping, understanding and justifying their actions.
£hey will justify these actions in terms of conceptual dis-
tinctions which flow from different perspectives and this has
serious political implications. It can lead to serious in-
ternal conflict which may produce schisms and defeat the
Movement, but more importantly it can produce false moves, move
persons in harmful or retrograde directions. The point is
that persons can mistake their interests. Women can want
things which in the long run may fail to satisfy their human
needs. These wants can flow from several sources - from the
dehumanization produced by oppressive conditions, from an
undeveloped moral perspective, or from an inadequate explanatory
11
theory. In Chapter IV I shall attempt to show how different
conceptions of female 'liberation' are more or less adequate
in terms of their recognition of the relationship between
•needs' and oppression, the moral principle of respect for
persons and explanatory theory. These conceptions are of
•liberation' as 'equality of opportunity'
, 'authenticity,
and 'dis-alienation'. Understanding the distinctions between
these concepts of 'liberation' is, I think, crucial to under-
standing the Women's Movement in its historical reality.
Understanding the developmental relationship between these
concepts and between these concepts and our theories of the
rise of Feminism is vital to our ability to grasp the ways in
which the Women's Movement has changed.
What I will do in the final chapter is to demonstrate
how different women in the contemporary Women's Movement
utilize different justifications for action because they are
at different points in their cognitive development. This should
not be taken to mean that they may not engage in the "same"
actions for different reasons - e.g., both radicals and
liberals may support the Equal Rights Amendment but for
different reasons, one as a progressive reform (although this
has been debated), the other as a final goal (although liberals
have changed and moved on to new demands). Nor should it be
taken to mean that any of the individuals selected as examples
6f these different levels of cognitive development have not or
cannot move on to new positions. Feminism rises and falls with
12
historical and social changes which affect the emotive-
cognitive repertoire through which persons experience their
lives. Indeed, Feminism itself is one of the ways in which
women's lives are affected. We should expect changes in the
Movement ideology and we should not take what is presented
in the final chapter of this dissertation as a static image
of contemporary American Feminism.
This dissertation is not meant to be an impartial laying
out of alternative explanatory frameworks. I am committed
to the notion that some frameworks are more adequate than
others, that some upon us up to perceiving alternatives to
which others are profoundly closed. I shall argue that many
contemporary social scientists and many political actors accept
explanatory frameworks unselfconsciously, thus limiting their
perceptions of alternative modes of thought and action. In
comparing the Moral Agent and True Believer modes, I shall
argue that the former is more adequate in just that sense
that it allows us to conceive of more possibilities, that it
allows us to understand developing meanings, alternative
images of human possibility.
CHAPTER II
THE TRUE BELIEVER
Perhaps the best way to lay out the True Believer model
of political action is to let the model-builder himself,
Eric Hoffer, identify the characteristic features of ex-
1
tremist politics. I will quote at length from the profound
short book, The True Believer
, whose purpose is to show
that all extremist movements, whatever their ostensible
differences in ideology, time and place, "...draw their
early adherents from the same types of humanity; they all
2
appeal to the same types of mind." The following passages
pick out those characteristics of personality and of mind which
distinguish these types of humanity from rational persons and
describe the conditions under which True Believers are likely
to emerge.
Basic Motivations - Irresponsibility and Frustration
•Not to reason why' is considered by all mass move-
ments the mark of a strong and generous spirit....
People whose lives are barren and insecure seem
to show a greater willingness to obey than people
who are self-sufficient and self-confident. To
the frustrated, freedom from responsibility is
more attractive than freedom from restraint.
3
There is in us a tendency to locate the shaping of
our existence outside ourselves. Success and
T^i It may be that Hoffer limits his description of extremism
to mass conditions; however, I think it is more fruitful to
treat his model as a description of "extremist" as opposed
to "normal" politics. Then we can ask a serious question -
can extremism occur in non-mass societies?
2. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York i Mentor Books,
1958), preface.
3. Ibid., pp. 108-9. Note the built-in contrast model.
14
failure are unavoidably related in our minds with
the state of things around us. Hence it is that
people with a sense of fulfillment think it is agood world and would like to conserve it as it is,
whHe the frustrated favor radical change .
^
The exaltation of the true believer does not flow
from reserves of strength and deliverencei he hasbeen delivered from the meaningless burdens of an
autonomous existence.
5
Comparison with Rational Politics
There is a fundamental difference between the appeal
of a mass movement and the appeal of a practical
organization. The practical organization offers
opportunities for self-advancement, and its appeal is
mainly to self-interest. On the other hand, a mass
movement, particularly in its active, revivalist phase,
appeals not to those intent on bolstering and advancing
a cherished self, but to those who crave to be rid of
an unwanted self. A mass movement attracts and holds
a following not because it can satisfy the desire for
self-advancement, but because it can satisfy the
passion for self-renunciation.
»
Anomie and the True Believer
The milieu most favorable for the rise and propagation
of mass movements is one in which a once compact cor-
porate structure is, for one reason or another, in a
state of disintegration.?
Ideas and Political Action - Security and Insularity
...the effectiveness of a doctrine should not be judged
by its profundity, sublimity or the validity of the
truths it embodies, but by how thoroughly it insulates
the individual from his self and the world as it is....
8
IT. Ibid
., p. 16.
5. Ibid ., p. 117.
6. Ibid ., p. 21.
7. Ibid ., p. 45.
8. Ibid ., p. 76.
15
Moral Ideas and Extremism
i
The fanatic cannot be weaned away from his cause
by an appeal to his reason or moral sense. He
fears compromise and cannot be persuaded to
qualify the certitude and righteousness of his
holy cause. But he finds no difficulty in
swinging suddenly and widely from one holy cause
to another. He cannot be convinced but only converted.
His passionate attachment is more vital than the
quality of the cause to which he is attached.
9
I. Assumptions undergirding the model
.
.
The True Believer model is a model of human actioni it
is an attempt to explain how persons acquire motives for
what they do. As such, the model rests on the assumption
that there is a relationship between social structure and
structure of mind, that particular social conditions are linked
with particular psychological states or motives - mass move-
ments with fanatical, irrational memberships arise under
social conditions of anomie; practical organizations based
on rational motives develop under conditions of integration
and order. Implicit in the model is a theory of development
or socialization, a theory which undergirds the theorist's
classification of action as mature and rational or immature
and irrational. I think it is important to start with this
theory of socialization and then move to investigate its
implications for our understanding the role of the passions,
moral judgments and explanatory theory in political action.
9^ Ibid. , p. 81.
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I. a. The social conditions under which True
Believers and rational political agents appear
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to go
into the theories of alienation and anomie at any length, the
True Believer model clearly rests on a theoretical base in-
herited from Durkheim rather than Marx. This means that the
model relies on a picture of an integrated society - either
organic or mechanical - where culture determines action in
an orderly, predictable manner. There is little problem of
mass unconventionality in such a society; rather there are
cases of individual deviance. When such a society breaks down,
however, persons are left in a state of psychological turmoil,
and it is this turmoil which underlies the actions of the
True Believer. More specifically, when a mechanically
integrated society with a clear authority structure dis-
integrates, one had better hope than an organically integrated
society with a clear division of labor within which persons
and groups pursue self-interested goals constrained by social
structures which set limits to their actions appears. Other-
wise one will find the chaos of anomie and the anarchy of
unlimited desire.
10~i Robert Tinker argues that Durkheim' s image of a moral
order is one based on altruism and affective ties and is
distinctly different from bourgeois egoistic morality. His
notion of a moral order - one based on "equivalence and
reciprocity in exchange relations" - is atvariance with
classical liberalism. But his organic conservatism is
compatible with the view of authoritarian morality I am
drawing here. For Durkheim, moral education "...must incul-
cate a spirit of self-discipline and obedience to the social
17
In both The_T>ue Believer and a later work The Ordeal
of Change
,
Hoffer draws vs a picture of anomic chaos and
pluralist order. Anomie, which results from massification,
produces the True Believer, "...an immature individual...
torn from the warmth and security of a corporate existence
and left orphaned and empty in a cold world." In a sense,
however, this orphanage is valuable since it forces the un-
developed person out of the social womb and into a chaotic
existence where s/he needs to discover an autonomous self.
"The crumbling of a corporate body, with the abandonment of
the individual to his own devices, is always a critical
12
phase of social development." However,
order, so that, paradoxically, the true basis of a genuine
personal autonomy is created." For Durkheim, as well as
for liberals, morality is necessary since persons have
insatiable needs which must be constrained. But for Durkheim
morality is the natural order? amorality or anomie is a
pathological condition under which persons act like some
liberals* image of the egoist. For Durkheim, then, some
liberals are mislead in believing that we need to provide
persons with reasons for being moral? man is by nature a
moral being insofar as he is a social being. Amorality is
what requires explanation. Robert pinker/ Social Theory and
SocialJ^olicy (l^ew York: Crane-Russak, 197171
11. By pluralist order, I do not mean the sort of nurturant
community described by Robert Paul Wolff in "Beyond Tolerance"
(Robert Pnul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert T/iarcuse,
A Critique of Pure Tolerance /Boston t Beacon, 19687, pp. 3-52) but
that pluralism which serves as the touch-stone of mainstream
American political science - the pluralist order in which one
finds a clear division of labor, a separation between elites
and masses, lower rates of participation in valued social
projects among the masses with value placed on higher elite
participation, broad disparities in income and power, etc.
12. Eric Hoffer, The Ordeal of Change (New Yorki Harper
and Row, 1963)» p. 9.
18
The newly emerging individual can attain some degreeor stability and eventually become inured to theburdens and strains of an autonomous existence only
wnen he is offered abundant opportunities for self-
in
S
wMJh
0n
9^-
8elf'r
+
all2ation
:
He needs environment
JL^i achievement, acquisition, sheer action or thedevelopment of his capacities and talents seems withineasy reach. It is only thus that he can acquire the
self-confidence and self-esteem that make an individual
existence bearable or even exhilerating i 13
Pure chaos is inimicable to human development. In order to
arrive at the reasoned constraint which marks the mature
political actor, persons need to experience the 'liberating 5
effects of plural structures with their varying roles and
constraints. While this pluralism, or division of labor,
produces conflicting interests and 'class' conflict, it also
produces a rational conception of one's own interests and
their limits, Moreover
* knowledge that there are many stan-
dards, many interests, many rights and duties, produces
tolerance, reasonableness, and an ability to see one's
opponents' position in a bargaining situation. Finally,
achievement of limited ends produces gratification and a
willingness to abide by the rules of the game one plays.
Hoffer's image of the social conditions under which
human development takes place is compatible with the theory
presented in a much more scholarly sociological piece,
William Kornhauser's The Politics of Mass Society
.
There,
Kornhauser identifies four types ef social organization -
totalitarian, communal, mass and pluralist - and he links
Tj; Ibid .
19
each type with four concommitant forms of culture end
four motivational schemes.
In communal society culture is fixed but differentiated
by status
i i.e., there are fixed standards of action which
differ for each segment of society. Traditions support a
motivational scheme based on clearly defined rights and
duties
i
in turn, the diverse cultural structure is supported
by the motives obligation and shame. Persons do not move
from one status to another and do not learn motives which
are linked to statuses into which they are not borni however,
they do learn that each status depends on all the others and
they share a sense of obligation to each other, feel shame when
obligations are not met. These affective commitments derive
from something greater than the individual herAimself and
that is her/his sense of membership in a larger collectivity
from which flow authoritative commands. This is a tradition-
directed, other-directed, group-centered society, perfectly
compatible with Hoffer's image of the corporate, mechanically
integrated society.
Another form of fixed culture in which persons are also
other-directed and group-centered is totalitarian culture.
But totalitarian culture is uniform and so too is motivation
with the exception of the motives of those few in positions of
ultimate authority. Here we find not diversity and legitimacy,
but monism and coercion. Totalitarian man is submissive
i
s>fhe is motivated by fear. S/he is separated from any
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larger purposes and therefore separated from her/himself.
This mode seems most compatible with Hoffer's image
of immature motivation, and indeed the True Believer is
the result of a transition from communal to totalitarian society.
However, Kornhauser 'a third variant - mass society and mass
person
- is more a capturing of this transition and of
immature motivation. In mass society, unlike communal or
totalitarian society, culture is fluid i Hike totalitarian
society, however, it is uniform and like totalitarian man,
mass man is self-estranged, anomic, suggestible and manipulable.
Lacking uniform standards, having no direction, mass man
searches for a collective identity which s/he may find in
totalitarian movements. HerAis motives lie in "...over-
coming the diffuse anxiety which accompanies the lack of self-
14
confidence." S/he is an impotent leveller, a populist, the
victim of mass culture, and s/he does not know her/his own
interests.
The alternative to these rather undesirable variants of
social life and political motivation is pluralist society
and the clearly articulated interests which flow from it.
By pluralism, Kornhauser means a structurally diffuse society
with a diverse, fluid culture. There is much social differ-
entiation, both vertical and horizontal; culture is fluid
buti non-anomic since there are standards, diverse though
they may be. There are many standards to which persons can
Tthi William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society
(New York | Free Press, 1959). p. 108.
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be exposed as they move vertically and horizontally across
social divisions in a mobile society.
In a pluralist society.
. .the inner cohesion oflocal groups and cultures provides a firmerbasis for self-relatedness, and the diversity ofgroups and cultures permits the individual to forma distinctive self-image. Social and cultural plur-alism invites the development of differentiated
autonomous individuals, for variety in institutions
and values encourages individuals to comparedifferent models of conduct and to integrate
elements from several models into a distinctiveidentify. -o
Persons have opportunities to play many roles and to develop
an understanding of the various motives accompanying these
roles. Indeed, the pluralism Kornhauser describes is the
condition under which autonomous individuality develops.
The motivational basis of this autonomy is self-reliance
and guilt - self-reliance as the outgrowth of exposure to
a variety of standards; guilt as the product of the inner-
directed internalized commands of conflicting authorities
(as contrasted to the outer-directed guilt of communal man).
This image of the mature individual in a pluralist,
order is compatible with what I call the inductionist theorv
16
of socialization. This theory is particularly useful for
our understanding the ways in which persons acquire the
interests and character traits which undergird the self-
reliant, autonomous, liberal political agent.
15. Ibid. , pp. 109-110.
16, A paradigm case of this approach to socialization is
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction
of Reality (New Yorkt Doubleday, 1966).
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The inductionist theory of socialization begins with
primary socialization which usually takes place in the home.
There the child develops certain character traits like ego-
strength and self-control which make the constrained pursuit
of self-interest possible, and also learns the realism which
undergirds constrained egoism as parents constrain herAim
from the pursuit of egocentric wants and introduce her/him
into an understanding of what s/he can legitimately demand.
Secondary socialization occurs in a less highly charged
emotional context, but it builds on both the basic personality
developed in the home and the sense fif guilt the child has
acquired when s/he fails to conform to parental expectations.
Persons learn role-specific character traits - punctuality,
efficiency, sportsmanship and the like - traits which build
on the self-control learned earlier. They are also given
specific content to the reality principle by their participation
in groups which give rise to specific self-interests. It is
these interests that mature individuals bring to politics and
which form the basis of rational political demands. Persons
also develop a sense of self-esteem rooted in the social value
placed on groups to which they belong.
Secondary socialization, then, results in persons who
are firmly committed to the pursuit of private interests and
to the defense of group interests since their own interests
are so clearly implicated in the well-being of the groups to
which they belong. Yet such persons do not cause society
to fly apart. Why? Because pluralist societies are held
23
together by certain structural safeguards and by rule3
of the game which all members learn as part of their social-
ization.
These structural safeguards, as Kornhauser describes
them, include a division of labor between elites and non-
elites which permits elites to uphold standards of decency,
civility, and tolerance in the face of non-elite's lesser
development as autonomous, rational agents (Hoffer would un-
doubtedly take offense at this, yet he calls for a strict
separation between working class and management in order to
maintain a healthy tension). Elites are constrained by other
structural safeguards - they are accessible (non-elites get
to choose who their elites are to be), and they are plural
(elites compete with each other for 'votes' and thereby
constrain each other). Non-elites can get to be elites if
they only try harder - there is equality of opportunity.
This all assumes that a division of labor is necessary for
the achievement of everyone's interests! i.e., that a division
into elites and non-elites works to the benefit of all since
elites are those best qualified - through the operation of
equal opportunities - to perform valued social functions.
Another structural safeguard is the existence of
numerous voluntary associations through which persons are
linked to the larger society and through which they pursue
and satisfy their self-interests. These associations serve
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to protect non-elites from elites and give non-elites a sense
of freely contracting into the social order. They are valued
primarily as a means of social control both of elites by
non-elites and as a means ol* dampening down irrational
political demands on the part of non-elites. Participation
in these associations is essential to the working of liberal
democracy since M
. . .non-participation results in lack of
exposure to information and indoctrination concerning demo-
cratic falues, and in the lack of habits of discussion, debate,
negotiation, and compromise - modes of conduct indispensible
17
to democratic politics."
Participation, then, is essential to our learning the
rules of the game which help keep pluralist societies from
degenerating into a war of each against all. These rules
establish the legitimate means for the pursuit of self-
interest and constrain persons from engaging in alternative
means. These are the normative rules of a politics of bargain
and compromise, norms of political conduct and political
justification. For example, persons learn that it is leg-
itimate to lobby a Congressman in pursuit of one*s self-
interest but not to offer him a bribe. They also learn that
they can make appeals to moral ideals like equality of
opportunity to redress a perceived imbalance in the distri-
bution of desirable social positions, but that they cannot
VT* Kornhauser, Politics , p. 73.
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appeal to justifications like being one of God's chosen
people.
I.b, Moral development
Politics, then, is more than the pursuit of self-
interest. It is this pursuit through the use of legitimate
means. Since some of these means are moral, it is important
that we look br fly at the theory of moral development
which undergirds the distinction theorists in this mode
make between immature and mature politics.
The fundamental assumption upon which this theory of
moral development rests is that persons' springs to action
are self-interested (although self-interest is a social
product). These egoistic interests are not naturally con-
strained since persons can seldom take into account the
interests, needs, wants and purposes of others, first
because they have direct knowledge only of their own needs,
wants and purposes, and second, because they naturally put
these above the interests, needs, wants and purposes of
others, except in rare cases of altruism. Theorists in the
True Believer tradition, therefore, assume that for persons
to live together, their basically conflicting egoistic
interests need to be controlled and constrained by the
introduction of a moral code and its accompanying feelings
of guilt.
In different social systems this constraint has different
content, but essentially the ethical system begins as something
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external to the individual! it stands on the social level,
both apart from and in conflict with the individual motiva-18
tional system. Ethical considerations act as constraints
on persons' ••natural" inclinations.
But ethical constraints do not remain entirely external.
Socialization internalizes these controls; moral growth,
on this view, consists of the building up of a repertoire
of internalized controls through identification with parents
and other authority figures. The development of a Superego
presents great conflicts, however, because the Superego
conflicts with pre-existing needs, wants and purposes. Since
morality is learned in a situation of intense conflict -
conflict between the demands of self and the demands of
authority figures and therefore of the Superego - it becomes
heavily laden with emotion, and particularly with guilt which
is the controlling passion in moral behavior. The psycholo-
gical basis of moral growth is fear, or anxiety over the loss
of parental approval and love. This results in guilt when-
ever the individual disobeys the parent-authority.
This primary socialization produces an authoritarian
morality. The moral attitudes of others, particularly those
with whom the person has strong and conflicting emotional
attachments, are introjected. In order to win praise, the
child (and under anomic conditions, the fanatic) learns to
anticipate the moral attitudes of others, those ego-ideals with
TE~9 See Thomas Nagel. The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford;
Clarendon Press, 1970; for a discussion of this conflict.
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whom s/he has emotional attachments.
9
Failure to live up
to these ego-ideals results in guilt and self-punishment -
Kornhauser's communal 'shame' - emotions which provide the
motivational basis for a morality of authority and conformity.
This conventional morality is the introjected moral code of
one's society. It is a morality of content, of duty and
obedience. It rests on the need immature individuals have for
authority, an authority provided by the social order.
Since this form of morality is so profoundly authority-
oriented, when society breaks down - as in the case of
" massification
- the individual is left with a repertoire of
controls which are inappropriate to the new situation. This
individual has no clearly defined interests which flow out of
her/his specific group memberships, but only vague wants
j
and s/he has no legitimate means even for the pursuit of these
wants. H/she is a potential True Believer. When social
authority breaks down, such an individual may turn to new
authorities for moral constraint. Conformity simply changes
its content i the form remains the same.
Since there are no objective standards of morality,
individuals have no rational basis for choosing between al-
ternative moral codes. 'Choice* will be entirely emotional -
that code which fills 'needs' - and through a conversion
process, the new code takes on the same status of authoritative
reality as the old. What is commanded by the new authority
is what ought to be.
±\T. J.C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society (London i Duckworth,
19^5). P. 43.
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We have, however, looked only at the effect of primary
socialization on moral development. In a pluralist society
persons will have the opportunity to move beyond this author-
itarian morality to a mature, inner-directed, autonomous
morality. Secondary socialization means not only exposure
to specific roles, but exposure also to non-familial social
norms. In the family the rules for making decisions among
conflicting wants are often too rooted in specific personalities
and in their emotional relationships to each other to serve as
guides in general social relationships. What persons need
•in order to engage in a rational politics constrained by
moral considerations are impersonal, non-emotional rules for
choosing among interests. These are the rules of the game
of a politics of bargain and compromise among conflicting
self-interested individuals and groups, and include moral-
political justifications for action like the principle of
equality of opportunity.
If authoritarian, immature morality is learned by
immature individuals in relatively authoritarian social
relations, mature, autonomous morality is learned by devel-
oping individuals in social situations where there are con-
flicting authorities and where persons have opportunities to
experience the constraints of various authorities. As the
individual is exposed to conflicting standards, s/he develops
independent, mature judgment i increasing sociality and
individualization result in autonomous morality; authoritarian
morality gives way to a morality of obligation based on the
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recognition of the rights and duties of plural statuses and
roles. What is owed me and what I owe others is defined by
our location in the social order. Since it is assumed that
society is open and pluralist, and experienced as fair by
its members, engaging in the life of that society is exper-
ienced as a benefit. When we do not meet our social obli-
gations we feel guilt because we have failed to abide by
standards and social arrangements which benefit us. Guilt,
then, underpins the mature morality of autonomous individuals.
.(We have also learned specific character traits like honesty,
fair-play, integrity, etc., which make it possible for us to
live up to our obligations and to feel guilty when we do not.)
One further point needs to be made about morality in this
model and that is that there is a rather sharp dichotomy
drawn between egoism and altruism and therefore between
justice and benevolence. Altruism is possible in personal
relations where there is a great deal of emotional investment
on the part of the participants, e.g., in relations between
mother and child. But altruism is far less likely in social
relations in general, and indeed is not necessary for a prac-
tical moral code. Practical, everyday morality does not
require that we love our sisters jit only requires that we
constrain our own actions by some consideration for their
rights and what we owe them. Just action is tempered by our
knowledge that our interests often conflict and that it is
in our interest to be accomodating; it cannot be based on
30
the building of relationships in which we may all be said
to have a mutual interest. Justice and benevolence are dich-
otomous
-
the former requires balancing of conflicting inter-
20
estsj the latter requires that we love our fellows.
II. Alternative images of political acti on
We are now ready to develop some of the points that have
begun to emerge about the role of ideas and passion in political
action. I shall lay out the True Believer model and its con-
trasting image of rational politics in terms of the role of
passion, explanatory theory and moral ideas.
II. a. True Believer motivationi the primacy of passion
Starting out from the fact that the frustrated predom-inate among the early adherents of all mass movements
and that they usually join of their own accord, it is
assumed
i 1) that frustration of itself, without any
proselytizing prompting from the outside, can generate
most of the particular characteristics of the true
believer; 2) that an effective technique of conversion
consists basically in the inculcation and fixation of
proclivities and response indigenous to the frustrated
mind. ^i
Hoffer's True Believer rests on the notion that under
certain social conditions, particular passions arise which
20. Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege (New Yorki McGraw-
Hill, 1966). Note the following passage t "Pragmatic morality
is the basis of all popular moral codes, and is based on the
recognition that men need one another, and therefore condemns
many kinds of harmful actions, especially those which threaten
to undermine the social order. Ideal morality, by contrast,
has never been accepted as the basis of any popular moral code,
since it not only condemns harmful actions but requires that
men love others and they love themselves and without regard
to possible rewards." p. 30.
21. Hoffer, The True Believer
,
preface.
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act as the springs to action regardless of the reasons or
ideas which are used to rationalize action. This passion
la * frustration^ when individuals cannot develop selves
with which they can live, when they cannot establish clear
interests and discover the means for pursuing them, they are
frustrated. Under anomic conditions individuals may re-
spond by joining social movements which rid them of an
unwanted, ill-defined self, or a self which cannot satisfy
its cravings legitimately. The impact of affect on political
behavior is overwhelming. We find here a language of the
emotions - anxiety, frustration, self
-hatred - and we are
left with a sense that social movements serve to sharpen
individual feelings of discontent, are expressions of
individual anxieties and frustrations which happen ts be
felt by a great number of persons - albeit persons suffering
the effects of the same social condition. The frustrated,
the anxious, grab onto a movement to ease their emotional
problems. The motivating drive is tension reduction, physical
•need* reduction, homeostasis, or seme other •cause' actually
quite unrelated to reasoning, a cause which flows from
within the individual, although conditioned by the social
22
milieu. Indeed, we have moved away from a description of
human action and toward a description of human behavior
j
22. See R.S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation ( London
i
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) for a discussion of motives
as causes.
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extremist action begins to look rather more like something
that happens to a person than something he or she does.
There are several important implications of this view
of political action. Since it rests on implicit assumptions
about the type ©f social order under which persons can devel-
op as autonomous individuals with selves they can accept, it
establishes a justification for particular social arrangements
and actions designed to promote them. The underlying dissat-
isfaction which leads to extremist action, however, is with
the self and not with society. To say this is to de-legitimize
claims of the True Believer against existing social arrangements
Motives spring from the depths of mental and emotional
ill-being. This sense of sickness and irrationality comes
out in Hoffer's lexicography of motivation j for example in
his use of the term •anxiety*. 'Anxiety* is the sort of
attitudinal concept which is most closely akin to a pure
emotion term} it has, in normal usage, no close or necessary
connection to reasoning. Anxieties, primarily about one-
self, give rise to 'needs* for change independent of any
theory of or plan for social change, and any evaluation
of social structures as they are presently constituted.
Hoffer moves from the concept * anxiety* to the concept
•frustration* without indicating any possible differences
between the two notions, particularly the role of cognition
and beliefs in the latter. Although both 'anxiety* and
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•frustration 1 are seen as connected to social conditions,
they remain at the level of irrational passioni as springs
to action they flow from individual emotions rather than
from any rational source which could be rooted in an
understanding of those social conditions.
This focus on anxiety and frustration has repercussions
in our understanding of the role of ideas in extremist
action, both explanatory and moral ideas. Building on the
assumption that passion is the spring to extremist action,
the True Believer theorist constructs an image of the way
1 ideas are held and acted upon which excludes the possibility
that rational discourse can take place within a political
movement and between movement adherents and their opponents.
It also excludes the possibility that movement members might
not all have the same motives for their actions. Since
extremist ideas are parasitic on the emotions of •sick 1
individuals, rational discourse is seriously impeded. Ideas
serve emotional needs regardless of their content, and
serve the same needs for all movement adherents. Again the
key term is 'anxiety* i an idea's acceptability flows not
out of its meaningfulness but out of its ability to satisfy
psychological needs. Ideas are used to support those self-
conceptions which reduce tension. Content and meaning are
irrelevant so long as the idea system is closed, complete
23
and security producing.
23. The way in which ideas are held and acted upon is very
important to the development of a political movement. If
34
When people are ripe for a mass movement, thev are
^usually ripe foran effective movement, and notsolely for one with a particular doctrine or program.^
Movements are interchangeable, ideology serves to obfuscate
practical reasoning and isolate the individual from truth
about her/himself and the environment. Indeed, this is
exactly why the True Believer finds an ideology attractive,
S,'J
th
5
«ff
?ctiv«ness of a doctrine should not bejudged by its profundity, sublimity or the validityof the truths it embodies, but by how thoroughly itinsulates the individual from his self and the worldas ix is.
The Movement is a substitute for an unwanted self; the ego
becomes attached to it in a total, passionate, extravagant
26
and uncompromising manner. Such attachments do not bode
well for rational discourse and open-minded evaluation of
counter-evidence and alternative considerations.
The True Believer becomes attached to new ideas through
a conversion process. Persons who hate themselves search
for a new identity. The come to the movement with a cognitive-
emotive structure - that of mass man - which does not facil-
27
itate rational choice. Rather it facilitiates imitation
ideas are held rigidly they become dogma. If ideas are heldin an open and self-conscious manner, the movement can change,
members can be rationally persuaded to change.
24. Hoffer, The True Believer
, p. 25.
25. Ibid ., p. 76.
26. Ibid
. , p. 24.
2?. See Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New Yorki
Basic Books, i960) for a discussion of these structures.
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of any identity which appears to bring security. The
closed mind is "open-to any and all influences from without
which appear to meet the need for security, especially
ideas which offer an excuse for failure and a promise
of a better world to come.
Re-socialization to these new ideas occurs in a rigidly
authoritarian structure which parallels the family in its28
emotionality. This structure reinforces the "needs"
of the converts for order and discipline. The ideas
.
themselves are used as manipulative tools whose purpose
is "...to instill in ^movement/ follcwers a facility for
united action and self-sacrifice..." and produce a will-
less particle whose passions can be channelled and directed
29
by effective doctrine.
Doctrine, however, must come from somewhere and this
is the function of the "men of words." The talkers and
thinkers
... prepare the ground for the rise of a mass
movement t 1) by discrediting prevailing
creeds and institutions and detaching from
them the allegiance of the people; 2) by
indirectly creating a hunger for faith in the
hearts of those who cannot live without it, so
that when the new faith is preached it finds
an eager response among the disillusioned
masses? 3) by furnishing the doctrine
and the slogans of the new faith? 4) by
undermining the convictions of the 'better
people, 1 those who can get along without faith -
2~F^ See Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Reality for a discussion of "alternation.
"
29. Hoffer, The True Believer
, p. 79.
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so that when the new fanaticism makes its appear-ance they are without the capacity to resist it. 30
The thinkers create the tools of manipulation, they use
ideas to play upon the emotional needs ©f the weak, the
insecure and the frustrated.
But are these thinkers, then, not the source of some
kind of rationality in mass movements? Indeed not, for
to round the circle of passion, the thinkers themselves
are motivated by frustration.
Whatever the type, there is a deep-seated craving
common to almost all men of words which determinestheir attitude to the prevailing order. It is a
craving for a clearly marked status above the
common run of humanity. 31
When the established order fails to satisfy this craving,
when men of words have no meaningful work through which to
satisfy their drive for status, they turn their frustrations
outward and create ideas designed to undermine the hated,
frustrating order.
However much the protesting man of words sees himself
as the champion of the downtrodden and injured, the
grievance which animates him is, with very few
exceptions, private and personal. 32
These frustrated, 'alienated 1 intellectuals are primed
for fanaticism. They do not seek to educate their followers
but to indoctrinate them. "They do not want freedom of
conscience, but faith - blind, authoritarian faith. They
30. Ibid ., p. 128.
31. Ibid ., p. 121.
32. Ibid ., p. 122.
-eep away the eld order not t. create a society of free md
independent men. but t. establish uniformity, individual
anonymity and a new structure of perfect unity."
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with
themselves at the hel*! Furthermore, the ideas which these
alienated intellectuals develop are non-rational since they
are unconstrained by the considerations of practical politics,
the politics of balance and compromise. Mass action is un-
constrained by the give and take of conflicting ideas which
flow out .f plural structures. And mass man is open to any
and all influences from outside, unprotected by *. sheltering
structures of an integrated society.
If ideas appeal to True Believers because of pre-
existing emotional needs, so too do moral ideas. Concepts
like justice, equality, freedom, etc., fir>« r«.t in
emotional needs of frustrated, self
-hating individuals, they
are used to justify
- or rather to rationalize - the actions
of fanatical intellectuals and their authoritarian followers.
ii:
tf^,Ba5 !? WOr2S needs the sanction of ideals andthe incantation of words in order to act forcefully.
.!i 5
a?' C0Tand » and c°nquer, but he must feel
o SIJ? saJjsfy;nS these hungers he does not cater toa petty sell. He needs justification, and he seeks itin the realization of a grandiose design, and in thesolemn ritual of making the word become flesh. Thushe does battle for the downtrodden and disinherited andfor liberty, equality, justice and duty 3^
33. Ibid. , p. 129.
34-. Hoffer, Xkidjial, pp. 39-40.
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Moral ideas are used roanipulatively as goads to action and
as rationalizations of less worthy motives. They are
parasitic on the passions. Sometimes the language of
political action is altruistic but this too is deceptive.
The extremist is rarely, if ever, concerned about others.
This is a person whose rawest emotional needs are out there
on the surface, whose motives for action are entirely self-
oriented, if not rationally self-interested (as this model
defines rationality). While altruism appears to take such
a large part in the motives of political fanatics, their
self-renunciation is a false altruism. It is not an out-
pouring of love for one^s fellow man, but the rationalization
of one's frustrations with an inadequate self turned out-
ward and made •good' by identification with the humanistic
goals of the movement. These are sick, unwhole persons who
substitute the movement for their incomplete selves. "Their
chief desire is to escape that self - and it is this desire
which manifests itself in a propensity for united action
35
and self sacrifice," in what appear to be humane causes.
Finally, since there are no objective standards of
morality, but instead socially relative moral codes, indi-
viduals cannot be said to have a rational basis for choosing
among alternative moralities. •Choice* is more a matter of
conversion i the new code takes on the same status of reality
as the old since it is learned under similarly emotion-laden
53^ Koiler, The True Peliever , p. 58.
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circumstances. What is commanded by authority is what
ought to be.
But we need to ask whether there is any relationship
between these moral ideas and the explanatory theories
which True Believers appear to accept as a package. It
does seem that there isi once certain emotional predis-
positions exist, for example a passion for equality,
36
certain explanatory theories are precluded. Thus the
Lvalues which. flow out of emotional needs can preclude
.acceptance of contradictory ideas or beliefs. The re-
lationship between facts and values, however, is unidirec-
tional. Evidence cannot be brought to bear on basic value
commitments, commitments rooted in the emotions.
-
II. b. The contrast model t rational political action
Hoffer draws a sharp contrast between the mass move-
ment adherent and the autonomous, rational political agent.
This constrast is developed most clearly in The Ordeal of
Chanffg in which he contrasts the immature individual in anomic
society who lacks opportunities for self-advancement with the
mature, autonomous individual in an integrated society which
provides avenues for personal advancement. This latter
individual is responsible, independent in judgment, a prag-
matist and a realist, complete, self-assured, and self-reliant.
S/he accepts the burden of autonomy, a burden which only
the strong can carry.
W. Ibid ., p. 37.
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bSsefJiJwf existenCe is heavily burdened and
villi
W1™ fears and can be endured only whenbolstered by confidence and self-esteem. 37
Reasonable politics are pursued by free individuals not
easily manipulated by extremist appeals. This free indi-
vidual is rooted in a social structure which gives her/him
-...leeway t^tinker, /to/ follow his hunches and run risks
on his own." He or she is free to test ideas again 'reality.
S/he is a distinct indivdual with a will and judgment of her/
his own. (All this obviously sets off a critique of the
True Believer who renounces self and personal responsibility,
de-individualizes her/himself in a corporate body, imitates
rather than originates, is gullible, propagandizable, etc.)
Hoffer clearly assumes that rational politics is
39politics in the pursuit of self-interest. The key terms
in Hoffer »s model of rational political action are autonomy
and self-interest, terms which I think Gerhard Lenski's
discussion of persons as egoists helps us understand. In
several important ways, Lenski's Power and Privilege is
radically different from Heffer's (and Kornhauser «s) work.
Lenski is indebted to an intellectual tradition flowing
more from Hobbes than from Durkheim, a tradition which
encourages him to abstract the individual out of social life
and to attribute to this individual universal needs, wants
37. Hoffer, The True Beliaver
. p. 25.
38. Hoffer, Ordeal
, p. 22
39. Hoffer extends rational self-interested politics to
•class* politics. In a pluralist society the clear separation
of classes permits each class to pursue its rational self-
interest. But one wonders why this does not degenerate into
41
and purposes. Hoffer and Lenski differ in their view of
man's relation to society and therefore in ^enr conception of
what comprises a moral order and why persons obey this order.
But, despite their indebtedness to different theoretical trad-
itions, they reach similar conclusions about what rational pol-
itical action and mature morality look like.
The philosophical egoism upon which Lenski constructs
his synthesis of radical and conservative theories of social
stratification and change is worth our consideration since it
also undergirds Hoffer's conception of rational politics and
can be taken as the foundation of the True Believer contrast
model. Lenski 's thesis is that the spring to human action is
the person's interest in his/her own happiness - defined as the
accumulation of what is valued. But things that are valued
are in scarce supply. Since "this is the normal feature of
the world of nature ..".persons are in constant competition to
obtain these scarce resources, to fill their insatiable appe-
tites. It "...follows logically that a struggle for rewards
...
. .
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will be present in every human society," an assumption which
is compatible with Hoffer's thesis (adapted from
. Durkheim) that
some divisions of labor do result in conflict over available re-
41
wards or "class conflict." We find in Hoffer a tempering
open class war. Class war does not erupt because each class
recognizes its usefullness to the whole, and is constrained
by appeals to justice and decency.
40. Lenski, Power and Privilege
, p. 32.
41. Hoffer, Ordeal
, pp. 65-67.
•f Lenski «s view, a move away from universalizing this
feature of human action, and a rooting of it in particular
social conditions.
Lenski moves from his assumption that persons are
fundamentally self-interested to a theory of social organ-
ization. Because persons need each other in order to pursue
their self-interests, they organize a social life. This
image of social life is clearly laid out in the following
discussion of games.
Children's games afford far more insights into thenature of social organization than is usually recog-
nized. In particular, they demonstrate the processby which institutions with their elements of cooper-
ation and morality and their concepts of right andjustice can emerge from the actions of an originally
unorganized aggregation of individuals each selfishly
seeking to maximize his own personal satisfactions,
x© achieve this maximization individuals are forced
to work (and play) together, but they find that this
can be rewarding only if the activity takes place
within the framework of a system of rules which,
above all else, protects the cooperative activityitself. This can only be done if certain basic
rights are guaranteed to all of the essential parti-
cipants.
.. .This may seem to entail some sacrifice
on the part of the stronger or abler participants,
but really itdoes not, since the only alternative
is the cessation of the cooperative activity and allits benefits. Thus, for them, as for the other parti-
cipants, adherence to the rules can be accounted for
merely as a form of enlightened self-interest . 2
Again this position is tempered in Hoffer, who would not
agree that persons join or form societies for utilitarian
reasons, or that persons even need reasons for doing what
they are already doing - i.e., participating in an ongoing
%2~» Lenski, Power and Privilege , p. 27.
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social life. Rather, utilitarian persons are the product
of particular modes of social life. Some social groups give
rise to our self-interests, others - especially
"political.,
groups
-
are used by us to pursue these interests. Lenski.
s
view of society is constructed out of an immutable human
nature, and Hoffer would certainly find fault with this.
However, I believe that, given pluralist social conditions,
-
Hoffer would agree that persons are motivated as Lenski
suggests
-
i.e., to satisfy their self-interests while con-
strained by that enlightened egoism which undergirds rational
political action.
One of the egoistic needs which Lenski picks out as
vital to political action is the insatiable need for self-
esteem;
«;irt
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? - Psychological process which causes men to
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*?Sree of resPect also creates ademand for more. The desire for status gives rise
{£w.eenSkK S ima?e 2? human action rests on the notion thatdrives, motives, instincts, interests, etc., flow out of
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ni 7 are internal t0 Persons and cause action.
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n° concePtual distinction between "instincts"
JSf^Jriy?®\Z avoidance of Pain » tension, hunger,thirst
- on theone hand, and "reasons., and "motives" -
e.g., interests, beliefs, etc. - on the other, either interms of how they relate to action - as "cause" or asjustification"
- or in terms of their relationship to
evaluations. The spring to action is conceived of as a pushfrom inside. This assumption establishes a particular
status for motives as causes for action which individualshave and it delimits the range within which motives can
vary
- between irrational, emotional pushes and egoistic
self-interested reasons. In a sense, Lenski's model yeilds an
accurate picture of human motivation; a person must have a
motive in order to be motivated? egoism is true insofa7~as thesprings to action must be one's own. Lenski, however, movesfrom this truism to argue that motives originate in the selfan argument which leads us away from seriously asking whether
to an insatiable appetite.^
And „o«er
, while rooting this des . re ^ parucuiar soc _ ai
conditions, agrees that this need is a vital element
in political motivation.
^The7 autonomous individual constitntoo o uically unbalanced entity. The co^f^! Chr,°n
'
of worth which alone can kJ£ h?£nfldence and sense
are extremely perishablP t lm+°? an even keel
anew each da£.^^S^^^^fgS*^ -challenge for tomorrow. And since itby work that the majority of Individ }f &lnlyworth and re^in +ht* t i dividuals prove their
up oonUnuoufly? Sence IhTll^V "T keep "
an individualist society.^
ceaseless hustling of
But an individualist society is not all that radioall
individualistic. Persons in such societies are motivated
by a need for self-esteem, and it is the social ffrouDS
with which we are identified which provide a great part
of that self-esteem. It is upon this group based esteem
that Lenski constructs a theory of conscious social change
which attempts to link the direction of change - from
egalitarian to stratified and vice versa - with surplus
and scarcity. This is Lenski
-
s theory of status incon-
sistency.
At first it appears that Lenski has constructed a
theory of socialchange which eliminates human consciousness
altogether. But he is not so naive as to do that. Both
social change and social maintenance require the deployment
persons^motions and reasons are somehow related to their
M. Lenski, Power and Privilege , p. 38.
^5. Hoffer, Ordeal
, p. 28.
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of ideas. For example, ideas can be used to manipulate
and control persons, to justify the status quo; or
ideas can be used to make claims on the distributive
system, to promote social change by mitigating the workings
of the distributive "laws.- m fact, Lenski goes so far
as to argue that ideas can be used "...to manipulate
the social situation of others, or their perception of
it, by the exercise of one's resources and rights, there-
by increasing the pressures on others to act in accordance
with one's own wishes."
What Lenski has done is to sneak a notion of false
consciousness into what is basically a technological
theory of social change through the back door. But what
is most interesting is his explanation of how false
consciousness can be converted to "real" consciousness,
how some persons can become aware that existing ideologies
can be utilized to justify demands for social change.
Recognition of one's real interests seems to be
based on the way in which our group memberships provide
us with self-esteem. If rational pluralist politics is
made possible by the mutual constraint of competing
plural social groups comprised of members seeking their
self-interests, and if these groups are open to all, we
46, Lenski, Power and Privilege
, p. 57,
need to understand what happens when persons belong to
groups which support conflicting demands and expectations,
and in particular groups which carry differing rewards.
One possibility is that these persons will be cross-
pressured and become politically immobilized, a position
which Hoffer would probably support. But Hoffer has
ignored the possibility that groups may be differentially
valued by society and therefore satisfy individual needs
for self-esteem differently. If this is the case, then
• persons who are members of differentially esteemed groups
have a clearly defined rational interest in pushing
for rewards in terms of that group which is more highly
valued.
This is Lenski's theory of status inconsistency.
Given a choice, persons who experience inconsistent
statuses will rationally choose to ignore that classificati
which demeans them and to focus on the classification
which raises their prestige, wealth, power, etc.
As we shall see in Chapter IV, the theory of status
inconsistency is considered especially appropriate to
the case of women in modern industrial society. Women
are perceived as making demands not as women but as members
4?. Lenski may still have to come to grips with the cross-
pressure thesis. Under what conditions do status incon-
sistencies promote political action, and under what
conditions do they immobilize?
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of the middle class, i.e., as educated professionals,
or would-be professionals, or as citizens. Since women
have won the vote and since few still opt for professional
life, Lenski feels free to write that "...for the vast
majority of women, the battle for equality has been won."
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Whether Lenski's perception of women's position
in contemporary society is accurate depends on whether
the category
-woman- is perceived as a group which carries
yrlth it social significance, i.e., significance in terms
of the social distribution of rewards and benefits. And
whether women will perceive inconsistencies in their
present statuses depends also on whether this category
carries significance for them. It is obvious that Lenski
does not think the category significant; it is not so
obvious that women agree.
We cannot assume that women wish to have their
position in a sex-caste system ignored, nor can we assume
that women believe that they are recognized only in their
higher statuses. Furthermore, we cannot assume that
all women who participate in the Women's Movement are
motivated by a simple desire for higher status in the
48. Lenski, Power and Privilege
, p. 426.
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within the existing status system. If vertical mobility
were all women sought, one might well wonder why women do not
simply follow Lenski's suggestion and marry men of higher
status, thus continuing to be rewarded by society for
ascribed status.
There is a final point which needs to bo teased out
and that is the point that persons experiencing status
inconsistencies cannot ceuch their demands for change in
any language they choose. To be rational, the demands must
be couched in the language of ideal-democratic ideologies
(as long as agents are located in democracies). The nature
of the demands serves as the criteria of rationality. A
demand is rational if it utilizes existing rules of the game
-
in the case of the United States, the liberal-democratic
moral-political rule of equality of opportunity - to max-
imize egoistic interests.
The theory of status inconsistency is an attempt to
account for rational political activism and the use of
political ideology in terms of persons 1 need for self-esteem.
WT There seems to be an inconsistency in Lenski's recognition
of democratic ideologies as valid and his thesis. that inequalityis inevitable. Democratic ideologies do seem to imply egali-
tarianism. But if we see that Lenski's version of democratic
egalitananism is the ideology of equality of opportunity(implying the equal opportunity to be better than others),
the inconsistency is resolved. Persons make demands for
equality of opportunity, which once met - met by the strict
demand for equality at the beginning of the race for status
with no consideration of the resulting inequalities of
condition - leave no grounds for criticizing any resulting
inequalities.
"Men's reactions to the phenomenon of status inconsistency-
is Lenski-s way of getting at consols, rational demandsfr social change which seem to fly in the face of a dis-
tributive law which predicts increasing inequality with
greater surplus.
in terms of tt^J *««»«ncy to think of himself
treating him in terms of his lowest status or rank.^
And so we have a rational politics of social change, a
politics revolving around whether others will acquiesce to
our demand for equal opportunities to be recognized and to
achieve in those positions which carry higher rewards.
We need only accept Lenski's assumptions about human
motivation and man's insatiable appetite for status to find
his description of the politics of change convincing. Persons
who experience inconsistent statuses are likely to make
demands for change because they have an interest in shifting
the focus of rewards and respect from stratification systems
in which they are not esteemed to ones in which they are.
This is not a demand for equality, but for ignoring some
systems of inequality in favor of others. "Egalitarian"
ideologies appeal to such persons so long as they redress
50. Lenski, Power and Privilege
, p. 86.
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the balance of inequality in their own favor. Others
have an interest in maintaining the status quo and will
oppose such shifts. Thus one might expect to find college
educated Blacks pressing for equal opportunities to become
business executives, and middle class intellectual women
pressing to become Democratic political candidates - with
a certain amount of while male resistence to both.
The theory of status inconsistency is a model of
rational politics which we can contrast to the True Believer
model of irrational politics. It may well be that True
Believers also experience inconsistent statuses - e.g.,
Hoffer's intellectual True Believers do have high educational
status but low prestige in the social order they reject.
Indeed, one of the problems Lenski himself has is that he
cannot utilize his own theory to distinguish between rational
and irrational politics. However, if we focus on the kind
©f demands which define rationality, and combine that with
the notion of status inconsistency, we find that rational
politics must be designed to maximize rewards for the self,
and be couched in the. language of the pluralist, bargaining
political game.
This image of politics has certain implications for the
way in which we press our demands. Because we have all
internalized the constraints of bargaining politics and be-
cause we all recognize certain claims as at least potentially
justifiable, we enter politics with a certain amount of
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willingness to make concessions to our opponents. More-
over, in a structurally diffuse society it is difficult to
hold ideas rigidly. In effect, pluralism guarantees that
ideas are held with that degree of hesitency which makes
rational political discourse possible. It is a plurality
of ideas and the hesitency which flows from this plurality
which stands behind liberal support of the political value
•tolerance,
•
and which serves as the base from which to
criticize True Believer thinking. The liberal points to
the danger of impassioned commitment to one "ideology-
to the exclusion of alternative ideas. Pluralist man,
confronted with several conflicting ideas (seldom are these
seen as ideologies) is a cautious man, waiting for these ideas
to stand the test of the marketplace, the test of 'truth.*
In the real world of liberal politics, it is assumed that
no idea ever does actually win out, and pluralist man always
stands somewhat aloof from a full commitment to any par-
ticular set of ideas.
III. A preliminary critique
Having set out in detail those criteria which define
the True Believer model of political action and its built-
in contrast model of rational action, I am now in the position
of offering a brief preliminary critique. This critique
forshadows the model of the Moral Agent which I will
develop in the next chapter, but it does not require any
^
detailed remarks about that model.
First there are questions which need to be raised about
assumptions of egoism, especially in Lenski
-s version of
rational politics. tfe need to ask whether this egoism is
trivially true, i.e.. persons indeed have to have a motive
in order for it to be their motive. But the more vital
claim that persons largely seek only to satisfy themselves
although they may do so by cooperating with others may be
open to more serious criticism. Lenski may be correct that
persons recognize that they must cooperate in order to engage
in many kinds of satisfying activities. However, this need
not limit us to a view of persons as entirely self-interested,
nor to a view that cooperation is parasitic on self-interest.
As I shall argue in the next chapter, this model ignores the
possibility that the very existence of cooperative activities
creates in persons the kinds of interests that cannot be
said to spring either from the self or to be entirely in the
self. If this argument is convincing, the thesis that egoism
undergirds rational action is underminded and a new dimension
is added to our understanding of human motives - one that is
excluded by the contours of the True Believer model and its
contrast.
Neither Lenski, Hoffer, or Kornhauser are interested in
whether persons can learn to take an interest in the devel-
opment of others, although they are each interested in how
persons can learn to adapt themselves to the interests of
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others. It is highly unlikely that any of them would accept
a theory of moral development which might move beyond egoism
to "some conception of 'social interests, 'community, • or
•solidarity.' Nor could they conceive of a rational pol-
itics that did not rest on self-interest. Politics is
rational when it is in the pursuit of egoistic interests,
irrational if other reasons are offered. The most para-
doxical thing about Kornhauser's version of the model is
that he readily accedes to the idea that persons who have
the least interest in an established order - either econom-
ically or affectively - are most likely to overthrow that
order, yet he cannot accept this overthrow as rational when the
society has established procedures for redress of grievance.
Lenski's version, moreover, is asociological and a-
historical, despite the fact that Lenski does see great
variation in social structure and organization. Lenski
abstracts the individual out of society and posits a universal
human need for self-respect and status. Without getting in-
volved in a lengthy discussion of the problems of lumping
together needs for self-respect with biological needs like
survival, sustenance, health, I think I am justified in
5T. See Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism
(Boston; Beacon, I968) for a discussion of 'community.'
52. Kornhauser's discussion of "class" politics is inter-
esting. Unlike Marx, Kornhauser sees class politics as the
norm in pluralist societies because he equates class with
economic interest groups. Class refers to individual inter-
ests and conscious states rather than to relationship with
the mode of production. It is not surprising that Kornhauser
saying that Lenski has made a perhaps unconscious and
certainly undefended leap from biological to social needs.
The implications of this are profound, because in doing this
he establishes the foundation upon which is built the notion
that inequality is inevitable. Without stratification there
would be no status and therefore no needs satisfaction.
Kornhauser, too, is open to this criticism. His
vision of a just society is an organically integrated social
order in which stratification and the division of labor
works to the advantage of all. So long as there is equality
of opportunity and persons can sort themselves out according
to their talents, democracy is preserved. Since some kind of
stratification is essential to satisfy human needs, and to
ensure that socially valuable functions are performed by those
with talent, ensuing inequalities are not open to serious de-
bate,
Kornhauser and Hoffer, however, are not as open to the
criticism of asociality and ahistoricity as is Lenski.
Kornhauser clearly links motivational schemes with social
structures, and neither looks for reasons why persons
cooperate. That is assumed to be part of what it means to be
a social being. Yet both seem to make an error in the
opposite direction and to loose sight of individuals as
they experience a continuous existence. As one cultural
form breaks down
- when there are marked discontinuities
sees class conflict as taking shape in coalition-formation
and compromise under liberal democratic rules.
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in authority or community or when there is a severe crisis
like prolonged unemployment or defeat in war - persons
appear to exist in a limbo. There is a feeling here that
persons do not exist at the interstices of cultural change.
A society having a traditional system of authority
is greatly in need of social formations which can
bridge the transition to a new system of democratic
power. Otherwise, no group is able to influence
deeply the collective activity i and instead of new
values being built into the social structure, there
is merely a cultural vacuum and social atomization.53
Change is something that happens to people; society dis-
integrates, culture changes, personality and motives change.
One cannot quarrel with the sociological sense of a
statement like Kornhauser's, "Personal autonomy does not
5^
develop apart from society and culture," but one wonders
what happens to autonomous persons when the pluralist order
which nurtures and sustains their independence is dislocated.
It may well be that they revert to less developed motivational
schemes, but this requires some empirical support. One also
needs to consider the possibility that persons might develop
another type of autonomy as they engage in the creation of
new roles, rules and constraints. There is no sense here
that societies may be pluralistic in providing opportunities
for persons to experience different kinds of constraints,
thus providing the tools for dealing with problematic
situations as challenges to present motivational schemes.
Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society , p. 126.
54. Ibid ., p. 110.
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There is also a questi.n as t. whether Kornhauser's
motivational typology is complete. We need to ask whether
•guilt',
-shame', 'obligation',
'anxiety', and
-self-
reliance', as he conceives them, are adequate conceptual
Pictures of political motivation. We need to ask where
motives like 'resentment' and 'indignation' can come in.
Nor are these motivational concepts particularly well
explicated. There is the very important case of 'frustration'
which we need to consider.
First, it is assumed that frustration leads to action,
while it may well be that frustration and tension arise in
the course of action. As Peter Lupsha has so cogently
argued, frustration theories posit a "triggering mechanism,"
there is the action, somehow it must have been caused,
therefore there must have been frustration.
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Frustration
is a basic emotion, something like fear or anxiety, which
can directly cause action without any mediating factors
like an explanatory theory which directs action toward the
cause of the frustration or which points out gaps between
ideals and reality which can be closed. Frustration theory
assumes an immature individual who cannot "ad just" to the
reality of these gaps. But, "...a crucial element remains
hidden i when a man is starving, or is denied justice or
freedom, frustration is a sane and reasoned reaction. Equally
55. Peter Lupsha, "Explanation of Political Violence i Some
Psychological Theories vs. Indignation," Politics and Society
2 (Fall, 1971)189-104. *
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anr and reasoned
- these do not mean devoid of passion -
can be a man's commitment to a movement which aims at
eliminating hunger, injustice, coercion.-
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Breines' criticism of Hoffer leads us directly to the
crux of the matter, and that is the place of explanatory
theory and moral ideas in this model of political action.
According to Breines, ideas flesh out and direct emotion
concepts like frustration. Unlike 'anxiety which is the
sort of attitudinal concept most closely akin to a pure
" emotion term like fear and which arises in a vague, ill-
defined, threatening environment, 'frustration' seems to.
require a more vivid conception of where one is and where
one would like to be, some theory of a 'good 5 society and
one's appropriate place in it. Theorists in the True Believer
tradition accept the notion that once certain values are
present, certain beliefs are precluded, but they do not see
that our beliefs can somehow play a role in our choice of
values, can redirect or reshape or reformulate emotions,
can set limits to what can be valued. Further, as Breines
suggests, even if ideas do originate in frustrations, this
ought not to be taken to imply the equivalence of all ideas.
...while one may separate, for purposes of analysis, the
psychological or social origins of ideas from the con-
tent and meaning of those ideas, one cannot exclude the
latter without hiding the truth of an idea. It isjust this hiding which Hoffer performs through his
claim that mass movements are interchangeable. 5
7
f>6. Paul Breines, "Would You Believe t an Introductory
Critique of The True Believer " ( Boston i New England Free
Press, no date), p. 4.
57. Ibid., p. 5.
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-^Some of the ideas people have are moral ideas. I will
ar^ue that the True Believer model founders on a conception
of morality as the induction of conventional guides. Despite
his own rejection of the idea that there can be any truth
value in moral judgments, the True Believer theorist does
buy the conventions of liberal democracy and is quite
willing to reject as rationalizations of deep, subconscious
motivations, or as obedience to the commands of external
authority, the reasons for action offered by the extremist.
They are not perceived as possibly flowing from alternative
ideals of a good society. In many cases this categorization
may be accurate, but in the next chapter, I shall suggest
that in at least some cases this is misleading.
Finally, there are untested assumptions made about the
structural constraints of pluralism. Pluralist structures
are assumed to provide persons with the social bases from
which to pursue their interests without threatening the
social order. Since there are opportunities to gain ad-
vantages, and because the division of labor is just, right
and necessary, one has reason to play by the rules which
mitigate social conflict. But the model fails to consider
the possibility of uncompromisable conflict. The very structure
and rules of pluralist society may make it impossible for
some to pursue their interests through legitimate channels.
Interests which flow out of radically different conceptions
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of what ought to be may be totally incompatible with the
rules which are designed to further those interests which
are rooted in what is.
And, as Gusfield points out in his criticism of
Kornhauser, extremism can and does occur in pluralist so-
cieties. By communicating group discontents, plural groups
may in fact be essential to the development of political
movements. One cannot assume that groups will restrain
conflicts where there are no routine means for redress of
grievances, and where grievances are not routine.
The belief that participation in the primary and
secondary associations of society will moderate
conflict arises from this ideological commitment
to pluralistpolitics. It leads the mass politicstheorist to identify political defeat with social
alienation, to view extremist movements as actions
of dis-attached persons, unrelated to specific socialbases or pursuing interests of a discrete social
base.->°
In the next chapter, I will suggest that this is indeed a
misleading assumption and that at least some extremists
are clearly identified with rewarding, meaningful, personally
gratifying groups, and not, as the True Believer model would
have it, groups which satisfy less than rational needs.
5HT Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics,"
American Sociological Review 27 (February 1962), p. 29.
CHAPTER III
AN ALTERNATIVE IMAGE OF RATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION
As we at all times occupy a certain position in space andperceive everything from a certain point of view, so we
occupy a certain position within the order of development
of social institutions and think of men and of their poten-tialities from this point of view. We know therefore' that
any philosophical inquiry into the conditions of freedom,
and into the essential human virtues, will always need to be
revised, however adequate it may seem to the particular
conditions of its time, and to the concepts prevailingin the thought of that time. 5
Stuart Hampshire - Thought and Action
But there is one other motive for intense political com-
mitment that is of a different moral order. That is the
motive of compassion. It is possible. to be moved to
political commitment - not by wanting power, not by
seeking some sort of religious fulfillment, not because
one needs it psychologically - but because one chooses
to involve oneself in the plight of one's fellow men.
It is this motive, and this motive only, that I propose
to treat with moral respect.
Peter Berger - "Between System and Horde"
I quote these two passages at length since they seem
to me to represent in broad outline the model of political
action which I shall develop in this chapter. Here I shall
attempt to explicate a model of rational action - a model
I shall call the Moral Agent - which moves beyond the
True Believer image of rationality as the pursuit of self-
interest, and which permits us to place that image of
rationality in its historical and social perspective.
While I do not intend to explicate the concept of 'rationality 1
I da want f illustrate how it is rooted in our social
life by showing that persons may experience social lives
which can move them beyond egoism and self-interest.
This experience can provide the basis for rational political
action quite different from the liberal politics pictured
in Chapter II. I zlB9 want t# draw ^ ^ relationship
between rational politics and moral reasoning, and espec-
ially to tease out the way in which our adopting a particular
ethical theory infects our political judgments and actions.
I. The moral agent, persons and human relationships
In order to explicate the Moral Agent model, I need
to clarify two issues, first, what does it mean to be a
person, and second, what types of interpersonal relation-
ships do persons engage in. These are important issues
since I want to claim that our image of persons undergirds
our moral judgments and because, we need an alternative
image of human possibility if we wish to move beyond the
egoism of the True Believer contrast model.
I should like to argue that being a person involves
having certain capacities. These capacities include the
following, 1) to feel pain and pleasure! 2) to formulate
intentions, projects and long range goals i 3) to enter into
rich reactive relationships! k) to become autonomous. In
some respects this image of persons is consistent with the
image developed in Chapter II, but there are several
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vital differences.
I should like also to argue that persons can engage
in relationships which either impede or encourage the
development of these capacities. Those which encourage
development are what I call 'liberating' relationships;
they are relationships in which persons treat each other
as having these capacities, and work to promote their devel-
opment. These are relationships built upon mutual respect.
I assume that persons have the capacity to engage in such
relationships, are capable, for instance of living up to
the demands of a commonly accepted moral code, of being
trustworthy, of fulfilling their obligations, etc.
Why these capacities are important will become clear
as I develop the notion of mutual respect. That we have
these capacities does not mean that persons do not engage
in other types of very human relationships - for example,
relationships of mutual hatred, which, in a sense, are re-
lationships built upon mutual respect since we do treat each
other as having certain capacities like the capacity to know-
ingly inflict pain. What I am interested in, however, are
the implications for political action of our having the
capacity to participate in relationships of the former type.
These paragraphs demand a great deal of unpacking. I
propose to do this in terms of the following questions
i
1) what does it mean to be a rule-follower; 2) what
particular rules does a Moral Agent try to follow, 3)
what other elements are involved in the actions of Msral
Agents
-
how are explanatory theories and passions linked
to moral reasons, k) how and under what conditions does
the capacity to reason develop, 5) how does this model
give us critical leverage against the True Believer model,
what are the implications of the Moral Agent model for
political analysis.
I. a. What does it mean to follow rules
Undergoing both models developed in this dissertation
.is an image of persons as rule-followers. This sense of
persons rests on the assumption that, while causal explana-
tions of human behavior may at times be adequate, a complete
understanding of what a person does - as opposed to what
happens to him
- needs to take into account the reasons
that person gives or could give for his or her actions.
These reasons are what constitute rule-governed behavior/
However, there are many different ways in which persons can
orient themselves to those rules which comprise the accepted
•reasons' for action in his or her own society. Among these
orientations are at least critical and non-critical stances
vis-a-vis the rules which constitute one's social life.
The image of autonomy on which the Moral Agent model
rests is very much linked to persons' orientation toward
IT I am avoiding many of the debates which revolve aroundthe distinction between 'reasons' and'causes.' See, for
example, Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes,"in May Brodbeck, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of theSocial Sciences (New York. The Macmillan Company, 1968)
pp. ^-57.
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rules. it rests on the idea that persons not only are
able to follow the rules which make action possible - i.e.,
understand the rules which govern conduct - but are also
able to subject them to critical scrutiny. True Believers,
rational egoists and Moral Agents all follow rules, but
only the latter have developed the sort of critical capacity
I will want to label moral.
To clarify what I mean by a critical orientation toward
rules, I think it is useful to refer to Piaget »s distinction
between heteronomous and autonomous reasoning or rule-
' following. In The Moral Judgment of the Child . Piaget
identifies three modes of behaviori "...motor behavior,
egocentric behavior (with external constraint), and
cooperation. And to these three modes of social behavior
there correspond three types of rules i motor rules, rules
due to unilateral respect, and rules due to mutual respect."
Motor rules are pre-social; they are rather more lawlike
(causal), in fact, than rulelike. But with increasing
sociality or constraint by those around her/him, the
individual acquires. an ability to follow rules. Finally,
when persons experience cooperation between equals, autonomy
and rule-following qua rule-following - or the ability to
critically evaluate existing rules - develops. The, indi-
vidual has moved as far from lawlike behavior as Piaget
sees possible.
2~. Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New Yorki
Free Press, 1965), p. 86.
65
T* put this in the language of child development,
In the first stage of development, the child has no con-
ception of social rules, indeed, s/he cannot distinguish be-
tween self and what is outside self and therefore cannot
distinguish between the constraints of social rules and
the constraints of her/his own body and the material world.
This inability leads to his/her investing the social
environment with "divine" authority, with the same massive
reality as the physical world. In the second stage, the
child can distinguish social rules from physical laws, but
,
still sees them as external to self and transcendently
real. "So long as the practise is not submitted to
conscious, autonomous elaboration and remains, as it were,
external to the individual, this externality is symbolized
as transcendence." Society precedes individual; realism
undergirds heteronomous activity. The child obediently
follows rules, while at the same time perceiving her/himself
as in fundamental conflict with these rules since s/he can
neither understand their nature nor assert her/his own
will and evaluate them from the point of view of her/his
oun needs. Yet these rules are obeyed uncritically.
But "...from the moment that children really begin to
submit to rules and apply them in a spirit of genuine
cooperation, they acquire a new conception of these rules.
Rules become something that can be changed if it is agreed
To Ibid ., p. 94.
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that they should be. ... " Rules may be altered ^^ ^
a critical perspective which reflects an understanding of
the difference between what Piaget calls
-constitutive- and
•constituted, rules and what John Searle calls
'constitutive.
and 'regulative, rules.
5
Searle himself fin<Js it difficult to articulate ^
distinction he wants to draw between these two types of
rules. "As a start, we might say that regulative rules
regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of
behavior, for example, many rules of etiquette regulate
• interpersonal relationships which exist independently of
the rules. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate,
they create or define new forms of behavior."
6
The rules
create the very possibility of the activity which is then
logically dependent on the rules.
H*WeVer
'
the distinction is not all that simple because
^ Ibid ., p. 95.
^o^Q
J
\
0h\ R ' S? ar1^ Speech Acts (Cambridge! University Press1969). See also Charles Taylor, "Interpretation smri +h» 9
ZZZLl-ii < ! I i discusses this distinctieni "...we arenormally induced to think of rules as applying to behavior
e^-^J
0Ul
?
bG available *• «s whether or S?tJ rSexisted. Some rules are like this, they are re^ulati™commandments, don't take the goods of Lo?her?g But there
c£ess wMoh f 9 Q 'f' 9 that kerning the Queen's move in
? ? ^ n0t 80 sePa^ble. If one suspends theserules, or imagines a state in which they have not yet beenintroduced, then the whole range of behavior in question?
C?J tt case, chess playing, would not be. Rules of thiskind are constitutive rules."
6. Searle, Speech Acts , p. 33.
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there may be several layers of rules involved. For example,
there are rules which define what it means to play games,
any games, e.g., rules that one follows the rules of the
particular game one is playing, that one doesn't cheat, etc.
But then there are the particular rules which constitute
the particular game, e.g., the rule in chess that a pawn
cannot take a piece directly in front of it. This rule is
essential to chess playing, unlike the regulative rule which
stipulates that a player cannot touch a pawn without moving
it. This latter rule could be changed without touching
the core of the game. It is a regulative rule.
Regulative rules take the form of injunctions, "though
shalts," while constitutive rules are more closely analogous
to definitions or descriptions of the activity, "if our
paradigm of rules are imperative regulative rules, such
non-imperative constitutive rules are likely to strike
7
us as extremely curious and hardly even as rules at all."
But it is upon this distinction that much of what I shall
argue in this chapter is based, for I shall argue that not
until we are able to see rules not simply as imperatives
but as constitutive of activities which we. may consciously
change, will we be able to assess and revise particular
rules and to act autonomously and creatively with respect
to them.
But there is another important implication for politics
of this distinction, and that has to do with the depth of
T* Ibid
. , p. 34.
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debate around and about rules. To clarify this somewhat,
I think we might look at the example Piaget uses, the
child's game of marbles. Once children have moved beyond
the motor-rule stage and have a sense of the meaning of
rules, we can begin to consider the implications of the
ways they are oriented towards rules for discourse. For
these children, the rules of the game of marbles are sacrosanct.
None of them can be altered because they are authoritative
imperatives imposed either by parents or by bigger children.
It is difficult to see here any possibility for rational
discourse about changing rules. But for children in the
third stage, rules can be subjected to debate in terms of
their understanding of what it means to cooperate in playing
a game.
It is important to point out that some of the debated
rules will be more easily revised than others? e.g., reg-
ulative rules about how far one stands away from the circle
into which the marbles are rolled may or may not be heatedly
debated in terms of whether they make for a better or worse
game of marbles, but constitutive rules about whether there
is to be a circle at all would - if raised - certainly arouse
great passion for to question this rule might be to question
the very game of marbles. As in political discourse, there
will be debate among children as to what rules are regulative
and what constitutive of the game of marbles, which ones
can be altered without sacrificing the game, but the most
serious debates win be over constitutive rules, although
it nay well be that to engage in these debates would require
a more sophisticated level of cognitive development and
would rarely be engaged in by children.
An analogy from politics may be clearer. The heatednes
of the debate over the distribution of rewards between organ-
ized labor and management, with each jockeying for position
within a system of rules of bargaining and compromise and
.
with each emphasizing those regulative rules - e.g., legis-
lation
-
which best help their own interests, is as nothing
compared to the heatedness of debate over definitions of
politics when these occur. Imagine the debate which would
ensue were one of the parties - labor or management - to
question the definition of politics as bargaining and compro-
mize and to suggest that these procedures were merely regul-
ative of a particular kind of politics. Imagine the debate
were one party to propose reconstituting politics as the
Qpursuit of common as opposed to self-interests.
Debate, then, can take place at either level of rule-
following, with the most vital debates occurring over con-
stitutive rules. However, the ability to engage in these
W. In "Conceptual Revision and Political Reform," Amherst,
Ma., 1973 (Mimeographed), William Connolly joins this issue.He argues that political disputes can revolve around what
constitutes the activity "politics." Convincing our opponent
to adopt our view is to open up possibilities hitherto
rejected and to go a long way toward winning the dispute. I
would suggest that radical revisions are more likely to come
from those who are not doing very well under existing rules.
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debates requires that we can engage in what Piaget calls
•true* rule following. This ability develops at the third
stage, the stage of autonomy. Social rules become self-
imposed as the conflict between self and society which was
so pressing in the second stage is abolished with the devel-
opment of our understanding of ourselves as social beings.
But not only are rules now self-imposed, they are also open
to critical scrutiny from the perspective of what one now
understands to be the purpose of rules - the delimiting and
defining of human activity.
Understanding constitutive rules undergirds the notion
of reflectiveness which is part of the conception of autonomy
and morality I support. Reflectiveness refers to the way in
which persons hold ideas. In making political choices, re-
flective persons are aware that their own conceptions may be
subject to radical revision in light of both the formal rules
constitutive of the activity itself, and in light of alterna-
tive notions of persons , their needs and their relationship to
society. Heteronomous persons are unfree in just the sense
that they are not reflective; they cannot subject the rules,
activities, and principles of their society to a critical an-
alysis based on an understanding of the constitutive rules of
social life and their relation to human needs, wants and purposes.
9. Zad7 individual is autonomous (at the social level) to the
degree to which he subjects the pressures and norms with which
he is confronted to conscious and critical evaluation...."
Steven Lukes, Individualism (Oxford i Basil Blackwell, 1973)p. 52.
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Reflectiveness is part of the social development of
the autonomous person. As we shall see below in the
discussion of the conditions under which moral development
can occur, reflectiveness grows out of social relationships
which permit the development of new cognitive structures
through which persons perceive the world in new ways.
Reflective action - that action in which Moral Agents
engage (when they are acting upon their best motives) -
is autonomous action. Unlike heteronomous action - which
is characterized by 1) a failure to distinguish self from
other (the person has no sense of self as a reflective
agent able to criticize existing social rules); 2) com-
mission of the naturalistic fallacy with respect to all
rules (what is, ought to be); 3) action based on duty and
obedience - autonomous action is characterized by a sense
of self and of responsibility for one's actions. Rules are
perceived as social and historical (and therefore alterable),
and the spring to action - the motivation to follow rules -
comes, as we shall see, not from a conflict between self
and society which society wins, but from a sense of solidarity
with one's fellows. Rules are not the internalized con-
straints of external authority, but the product of social
interactions and are seen as part of what it means to be a
person. The Moral Agent understands the idea of rule-following.
I.b. What kinds of rules constitute morality
Some of the most important rules of conduct we follow
are moral rules. Moral rules are particularly important
^.politics sinoe many of our pomicai actions ^> moral considerations. Therefore it is imp9rtant for us
to understand what a moral iorule ls and how persons orient
themselves toward these rules.
The distinction between heteronomous and autonomous
rule-following is essential to our understanding the dis-
tinction between the actios of the True Believer, the
rational egoist, and the Moral Agent. What I want to do
at this point is to illustrate the sorts of reasons one
.
might offer for engaging in certain kinds of actions when
one is applying moral rules heteronomously and autonomously
Thas will lead us directly into a discussion of the possible
principles which could constitute morality itself, and the
implications of these principles for political practise.
Lawrence Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development
helps us get at these issues. Kohlberg's thesis is that
morality is rather more than a set of character traits,
role-specific behavior, obligations and rights, more than
the code already embedded in existing social practises.
He wants to show that morality is a form of reasoning which
develops conceptually over time. Kohlberg identifies
three levels of reasoning, levels which correspond to
Piaget's motor, heteronomous and autonomous modes of rule-
following, although one could debate whether Level III
ought to include Stage 5 in a society whose moral code
embodies these principles. These levels and stages are
set out below, but anyone interested in a fuller description
of the stages is invited to review Kohlberg's work as cited
in the Bibliography.
Level I. Premorali
Stage 1. Punishment and obedience
orientation
Stage 2. Naitve instrumental hedonism
r
Level II. Morality of conventional role conformity,Stage 3. Good-boy morality of maintaininggood relations and approval by
others y
-
- Level III. gSi£op^^^^V
.
Stage 5. Morality of contract, or individual
rights, and of democraticallv
accepted law J
Stage 6. Morality of individual principles
of conscience. 1°
These stages are conceptual, i.e., they involve the developing
ability to make sharper and more complex distinctions about
persons, punishments and principles. Thus, for example,
persons at Level III have a more developed understanding of
persons and their social nature than those at Level II -
society is envisaged as a human construction rather than as
a concrete reality.
In the pre-moral stages, persons obey rules not out of
any understanding of the social nature of rules, but either
because they fear direct punishment or because following a
rule can get them what they want. These stages are similar
to Piagefs motor-rule stage since persons actually do not see
}°* Encyclopedia of Philosophy
. "Moral Development," bvLawrence Kohlberg.
11.
^
Obviously theorists who accept an image of society ashaving ontological reality apart from individuals will disagree
with this claim. &
7^
themselves as rule-followers by aS constrained either by
externa! force or by the force of their own needs, (whether
Kohlberg is correct that these are t„. distinct stages with
an invariable sequence is open to debate.) Under conventional
morality
-
the level which parallels Piagefs heteronomeus
morality
- reasoning flows from social convention, one makes
reference to what others think or to the demands of society
in justifying one's actions. At the third level, however,
one is able to evaluate these conventions in terms of prin-
ciples which move beyond convention and which are based on
an understanding of the purpose of moral rules. This level
parallels Piagefs autonomous morality, but again there are
problems since it is not clear to me how one could distinguish
whether Stage 5 reasoning were autonomous or heteronomous in
a society where contractualism, individual rights and demo-
cratically accepted law are embedded in convention.
12
™!^ 1 T5ere n are s!me r?al P">hlems with Kohlberg 's theorv of
know* ?£?
l0pment
- ?irst ' *here i s *he ProMeS of how^nes that a person is morally developed. Is there a differ-
;SS
e($m?£ li^ing'^nd,USing ' a co"oePt? As Alston points
.
. ^ -
~
«. &J.vcn ai»uai,ion without naving it,but one can have a concept without using it in a given
?«Wt?!n,
"
+ .5?
h
l
,e?*
,
f 0wn tests seem t0 6et ^ moral reason-ining m artificial situations. In "real-life" situations.
bn?
S
w??h
a
^
n0t Tly fronted with the logic of the situationout it its emotional impact, including emotional ties to per-sons about whom moral choices need to be made. This may inter-fere with pure reasoning at Whatever stage the person has
reached. (This may help account for why Kohlberg can seeMartin Luther King as a moral agent but not Stokely Carmichael:Carmichael's various hatreds may get in the way of his reason-ing capabilities which may really be at Stage 6.) Kohlberg
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While it goes well beyond the scope of this dissertation
to take on the issue of whether Kohlberg has legislated a
m°rality
' i>e
-' ^^ated his Stage 6 principled morality
has ignored important features of moral development f„„
problems
e
in
eth™^+ ?era *! m6 t0 be imP°rtant conceptual
fZZitl .i J t 005nltlv8 stages, problems which flow from
EES aichotomxzation of form and content and from hislack of a sociological theory. It seems to me that children
' ing and
n
tharthe oi^nV1'"? !"* the f°™S °f -ra^reason-m a t th distinction between form and content atsome stages cannot be maintained. If this is so? then theStage theory is far from culturally unbiased. For exampleKehlberg will have trouble testing moral development in
SSi^i?, ?
^
an"ed ^e lines of Stage 5 morality -contract liberalism
- since it will be difficult to tell
Im+SSSi 8? inaivldu?I is reasoning from authority - the
ir rill
Preneuncing the rules of contract liberalism -
LIH C1 ? 1f* , There is also the Problem of establishinglevels of moral development in liberal societies which iustifvconstituted moral rules in terms of Stage 2 reasons? One *wonders also whether persons will have opportunities forexposure to situations which can move them on to Stage 6when social rules are organized along Stage 5 principles.What happens to moral development when the social structure
confirms the formal mode of rule-perception and the content
©1 moral principles at lower stages of development. Canpersons develop the principle of 'respect for persons' in
a bargaining society where the 'other' is one's opponent
and where the only reason for putting oneself in his placeis te try to understand how he might be manipulated"? There
may be something to Kohlberg 's claim that middle class childrendevelop more rapidly than working class children because they
are exposed to more environmental stimuli (and perhaps, as
Peters suggests, because they have more opportunities to
practise reasoning at higher levels), but the question remains
as to whether middle class life experiences promote Stage 6
reasoning, or whether working class children need to go^ through
Stage 5 in order to reach Stage 6.
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into morality qua morality, thus avoiding debate over what
constitutes morality
- I think that it is important to devel-
op the implications of his theory of cognitive development
for political evaluation and action. If persons do
develop the kinds of cognitive abilities which Kohlberg
claims for them, what are the implications for our under-
standing of political action?
Kohlberg' s claim is that Stage 6 morality is a critical
perspective from which persons can evaluate any of the ethical
principles
- the regulative rules of a particular moral code -
Which are already embedded in social practise. If this claim
is valid, it is important for our understanding of how
persons can move beyond the social conformism of True Be-
liever morality and develop ideal standards which can serve
to undergird political action. But what are the principles
which Kohlberg claims persons develop and which undergird
this critical stance?
For Kohlberg, as for Piaget, one's orienation toward
rules develops with an increasing ability to distinguish
oneself from what is external to oneself, and at the same
time to see oneself as a person among persons. This ability
to see oneself as a person, with the capacity to will one's
own action, makes possible the adherence to certain moral
principles. First, it makes possible the moral principle
13. Kohlberg does begin to engage in this debate in an
article entitled "From Is to Ought i How to Commit the
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in Koral Develop-
ment," in Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development.
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•f prescriptivity or reversibility. For one who sees
him or herself as a person among persons and as a chooser,
a
-moral* rule cannot be either that which another wills for
me, nor that which I will for another but not for myself.
The Moral Agent cannot formulate a 'moral' rule which
s/he would be unwilling to have applied by another to
. . 14
nira or herself in a similar situation.
The formal rule element at Stage 6 also meets the require-
ment of universality. Moral rules are meant to be applied in
a self-consistent manner to all (morally) similar cases.
There can be no exceptions to the rule except morally de-
serving ones..
So far, then, the formal constraints of moral reasoning
are prescriptivity and universality. But Kohlberg adds
a further requirement of moral reasoning and that is the
requirement ©f respect for persons. It is this principle
which I take to be central to the model of the Moral Agent,
and it underlies the two formal principles already described.
Vf. For a more thorough discussion of the principles of
moral reasoning, or the moral point of view, see Kurt
Baier, The Moral Point of View (New Yorkt Random House, 1965).
15. According to Kohlberg, Stage 6 is a more developed mor-
ality
^
because it handles "...more moral problems, conflicts,
•r points of view in a more stable or self-confident way."
It can do this because of the principles of reversibility and
universality. Earlier stages are unable to resolve moral
dilemmas which Stage 6 can handle because they are "...not
fully universal and prescriptive and therefore lead to con-
tinual self-contradictions, to definitions of right which are
different for Republicans and Democrats, for Americans and
Vietnamese, for fathers and sons. In contrast principled
morality is directed to resolving these contradictions in a
stable self-consistent fashion.
" (Kohlberg, "Is-Ought," p. 185)
Yet there are problems here for certainly a Nazi prison-camp
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Kohlberg argues that moral development involves the
increasing ability to distinguish human life as a universal
principle from all other value judgments about individuals -
judgments based on wealth, status, sex, personal relationship,
etc.
-The moral imperative to value life becomes increasingly
independent of the factual properties of the life in question."
16
But we need to ask what Kohlberg might mean by valuing human
life, or, as I shall term it, by the principle of respect
for persons.
The moral principles of universality and reversibility
have an internal relationship to the concept "person." They
both imply treating others as one would treat oneself - the
Golden Rule. But how does one treat oneself? I should like
to argue that we treat ourselves as having those capacities
listed earlier in this chapter, as having the capacity to feel
pleasure and pain, as having interests, needs, wants and pur-
poses, as acting freely on our own choices, as choosing our
own lives, and as capable of participating in humanizing re-
lationships. Thus to treat others as we treat ourselves is to
treat them as valuing, autonomous individuals, capable of
feeling pleasure and pain, of entering into rich reactive re-
lationships, and as capable of development.
official was entirely stable and consistent in his carrying out
of official orders. Is his a developed morality?
16. Ibid
.
Compare this with Durkheim's moral theory in which
respect accrues to roles rather than to persons.
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In his article "Persons and Punishment," Herbert
Morris develops what I find to be a fruitful distinction
between what it means to treat others as persons as opposed
1?
to treating them as things. To treat another as a thing
is to treat him or her from the outside, to ignore intention-
ality and responsibility and to seek to manipulate behavior.
When we treat a human being as an animal or someinanimate object our responses to 1he human being
are determined, not by his choices, but ours indisregard of or with indifference to his. And
when we 'look upon 1 a person as less than a person
or not a person, we consider the person as incapable
of rational choice. 10
Punishment rests on the idea of persons as rule-followers,
as beings aware of the social basis of rules and of the impli-
cations of breaking rules - that one has unfairly advantaged
onself and therefore owes a debt to society (assuming that
the rules are fair). Punishment rests on choice? following
rules implies being aware of alternatives and assuming that
persons could do otherwise than they do were they to so choose.
Treatment rests on the logic of sickness; it is undergirded
by assumptions of irrationality. Irrationality, however, is
17. Herbert Morris, "Persons and Punishment," The Ironist
,
52 (October 1968) i475-501. See also P.F. Strawson, "Freedom
and Resentment," in P.F. Strawson, ed., Studies in the Phil-
osophy of Thought and Action (New Yorki Oxford University
Press, 1968).
18. Morris, "Persons and Punishment," p. 11.
19# This notion of choice is problematic since one has to
determine what choices are in fact open to persons. This
is largely a question of individual and social development.
always tremendously difficult to assess. Treatment may be
imposed on persons who are expanding the borders of ration-
ality and acting as responsible agents, and who therefore
deserve to be treated as such. Yet we may misinterpret
their actions and impose treatment upon them. But if we
ourselves are rational and want to avoid the possibility
of being so treated, argues Morris, we will choose punishment
over treatment, and thereby maintain our freedom to act on
20
our own determination of rationality.
Respect for persons moves us away from a focus on
individual pathology to a focus on social pathology, to
the socially imposed limitations on human development. If
wg find that we cannot trpat s -r~-rr~ k«««. v •0 ^^ x a range oi human beings as persons
in our society, we have reason to criticize the existing social
order. Further, if we discover alternatives that would open
up new ways of life for persons that we think would be in
their interest
- would develop their personhood - then to
treat them as persons is to present them with these alter-
21
natives for rational deliberation. Respect for persons
undergirds a critical stance on any social system and its
rules, in the same way that the formal principles of reciprocity
20. The "idea of 'freedom to act' is problematic, but I cannotnor need I get involved in the debate over whether one isfree' to do x if x is prohibited and one doe3 x anyway.
21. This raises the "before-after" problem ©f revolutionary
strategy, for if persons are under- or undeveloped in the
existing social order, how can they be deliberative about
choosing a new one. The solution is often to impose the new
social order on them until they choose it. (See ft'aclntyre'sdiscussion of Stalinism in "A Mistake about Causality in
Social Science," in Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman, ed.,
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and universality serve as criteria for evaluating moral
rules. Respect for persons acts as a moral reason both in
choosing the ends of social change and the means, it is
fundamental to a conception of a just social order, a
conception which can serve as the evaluative standard for
social criticism.
But if we ought to respect persons, and especially to
treat them as having needs, wants and purposes of their own,
isn't this to accept egoism and the image of social life
which flows out of eglism? Here we need to consider the
idea that the needs, wants, and purposes of persons are
not identical with the needs, wants and interests of
persons in themselves. To assume this is to make a false
move and to accept egoism as inevitable.
The developmental model rests on the notion that persons
are social and historical beings. Motives and interests
flow out of social relationships. If we experience a 'liber-
ated* social order, our interests and capacities will be
those of a fully developed person, a Moral Agent. In less
than ideal social orders, our motives will be less than ideal.
Under particular conditions, they will more approximate the
egoism and limited cooperativeness of contractual-pluralist
images of human motivation.
Philosophy
,
Politic s and Society
, 2nd Series /New Yorkt
Barnes and Noble, 196^7^ I think the problem is surmounted
in the thesis I present - to provide alternatives and to
expect persons to consider them as rational beings is to begin
to see their development as persons.
22. Morris* conception of punishment assumes equality of
persons, it rests on the notion of breach of contract, of
23
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Under conditions of liberation, we develop an
interest in our own well-being which is rooted in a
recognition that we share a life situation with others.
Our well-being becomes bound up in the well-being of
others. Since we see ourselves as implicated in a web
of social relations through which we have learned to treat our-
selves as a person among persons, we come to recognize others
as persons with similar interests and capacities as our
own. Our well-being is wrapped up in our ability to develop
our own capacities, but this development is seen as dependent
upon the kinds of relations we have with others. If we per-
ceive our development through the developmental model -
if we see individual development as bound up in reciprocal
cooperative social relations - then we come to see that we
have an interest in such relations. But, since we can only
have reciprocal relations with our equals, we have an
interest in the development of others. And, since cooperation
is only possible between persons who need each other, we
2k
come to recognize our needs in others.
trust, and of reciprocal relations. Morris rests his casefor punishment on the notion of punishment by reciprocity -
things are put to rights, contracts are restored, persons
are shown how they have harmed relations of trust and sym-
pathy - rather than punishment by expiation.
23. See "Conditions," below.
24. "We are led to the notion of the community of humankind,
the members of which enjoy one another's excellences and
individuality elicited by free institutions, and they recog-
nize the good of each as an element in the complete activity
of the whole scheme of which is consented to and gives pleasure
Moral development resolves the tensions between self
and society that individuals feel at preceding stages, if
egoism gives persons reasons to act only when action is in
their own interest (except for those rare instances of
altruism)
.
the notion of social interests casts doubt upon
the claims of egoism. Needs, wants and purposes flow out of
social relations, and changes in these relations result in
changes in needs, wants, and purposes, or the
-goods' of
individuals and collectivities.
25
Different stages of social
and individual development are accompanied by different ends.
AS persons move from relations of unilateral to mutual respect,
conceptions of
-good' change from the rational life plan
of egocentric competition to the rational life plan of26
cooperative sociality.
to all..., the successful carrvine: out of -1110+ u0+u»j.'is the shared final end of alftne members^ society "ndthese institutional forms are prized as good in ?hemselwA/m appreciate and enjoy these attributes in one anothe?* ' * '
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in cooperating to affirm jusHns^-t ions. It follows that the collective activity of iusticeis the preeminent form of human flourishing. John Rawls,ATheory of Justice (Cambridge, Belknap Press, 19?1)? pp523-529. How this recognition becomes a 'need* is discussedbelow under "Reason and Passion."
25. On the Marxist view, needs flow out of relations ofproduction; on^ the human development model, out of the structureof human relationsin general. I cannot deal with the questionof whether productivity is the basic human interaction and
whether its structure is fundamental to the form of social life;it seems to me that there are other fundamental relations nottaken into account by economics including relations of sex.
26. Before persons reach Kohlberg's Stage 6, they regard theirgood as individual and egocentric, except where they perceive
8^
The rational life plan of the moral agent is inseparable
from consideration of the social arrangements under which all
persons can experience the benefits of a life viewed from
the moral perspective. A commitment to this conception and
to these principles serves as a guide to political action,
both constraining actions which might inhibit the develop-
ment of others and encouraging actions which might broaden
an interest in a contractual relationship; i.e., they consent
to social arrangments if these are in their interest. It is
difficult for such persons to see a 'social good', (this is
the difficult 'pluralists' have with the concept 'public
interest') except as the outcome of conflicts among individual
•goods'. Having a limited sense of what respect for persons
means, individuals at Stage 5, for example, lack a reason
to regard their own good in terms of the good of others;
theirs is a competitive conception of social relations with
'good' understood by reference to Stage 2 hedonism. The
result is a society of essentially private individuals
for whom public participation is a burden and for whom
public institutions are means to private ends. These individuals
-do assume certain obligations, but only insofar as these fill
their individual interests and are thus seen from the per-
spective of enlightened self-interest.
Stage 5 may be an autonomous morality, as Kohlberg claims
(there are problems especially in a liberal society), but it
is not a fully developed morality since it lacks a fully
developed principle of respect for persons. The distinction
between Stages 5 and 6 can perhaps be clarified by looking
at the distinction Piaget makes between the morality of
equality and the morality of equity, both autonomous moralities.
These are differentiated in terms of the concept of persons
implied by each, equality referring to an abstract individual
and lending itself to support of abstract and universal rights,
while equity takes into consideration the different needs
and handicaps persons have arising out of their natural and
social condition. (Piaget, IV'oral Judgment
, pp. 315-325*)
This notion of equity supports a radical critique of existing
social arrangements based on abstract rights, and lends
credence to the idea that rights are socially specific. It
can undergird claims aginst inequities in the distribution
of rights and privileges by lending support to demands for
compensatory inequalities.
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opportunities for others to develop.
Finally, we need to consider another implication for
action of the principle 'respect for persons. . i have already
suggested that this principle undergirds critical evaluation
of existing social arrangements and supports the establish-
ment of alternative institutions. But what ought we to do
when other persons express no interest in altering their
life situation. The question I should like to consider
here is whether we are obliged to treat any of the expressed
interests of others as deserving of respect. An interesting
treatment of this issue can be found in Thomas Hill's article
"Servility and Self-Respect. ••
Hill's concern is somewhat different from my own. His
intention is to defend the thesis that one has a duty to
27. The Moral Agent model also rests on a form of 'consent'I do not mean that persons stand outside social relationshipsand choose whether or not to join. This is to abstract ?heindividual and to construct society upon the shaky foundationsof universal needs, wants and purposes. My point is thatmoral concepts undergird or constitute social life - thev
^I^i°me ^hing t0 d ° With social co-operation and make itpossible for persons to live together. Our moral concepts
are inextricably linked with our knowledge about
the possibilities of human motivation and social life. Forinstance, if we assume that the facts of human life are scarcitv
and competition, we will adopt a rather different view
of the possibilities and reasons for action than if we assume
that persons can develop social interests, can move beyond
egoism and hedonism. Our conceptions of what can form reasonsfor action are delimited by our conceptions of human needs,
wants and purposes. If we agree that morality is rooted
in our conception of the person, and if we agree that persons
are social beings, we no longer need to give reasons why
persons ought to be moral, reasons why persons should consent
to a moral order. If persons are rooted in social life, then
the question "why be moral" is non-sensical. To get a sense
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respect oneself as a person, a thesis which he claims flows
from Kant's
"...contention that respect for persons, strictly
speaking, is respect for moral law." The question which
interests him is whether a person can (morally) refuse to
respect him or herself, i.e., act serviley. By servility
Hill means an attitude of deference to others, a reluctance
to make demands, to express one's own preferences or opinions,
a tendency not to form one's own interests, values and ideals'
or to treat these as less important than those of others. He
offers three paradigm cases of servility - the Uncle Tom, the
Self-Deprecator, and the Deferential Wife - and asks whether
"...there are grounds for regarding ^their7 attitudes...
as morally objectionable. Are there moral arguments we
could give them to show that they ou^ht to have more self-
respect?" Hill rejects utilitarian arguments since these
could be used to justify servility if it should contribute
to the greater good, and he rejects happiness as a reason
for servility.
The Deferential Wife may be quite happy; but
if her happiness turns out to be contingent on herdistorted view pf her own rights and worth as a
person, then it carries little moral weight against
the contention that she ought to change that view....When a person's happiness stems from a morally
objectionable attitude, it ought to be discounted. 28
of this problem, see Kurt Baler* s The Moral Point of View
.Chapter ?. This question can only be raised if persons
exist outside social life which by its very nature is moral.
Morality varies - from heteronomous to autonomous, from
egoistic to principled - with social life, but persons are
moral beings regardless of what form this takes.
28. Herbert Morris, "Persons and Punishment," Monist 52(October, I968) i475-501.
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But why is servility a morally objectionable attitude?
Because, argues Hill, servility involves a failure to "...
understand and acknowledge one's own moral rights." Persons
may not press their rights because they do not understand
them, and we may seek to help them through moral enlightenment,
but when persons do know their rights and still do not press
them, this is a moral defect unless there is some overriding
consideration such as "...a desire to avert dire consequences
.to oneself, or even an ambition to set an oppressor up for
a later fall....- Laziness, timidity, or "...a desire for some
minor advantage," are no excuse for disregarding one's own
moral status as a person deserving respect, although any of
these may be a factor in one's inaction. To be servile is
to fail to respect ©nself as a person, and if respect for
persons is central to respect for morality, then not to
respect oneself is not to respect morality, to remove oneself
from the moral order. Hill argues that we have a duty to
ourselves, a duty to respect ourselves, and that this
implies a disposition to affirm our rights and not to tolerate
abuses. We may release ourselves and others from their
obligation to respect these rights, but only under special
circumstances. Failure to respect our own rights is supported
by self-recriminationj failure to respect the rights of others
is supported by censure, and, I would add, by feelings of
29
regret and shame.
29T IbTdT
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There are several interesting implications for political
action in these arguments. They directly support the con-
tention that one ought to press for redress whenever one's
own rights are infringed, and by extension - assuming that
respect for oneself as a person implies respect for the
category persons - one ought to press for the rights of
others and work to remedy social conditions which harm
others. Of course, there may be overriding considerations
which inhibit action, but the reason for action remains valid.
II. Is moral reasoning enough?
In an article entitled "Moral Development i A Plea for
Pluralism," R.S. Peters criticizes Kohlberg for making the
Platonic assumption that knowing the good means doing the
good. This criticism is I think valid, but need not under-
mine the model as a whole. What needs to be clarified,
however, is the way in which the Moral Agent model does in-
corporate other elements than moral cogntions, particularly
.the elements of explanatory theory and affective commitment.
What I wish to show is the way in which moral reasoning is
linked to reasoning of another sort - explaining social
phenomena - and to feelings, or the affective commitments
which are essential to move one to action.
II. a. Moral reasoning and explanatory theory
It has already been suggested that explanatory theories
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are linked to metaethical theories since theoretical assump-
tions about persons and how they develop are conceptually
linked to notions of persons and the 'good' society and to
images of what is humanly possible. For example, the meta-
ethical position that respect for persons is an integral
part of moral reasoning rests on theoretical assumptions that
persons can respect each other and that they can develop the •
particular capacities in question. The principles of morality
are supported by a theory of moral development. Values have
an empirical element; facts and values are linked in a theory
of motivation. If we accept the theory of moral development
and the notion of good which flows from it, we also accept
a theory of the social conditions under which morality can
develop. This has profound implications for our evaluations
of social life and for our commitment to social change. It is
in this sense that I take Charles Taylor's thesis that an
explanatory theory rooted in a conception of human needs,
wants and purposes, "...secretes its own norms for the
30
assessment of polities and policies."
But not only do ethical judgments rest on explanatory
theories - in this case theories of moral development -
we have seen that the formal principles of developed morality
need to be fleshed out by explanatory theories. In particular,
30^ Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in P.
Laslett and W.G. Runciman, ed., Philosophy, Politics and
Society
, 3rd Series (New York, Barnes and Noble, 1967), p. 48.
For example, if research were to provide evidence against Pia^et's
psychological theory, John Rawls 1 metaethics would be under-
mined. Rawls' principles of justice are undergirded by
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in fleshing out the formal requirements of Stage 6 morality,
we cannot avoid the intrusion of social content, particularly
content about what constitutes harm or injury to persons.
31
But this content rests on an explanatory theory, the explan-
atory theory which undergirds society's image of persons.
As an example of this relationship between theory and
evaluation, consider the different evaluations of injury which
flow from our adopting one or another of the contending
theories of social inequality. One cannot claim redress for
.
an injury if inequality is the result of differential merit
and benefits everyone
- a claim which consensus theorists
like Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore make. But one does
have a claim if one adopts the conflict theorists' view
that inequality is the result either of the intentional
power drives of individuals (Gerhard Lenski) or the preser-
vation of the interests of a dominant class (Frank Parkin,
C. Wright Mills).
Kohlberg wants to argue that there is a difference be-
tween learning the content of morality and knowing the formal
rules of moral reasoning. Morality, for Kohlberg, is a form
assumptions about cultural invariance in the development of
autonomy? if all societies do develop in the direction
of differentiating persons as autonomous and responsible,
support is leant to his thesis.
31. R.S. Peters, "Moral Development! A Plea for Pluralism,"
in T. Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development , p. 2^7.
of practical reasoning independent of social content. But
certainly it might reasonably be argued that in order to
understand persons- reasons, we have to have some idea of „hat
they are reasoning about. To use Kohlberg. s own terms, we
need to know what confronts them as a dilemma. I believe
that it is here that Kohlberg makes a mistake in his com-
parison of Martin Luther King with Stokely Carmichael and H.
Rap Brown.
JST— LUther King j0ins a l0*S ^st of men who hadthe arrogance not only to teach justice but to liv2
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who questions the basis on which men erect their"
'
paltry sense of goodness who dies. 33
In the wake of assassinations of Black Panther and SLA
members, Kohlberg 's assertion becomes particularly dubious,
but it is still interesting to see why King epitomizes
goodness for him in a way Carmichael and Brown cannot.
King is a moral man, a moral teacher, because he has a
"...concern for the growth of justice in
. . . society."
...King was a moral leader, a moral educator of
adults, not because he was a spokesman for the
welfare of the Negroes, not because he was against
violence, not because he was a minister of religion,but because, as he said, he was a drum major for
ed. Irving Louis Horowitz ( Oxford i University Press, 1958).
33. Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," in Nancy F. and
Theodore R, Sizer, ed., It'oral Education (Cambridge i Harvard
University Press, 1968), p. 66.
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justice. His words and deeds were primarily designed
?
e America
^ respond to racial problems in
he ?ooV h^H
Senf °£ JU?J lce ' and a^y particular actiont k ad value for this reason and not just becauseof the concrete political end it might achieve. 3^
Now I have no quarrel with Kohlberg's portrait of King as
a Moral Agent; King obviously made political choices from
a moral point of view. But he also made those choices
in terms of an explanatory theory which supported the pos-
sibility of certain types of change, and of change through
particular means. King, as compared to Brown or to
• Carmichael, confronted a moral situation in which, as he
sawj/t, there was no conflict between the value of human
life and the value of human liberation. For King, liberation
of the Negro people was possible within existing social struc-
tures because that liberation was largely a matter of changing
attitudes, of moral education in Kohlberg's sense. (Indeed,
one might argue that King was assassinated as he moved away
from this position, and not, as Kohlberg would have it,
because he was a moral educator.) For Brown and Carmichael,
however, Black liberation was a matter of structural change,
of power relations, and, given their belief that white persons
had a clear interest in maintaining existing power relations,
violent confrontation became a more justifiable tactic.
Kohlberg himself argues that "...it is sometimes right to kill
because it is sometimes just," but since Kohlberg accepts
King's perception (or at least his own understanding of
King's perception) of what is out there to be reasoned about -
W* Ibid ., p. 68.
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what injuries are being done to persons, how and by whom -
he takes King to be a Moral Agent. Carmichael and Brown,
on the other hand, probably remain enigmas to Kohlbergi he
does not comprehend their explanatory framework.
The issue here is whether two persons at the same level
of moral development need, agree on all political issues.
Understanding h«w development occurs implies a commitment
to a liberated social order, but persons at the same level
of development can have different understandings of how
they got there. Further, the idea of a liberated social
order implies that persons are not injured t injury is certainly
a concept upon whose definition all do not agree.
There are formal requirements for determining whether
something constitutes an injury. One such requirement is
that the harm not be caused by some natural condition but
that it be the result of human agency (a flood would not be
an injury but if a flood victim is not aided where aid is
available, that person has suffered an injury). More im-
portantly, what counts as an injury has reference to an
explanatory theory. If we assume that inequalities are
necessary in order to perform socially necessary functions
and that they therefore work to the advantage of all, then
there is no injury in these inequalities. However, if we
assume that social inequality is not the inevitable result
of differential merit and the performance of vitally nec-
essary tasks, and moreover is injurious to the development
of at least some persons, then the inequalities are infringe-
ments on persons which carry a claim against society.
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Respect for persons carries with it certain assumptions
about what it means to be a person, and these assumptions in
turn are linked to our conceptions of injury. But these
assumptions are also rooted in different social contexts,
although, if Piaget is correct, the variation is within
certain broadly defined limits. The formal principle of
respect for persons is inextricably linked with the ways
in which societies structure relationships between persons.
For instance, if we live under Durkheimian nomic conditions,
we may perceive the needs, wants, and purposes of individuals
in terms of limits, roles, a division of labor, etc. The
schedule of human needs, wants and purposes will be radically
different from a schedule developed by persons who experience
•liberated* social relationships. The latter will be more
likely to view persons as role creators rather than role
takers, as having capacities for development which ought
to be encouraged, and as being harmed by alienating divisions
•f labor. The social context sets the terms in which we
view persons, not so much in the culturally relativistic
sense that every culture sees persons in completely different
ways, but in the structuralist sense that societies structured
along different lines - varying between heteronomy and
autonomy - encourage radically different conceptions of
persons, and radically different conceptions of what con-
stitutes an injury to persons.
Cultural context also infects our understanding of respect
for persons and injury in another way. As an example, let
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us assume that respect for persons means that every
person must have a fair opportunity to develop his or
her potential as a full human being. However, the
idea of a full human being is bound up in a social con-
text which places greater and lesser value on certain
types of skills and certain types of achievement.
35
In an article entitled "Violence and the Rule of Law,"
Bernard Harrison argues that every society carefully de-
fines those spheres in which merit or achievement is to
be rewarded. For example, a capitalist society values
and rewards entrepeneurial skills. If we wish to call
into question this system of distribution of rewards and
punishments
- if we wish to move beyond demands for
equal opportunities to develop entrepeneurial skills and
to achieve in the capitalist stratification system - then
we must post alternative forms of human excellence and
demand that these excellences also be rewarded. For example,
we might demand that physical stamina be more highly rewarded
than entrepeneurial skills, which would result in reversing
the present hierarchy of income, status and power. Some
alternative conception of persons would cast doubt upon equality
J5~. The implications are quite clearly drawn in R. Herrnstein
"IQ ,
"
The Atlantic. September, 1971, pp. 43 - ok, Herrnstein
describes the oligarchy which inevitably develops out of a
meritocracy which is assumedly fair yet weights competition
in favor of those who have inherited abilities.
36. Frank Parkin suggest this alternative in Class Inequality
and Political Order (New Yorki Praeger, 19?1).
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•f opportunity for those whose talents were not recognized
by the value system built into capitalism. The broadest
critical alternative would promote the valuing of any human
excellence, but obviously some achievements will be of no
value in a given "real" society - a master ice-box maker
would hardly be applauded by the Eskimos. However, this
alternative would provide the broadest interpretation of
respect for persons i by adopting this idea - that any achieve-
ment is worthy of respect - one could perceive structural
•injustices to which one was previously blind. These struc-
tural injustices are not simply the closing of opportunities
for success in prevailing terms to particular groups or
persons, but the de-valuing of particular skills and modes
of human excellence. Closed opportunities for groups who
have not hitherto succeeded in established fields might require
compensatory inequalities. The more radical demand would
require a radical restructuring of basic social values so
37
that alternative human excellences would be rewarded.
Finally, the means by which opportunities are closed and
skills and talents de-valued are perceived through different
37. The difference is important for distinguishing between
the demands of liberal and radical feminists. However, there
are serious dangers in pressing for one to the exclusion of
the 'other. Both seem to be essential elements in the stance
of a Moral Agent; both flow out of a theory of human devel-
opment and respect for persons. Indeed, there are dangers
in overemphasizing the radical position since it could
easily be subverted into a separate spheres doctrine.
explanatory theories. For example, in his The^pf_JusU
John Rawls does not find any conflict between capitalism
and his principles of justice because he does not regard
private ownership of property as closing opportunities to
persons. Obviously, much has been said on the opposing
side and the debate is terribly important. And as S.I.
Benn and W.L. Weinstein point out, "...it is a well-estab-
lished move in radical argument to call in question the
hitherto given initial conditions, like property insti-
tutions, by arguing that they do close alternatives other-
wise available, because there is nothing illegitimate nor
ically absurd in envisaging a social order in which they
would be absent or at least different."^
8
II. b. Affective commitment and political action
i
the problem of saintliness
Not only does political action involve a conceptual
38. S.I. Benn and W.L. Weinstein, "Being Free to Act.
and Being a Free Man," Mind 80 (April, 1971) , 194-211.
Much has been said about the implications of different ex-planatory theories for Feminist action and intense disputeshave taken place over' just what constitutes the source ofinjury to women. One's sense of injury is not arbitrary
1
explanatory theories flow out of our life experiences - ourperspectives are those of social and historical beings -
and this may have a great deal to do with the debate now
raging among Socialist, Radical Feminist and Lesbian women.
A good review of these debates on the level of explanatory
theory can be found in Zillah Eisenstein's "Connections
Between Class and Sexi Moving Towards a Theory of Liberati
paper presented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Women's Caucus Panel, New
Orleans, September 4-8, 1973. (Mimeographed.)
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link between explanatory theory and moral reasoning, it
involves an affective element, m the True Believer version
•t P.litioal action, a sharp dichotomy was drawn between the
passionate motivation of the True Believer and the reasoned
action of the rational political agent.
39
it is this dich-
otomy that I now wish to call into question by indicating
aome of the ways in which emotional and cognitive development
are linked.
Kohlberg suggests that cognitive and emotive development
run parallel to each other.
In contrast to irrational emotive theories of moraldevelopment such as those of Durkheim and ?J
anf
n
^ff
e
"t?
Vel ° Prnental View h^ds%
1
Lr'cognition"
e
d af ect' are different aspects, or perspectives
h^t t S1"6 me?tal events » ™at all mental eventsave both cognitive and affective aspects and th*+
rt^i;^* of m-ta^^-po3itionrJefi:c ts ata^e^ in^ cognitive
Unfortunately, one cannot be entirely sure what Kohlberg
means in this passage, whether cognition and affect are
two sides of a "mental event" or whether reason and affect
are somehow internally linked to each other. He is pursuing
a fruitful avenue when he argues that sentiments include a
39. I want to be clear that the model of the rational Bali-H^iagent developed in the last chapter is clearly roofed in lalha social conception of the person and in an artLuUted visionof human needs. The dichotomy is not between abstract indi-vidualism and social being, nor between abstract reason andemotional needs, but between action constrained by self-interestand action compelled by passion.
^i^Kohlb?o?' "Fr0m is t0 0uSht »" P. 189i see also LawrenceKohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence i The Cognitive-Developmental
Approach to Socialization," in D. Goslin, ed., Handbook of
social Theory and Research (New York, Rand McNplly, 1969)
"
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conceptual dimension, that our •feelings' are given different
names depending on our stage of moral development. But this
may mean only that our feelings remain the same and that we
change their names. Kohlberg also argues that affect is
neither moral or immoral, "The moral channeling of mechanisms
(of effect) themselves are cognitive." This statement
leads one to suspect that Kohlberg does not see real differ-
ences between the emotions as cognitions develop, but rather
that cognitions channel the old emotions in new ways. What
Kohlberg seems to have done here is to reverse the relation-
ship between reason and passion which we find in the True
Believer model rather than clarifying the dialectical re-
lationship between the two.
Three things need to be said about reason and the
passions to clarify the model I wish to support. The first
of these has to d© with the internal relationship between
reasons and passions which is best stated in the following
lengthy quotation from Stuart Hampshire* s Thought and Action
.
/T/he range of the emotions, feelings and attitudes of
mind, identified and distinguished from each other,
changes as the forms of human knowledge develop. We
identify new emotions and attitudes that have never
been recognized before. With a new self-consciousness,
and with the extended vocabulary that goes with it, we
Ibid
., p. 230.
42. Alston argues that Kohlberg ignores the emotive aspect of
moral judgments. Kohlberg, he says "...is to be given a great
deal of credit for doing some very hard and very unfashionable
thinking on moral thought as a subject of interest in its own
right, and for producing evidence that should force psycholo-
gists to take the cognitive aspects of morality seriously as
an important influence on behavior. However, like all
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discover new motives for action and new obiects
"
reflectivH
0' 1^ 1 intentio»s are directed Iflective man is aware that he would have rec-
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°f customary intentions, unlesse abandons any claim to rationality or finds bv
^nioUai- C °?PariS0ns^hat his habits have somephilosophical ground. ^3
Passions, like reasons are not presocial; they are socially
and historically specific and flow out of social relationships
which vary with time and place. They are rather like things
that happen tc us, but that should not imply that we cannot
be reflective about them. Reflective persons do not simply
introject socially imposed emotions. They are capable of
sensing the specificity of their own emotional repertoire and
reflecting upon alternative possibilities. This is an ex-
tremely important point for the developmental thesis which
is, in a way, similar to a movement from culture to culture,
or language game to language game. If this analogy holds,
champions of the neglected, Kohlberg has not been able to
resist the temptation to overstate his case. From being the
outcast stepdaughter, moral thought must not only be restored
to its rightful place as a sovereign of the court i it must be
elevated into an absolute sovereign." William Alston, "Comments
on Kohlberg' s 'From is to Ought,'" in T. Mischel, ed.
,
Cognitive
Development, p..2?8.
43. Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York, Viking Press
1959).
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then in talking about cognitive development we need also
talk about emotional development, and this relationship is
hardly ignored in Piaget 's work. In a moment I will look
at John Rawls' explication of this relationship, but there
are two preliminary points which need to be drawn out first.
The first of these also has to do with the internal
relationship between reason and passion. Passions (like
reasons) are theory imbued j emotion concepts - politically
important ones like indignation, for example - need to be
seen as resting on theoretical assumptions about persons,
that is on beliefs. Secondly, the theory of moral develop-
ment as constructed by Piaget rests firmly on an emotive
base. Clarification of Piaget' s image of the relationship
between macro-structures of unilateral and mutual rccpcct and
micro-structures of individual 'needs' helps us get at Piaget 's
sense of persons as social beings, and at his understanding
of the internal links between reason and passion.
For Piaget, moral development must be understood as
the product of an interaction between social structures - the
44
ideal types of social interaction - and cognitive structures.
Much of the analysis in this dissertation is on the macro
level, but Piaget is very explicit that the child him/herself
is part of an interaction process. The child's own development
confirms or denies the social environment. For example, the
externality of moral injunctions at the stage of heteronomy
is confirmed by the child's general realism at certain ages.
The child's own lack of a sense of intentionality is confirmed
by punishment meted out in terms of the consequences of acts.
The relationship between society and individual is dialectical.
In some ways, Piaget seems almost to argue that there is a
biological unfolding which is part of human development, but
that this unfolding can be aided or impeded by the social
relations in which the child is implicated. See Piaget,
Moral Judgment
, p. 84, and Genetic Epistemology (New Yorki
W.W, Norton, 1971).
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These cognitive structures, however, clearly incorporate an
emotive element, and it is this element which demands clari-
fication.
John Rawls version of the Piagetian model directly con-
fronts Kohlberg's Platonism. Kohlberg has problems with the
question "Why be moral?" because he has not firmly embedded
moral reasoning in a total theory of personality, a theory which
would incorporate the emotional side of human development.
He offers the reasoning game as if it were a choice, as if
one could either take it or leave it. What Rawls does is
to show that the reasoning game is internal to one's develop-
ment as a person and is part of the human capacity to feel
and to enter into rich reactive relationships.
/If/ men did not do what justice requires, not
only would they not regard themselves as boundby the principles of justice, but they would be
incapable of feeling resentment and indignation
and they would be without ties of friendship and
mutual trust. They would lack certain essential
elements of humanity. 46
47For Rawls, morality does not consist solely of reasoning.
4
zn>T See Phillipa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," Procedings of the
Aristotelian Society 59 (1958-1959) »86-89, for a discussion
of this issue.
46. John Rawls, "The Sense of Justice," Philosophical Review
72 (July 1963), P. 281.
47. Indeed, a defense of pure reason is not critical to
neo-cognitivist ethics. Piaget argues that children often
act at a higher moral stage than they can reason at because
they have developed moral habits beyond their cognitive
abilities. Neo-cognitive ethics and the theory of moral
development does not exclude the development of character
traits nor the role of habituation in morality.
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Moral personality is dual, it involves both affect and
cognition.
But duality is perhaps a misleading term since Rawls'
purpose is to show that there are internal links between
emotion concepts and belief concepts at different levels
of development. Wore specifically, Rawls' three stages
•f moral development are associated with three concepts
of 'guilt'
- 'authority guilt' with heteronomy, 'association
guilt' with an association morality, and 'principle guilt'
• with autonomy. Morality is not only identified with different
conceptions of guilt j moral development is pictured as
highly dependent upon persons' ability to experience certain
feelings, 'natural attitudes', or 'needs.'
The first stage in the sequence of moral development
Rawls terms the morality of authority (Piaget's heteronomous
morality). This morality is a product of the 'family'
structure - a structure of unilateral respect - and it is
based on the first of three psychological laws.
First law i given that family institutions are just,
and that the parents love the child and manifestly
express their love by caring for his good, then
the child, recognizing their evident love of him,
comes to love them.^°
Because the child loves the 'parent' and wishes to obey
that parent despite the fact that injunctions are not
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Belknap
Press, 1971), p. %W.
104
"understood," s/he comes to accept parental commands as
obligatory and sees them as massively real.
Zlt7 is characteristic of the child's situation thathe is not m a position to assess the validity of theprecepts and injunctions addressed to him by thosein this case his parents. He lacksboth the knowledge and the understanding on theoasis of which their guidance can be challengedIndeed, the child lacks the concept of justificationaltogether, this being acquired much later.**
If children love and trust their parents (if their con-
duct towards them warrant it), then they develop a need to
obey them and a sense of guilt - "authority guilt" - which
•arises when there is "...a breach of the relation of love and
trust with the authoritative person." But this morality of
external constraint is unstable because parental injunctions
are not in line with what children want to do? if they were,
there would be no need for them. Morality at this stage
conflicts with the hedonistic needs of children? there are
unresolved tensions between self and society which continue
to threaten the equilibrium of the child's morality.
At stage two, the stage of association morality, persons
develop a sense of what it means to follow rules, and this
tension begins to be resolved as persons come to see the
necessity of cooperative needs satisfaction. At this stage,
we find a morality of role-taking, a morality of association.
W. Ibid ., p. 463.
50. Rawls, "The Sense of Justice," p. 287.
51. We might want to call this a transition stage between
heteronomous and autonomous rule-following since it encompasses
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The content of the morality of association isgiven by the moral standards appropriate to theindividual's role in the various associations
to which he belongs. These standards include thecommon sense rules of morality along with the ad-justments required to fit them to a person 'sparticular position; and they are impressed uponhim by the approval and disapproval of thosein authority, or by the otherirembers of thegroup. 52
This morality is built upon the feelings of fellowship
and trust which persons develop from engaging in cooperative
activities.
Second lawi given that a person's capacity forfellow feeling has been realized by acquiring
attachments in accordance with the first law,
and given that a social arrangement is just and
publicly known by all to be just, then this
person develops ties of friendly feeling and
trust toward others in the association as they
with evident intention comply with their duties
and obligations and live up to the ideals of
their station. 53
Persons feel "association guilt" when they fail to fulfill
their obligations to friends and associates.
Kohlberg's stages 3-5 and clarifies the distinction between
Stage 5 and Stage 6 moralities. There are important differ-
ences between Rawls middle stage and Piaget's transitional
egalitarian stage. For Piaget, children begin to feel the
effects of relationships of mutual respect at about age 7 or
8 andto express this in terms of an absolute equality. The
transition is not so much a transition from heteronomy to
autonomy at this point, but a change in the sense of equality.
By age 11 or 12, children have moved from absolute equality
to equity. "Instead of looking for equality in identity,
the child no longer thinks of the equal rights of individuals
except in relation to the particular situation of each." This
opens the way to compensatory inequalities and may be espec-
ially important in political judgments.
52. Rawls, Theory , p. 467.
53. Ibid ., p. 490.
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It seems to me that this stage of morality runs
parallel to the autonomous morality developed in the
preceding chapter. Especially in pluralist societies
where persons have opportunities to experience a wide
variety of roles does this stage conform to that version
of autonomous morality. Indeed, the following passage
from Rawls' work could well have been written by a
theorist in the True Believer made*
Thus the morality of association includes a
large number of ideals each defined in ways
suitable for the respective status or role.
Our moral understanding increases as we move
in the course of life through a sequence of
positions. The corresponding sequence of ideals
requires increasingly greater intellectual judgment
and finer moral discriminations. Clearly some of
these ideals are also more comprehensive than
others and maka^quite different demands upon
the individual.
In a pluralist society, persons have the opportunity to
reach the kind of autonomous morality described in the
last chapter. This is the contract morality we find at
Kohlberg's stage 5. Yet we need to ask whether this
morality, based as it is on a division of labor and on
role-playing is a truly autonomous morality. In one sense,
Rawls seems to argue that it is. The transitional stage
is built upon an understanding of the cooperative basis of
social life.
In due course a person works out a conception of the
whole system of cooperation that defines the assoc-
iation and the ends which it serves. He knows that
W. Ibid . , p. 468.
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others have different things to do depending
upon their place in the cooperative scheme. Thushe eventually learns to take up their point of
view and to see things from their perspective. 55
But the purpose of putting ourselves in the other's position
is to discover what they expect us to do, that is, to dis-
cover our duties and obligations and to win the approval
of others. Thus the morality of association remains a
heteronomous morality, especially to the extent that our
56
motives for being good are cues from the outside.
J5~. Ibid .
56. Rawls rests his arguments on a tacit approval of thedivision of labor. But if a society lacks a division of
labor, does this mean that moral development will be retarded
Can persons develop under unalienated social structures? If
not, there are serious implications for Marxist theory.
But I think that a commitment to the division of labor is not
essential to this model and that the model is compatible with
a Marxist perspective. Piaget does speak of a division of
labor also, but his emphasis is always on the differences
in structured social relationships. His argument for
pluralism is not that the more complex and demanding social
roles are, the greater the opportunity for development
through conflict - although this is part of his thesis - but
more that there is greater opportunity for experiencing
relations of mutual respect. Piaget is critical of Durkheim
for failing to distinguish between the two types of social
relations and for treating morality as a unity. He agrees
with Durkheim that our rules derive from our social life,
but he argues that Durkheim lacks a theory of autonomy.
Durkheim is correct about the morality of duty but fails to
develop a morality of autonomy. "The analysis of the child's
moral judgments has led us perforce to the discussion of the
great
^
problem of the relations of social life to the rational
consciousness. The conclusion we came to was that the morali
prescribed for the individual by society is not homogeneous
because society itself is not just one thing. Society is
the sum of social relations, and among these...we can dis-
tinguish two extreme types 1 relations of constraint, whose
characteristic is to impose upon the individual from outside
a system of rules with obligatory content, and relations of
cooperation whose characteristic is to create within people's
minds the consciousness of idea norms at the back of all
rules." ( ivoral Judgment , p. 395) If we can argue that cooper-
ation need not be rooted in a division of labor, then we nave
an argument in favor of the compatibility of Piaget 's thesis
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Autonomous morality is the attachment to principles
for their own sake rather than for the sake of avoiding
disapproval or winning approval. At the stage of principled
morality, persons have come to recognize the value for
themselves and others of their involvement in a well-
ordered society.
w+^H iCadS.^ an accePtanc e of ^the principles ofjustice/ by a third psychological law. This law
states that once the attitudes of love and trust, andof friendly feelings and mutual confidence, have beengenerated in accordance with the two preceding psvch-ological laws, then the recognition that we and thosefor whom we care are the beneficiaries of an estab-lished and enduring just institution tends to engenderin us the corresponding sense of justice. We develop
a desire to apply and to act upon the principles ofjustice once we realize how social arrangements an-
swering to them have promoted our good and that ofthose with whom we are affiliated. 57
We develop a concomitant sense of guilt - we will "...
feel guilt for infractions which harm other persons even
though these persons are not objects of any particular
fellow feelings." This is principle guilt. "One might say
that principle guilt is guilt proper. It is, as the two
58previous forms of guilt were not, a complete moral feeling."
It is complete because it is the full expression of human
feelings, and its absence indicates the absence of a kind
with alienation theory. I think we can so argue, and I
suggest the compatibility in my final chapter where I
argue for •liberation 1 as 'dis-alienation. • To make the
necessary arguments here, however, would move well beyond
the scope of this dissertation.
57. Rawls, Theory , p. 474.
58. Rawls, "Sense," p. 292.
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of humarmess,
/One/ who lacks a sense of iustice laek«
.
fundamental attitudes and capacities included under
-
the notion of humanity.
.. .Now the fact that one who
«i« \lt*T °f+ 3ustjce - a"d thereby a liabmty to
fcities i« n-5 ?-
a
i" £
u?dame"tal attitudes and cao-
i
8 t to be taken as a reason for actine asjustice dictates. But it has this significance? bvunderstanding what it would be like not to have*sense of justice
- that it would be to lack plrt of
a^ssaj^" we are ied *• accept « havLf
It is this sentiment which makes it possible for us to feel
resentment and indignation, shame and remorse, guilt and
responsibility. The capacity to feel these emotions is part
Pf what it means to be a person, to have certain human
characteristics and needs.
What I maintain here is that our needs, wants, and
purposes are internally related to our activities, to our
human relationships. As our activities and relationships
change, so too do our needs, wants and purposes. But our
needs, wants and purposes are also the grounds from which
we critically evaluate existing practises. How is this
possible if they are constituted by those practises?
The key to coming to grips with this thorny issue lies
in our understanding that societies are not unified entities,
experienced monolithically by their members. Rather, we may
in some of our activities have the opportunity to develop
needs, wants and purposes which allow us to reflect critically
upon other practises in which we engage. If Piaget is correct,
59". Rawls, Theory
, pp. 488-489.
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most of us do develop critical abilities, do develop the
ability to understand what it means to follow rules and to
understand that rules can be altered, and do develop a
•need* to be moral persons.
Persons who experience well-ordered social lives, to
use Rawls' expression, develop a 'need' to be moral persons,
persons who experience less than well-ordered social lives
remain at lower levels of 'needs' development. Moral
learning, then, is more than formal cognitive development,
more than the acquisition of concepts. The idea of 'needs'
encompasses an emotive content as well, a content which also
flows out the structural features of unilateral or mutual
respect. To paraphrase Rawls' rather extensive discussion,
in a well-ordered society, persons move along in their mural
development
- in their development as persons - because they
experience or feel the benefits of participating in this
order. They acquire motives to be good - as well as the
ability to know the good - as they experience the value of
, .
_ 60
life organized along the principles of a well-ordered society.
Indeed persons can often act on reasons at a higher stage than
the one they can formulate reasons for on the cognitive level
which means that persons have a 'need' to be good before they
understand what the 'good' is. Piaget's understanding of
moral development is built upon the very type of emotional
50l Ibid ., pp. 453-512.
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sensitization^which others have argued is essential te>
moral growth. He maintains that children experience
the rewards of rule-following and act out of motives in-
duced by these rewards long before they can articulate the
abstract principles of reasoning at any particular level
of development.
The point is that moral learning is contingent upon
the acquisition of moral feelings which in turn depend upon
the development of ties of affection and trust. We do,
as Peters suggests, need to care about moral principles.
Thus reason and passion are not two forces in conflict with
each other. Their relationship is an internal one. The
moral feelings are not raw emotions channeled by cognitions?
the feelings themselves are made possible by cognitions,
particularly cognitions or beliefs about oneself and others
as persons.
Passions (like reasons) are theory imbuded. If we
accept this statement, then emotion concepts like 'indignation'
can be seen as resting on theoretical assumptions about
persons, about ourselves and others. These theoretical
FT. Peters, "A Plea for Pluralism."
62. Perhaps something ought to be said here about 'rewards'
so that the thesis is not interpreted as some variant of
stimulus-response theory. It seems to me that the very
idea of rewards changes with moral development and that S-R
theory is mistaken in assuming an abstract model of pleasure-
seeking and pain-avoidance. Rewards at the stage of author-
itarian morality are the love of parents and avoidance of
punishment; at the stage of association morality, rewards
also consist in the esteem of others. But at the stage of
principled morality, reward lies in reciprocal relations of
warmth and trust, mutual respect and 'personality'.
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assumptions are also part of our moral development and
are specific to particular types of social relations.
Relations of mutual respect encourage our capacity to
see ourselves and others as persons. This capacity under-
girds our ability to have certain feelings. We feel shame
at not having lived up to self
-expectations, and we feel
regret when we fail to fulfill the requirements of morality,
A man's morality is shown by the type of question of
conduct that he takes seriously, by the type ofdecision about which he is prepared to reflect
carefully, and to entertain genuine and reasoned
criticisms.
.. .An expression of regretis like an expression of envy, admiration, anger,fear, or hope, in at least one respect. It is not
the announcement of a feeling, infallably identifiedby its felt quality; it is rather the announcement
of a feeling, m this case a feeling of unpleasure
associated with a thought of the past, together
with the identification of an object and the announce-
ment of an inclination to behave in a certain wav in
the future. 6 3
Thus emotion concepts like regret have built into them
certain beliefs about human capacities, in this case the
capacity to act intentionally. Regret has built into it
certain beliefs about what one ought to do; it implies
the ability to reflect on our past actions, to seek new
reasons for action, although it does not entail action.
We may regret an act and yet continue to engage in it in
the future.
But emotion concepts also have built into them beliefs
about others, beliefs that others are persons like ourselves.
We believe others to be like ourselves in their ability to
63. Hampshire, Thought and Action
, pp. 240-242.
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feel pleasure and pain, to formulate intentions, to feel
affection, trust, etc., and to develop as autonomous
beings. We have beliefs about the ways in which others
can be injured, and we have expectations about the behavior
of persons toward each other. When persons injure each other
or injure us, we feel either 'indignation' or 'resentment'.
Both these emotion concepts imply our understanding of
others as rational, purposive agents, responsible for their
actions. If others were not responsible for their actions
•
-
if we were to believe that they were not actors in at
least some respects - then we could feel neither resentment
nor indignation. Our beliefs about others are central
to how we treat them and to how we expect them to treat us.
But since our beliefs about others flow out the types
of relations we have with them, it matters very much what our
ordinary interpersonal relationships are like. These vary
in form and in content j therefore, our view of others (and
of ourselves) varies in form and content. If we do not
enjoy the more developed forms of inter-relationships, we
will not enjoy the more developed forms of moral feeling,
including the ability to feel indignation, shame and prin-
65
cipled guilt. It is important to look at the structure
P.F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in P.F.
Strawson, ed,, Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and
Action (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968)7 See
pages 84—88 for a discussion of intentionality, responsibility,
and the moral feelings.
65. It is difficult to imagine what attitudes one might have
toward persons in positions of absolute authority over oneself.
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of interpersonal relationships - at the mix of authority
and equality as seen from the point of view of each party
to the relationship
- to understand what emotions might under-
gird action in that particular social context. Insofar as
relationships tend toward equality - at least as the injured
party sees her/himself as the moral equal of the insurer -
there will be a potential for resentment and indignation
which could provide the motives to action lacking where one
of the parties - in particular the injured party - does not
.
view her/himself or the ©ne who has injured him/her as a person.
Finally, our having certain moral notions and emotions
leads us to expect others to have them also and act towards
us in terms of them. These expectations lend support to
our treating others as persons and give rise to feelings of
guilt when we transgress their humanity. "/Q/ne who feels
guilty, recognizing his action as a transgression of the
legitimate claims ©f others, expects them to resent his
conduct and to penalize him in various ways. He also
66
assumes that third parties will be indignant with him."
This combination of belief and affect is tremendously
important for our understanding of political action. If
one adopts the position that passions precede values, one will
But since relationships are never pure, resentment and
indignation are possible even in the most authoriarian
societies. It may, however, be difficult to act upon because
of the differences in power of the parties. This is important
for social change since it will be difficult to determine
when an oppressed group feels indignation toward its
oppressive if it never expresses this attitude in action.
66. Rawls, Theory , p. 383.
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have a radically different conception of political motivation
than if one adopts the view thati
5^?erai' is a necessary condition and a
ex^mti^ Ur\° f m°ral feelinSs that the person's
?Si5^ifon . 1?v?k?s a m^al concept and its assoc-iated principle (s) and thereby makes reference toan acknowledged rignt or wrong. 6? i *°
It becomes clearer how moral principles can be guides to
political action when one sees that emotion-concepts are
linked to levels of moral development, thus giving rise to
different motives for action. If analysts fail to see this
point, they will tend either to take passion - e.g. 'frustration*
-
as the only spring to action, or to limit motives to the
constraints of self-interest, obligation and duty. We
need to have moved to Piagefs third stage of development
in order to see that at least some social activists are
motivated by what Rawls' terms "the sense of justice," and
68
its related "guilt proper."
II. c. Reasons and actions
I think it is important at this point to pick up on
several warnings which have been expressed throughout this
chapter that this model of political motivation has reference
W* Rawls, "Sense," p. 295.
68. I want to be clear that if a society is organized in cer-
tain ways, it will be very difficult for "guilt proper" to
flourish. This is the reason, I think, why most political
action in the United Stages is motivated by reasons and
passions at the second of Rawls* three stages? it is rare
to find persons at the third stage, and I would suggest that
it may well be persons who have have been excluded from the
dominant social structures and who are implicated in sub-
cultures who do develop. I think this is the reason why
the Women's Movement has benefited from its stress on egal-
itarianism in "consciousness-raising" groups.
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only to potentialities. To say that a person had a reason
for action and also the concomitant feelings is not to say
that s/he acted or will act. Our ability to perceive
certain kinds of social practises as injurious, and our
ability to feel certain kinds of emotions has no necessary
connection to political action.
Indeed, we may have a reason for acting in a way which
we think would be right and good, and yet find ourselves act-
ing in quite another way. There are several reasons for this.
First, we may feel quite indignant about a particular social
practise, and yet feel powerless to change it. Or we may
even feel that were we to know what to do, we could indeed do
it, but we lack a clear idea of what to do. We lack a stra-
tegy for change. Or we may feel guilty about a social prac-
tise, feeling ourselves in some way benefitted by it while
others are injured, and yet fail to act to change that prac-
tise. An excellent example of this sort of instance is the
phenomena known as "white guilt." Most liberals have probably
experienced the feeling that they are beneficiaries of racism,
the feeling that somehow they are partially responsible for
its perpetuation, but have not felt that they could do any-
thing about it.
Or we may have very good overriding reasons for not
acting on our moral judgments. For example, I have a moral
reason to go to my Aunt's house when she is ill because she
would be happy to see me. Now I may not be able to go for
any number of reasons, some of which are overriding moral
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considerations
- my daughter is also ill and I cannot
leave her alone in order to visit my Aunt - some of which
are circumstances beyond my control - I am also ill and
cannot get out of bed. I may have non-moral considerations
in mind
- I lack the airfare to get to Chicago where my
Aunt lives. (This assumes that I accept the rule that I
ought to pay for my flight.)
Then there is the thorny problem of when we should be
critical of existing social practises. Certainly we cannot
•
afford to be critical at all times; we would, I think, go
mad if we did not acquiesce to some extent to existing
practises. There has to be some background normality to
frame our critique of specific practises.
A related problem is how much can we affort to criticize
ourselves. Can we emotionally afford to be forever evaluating,
regretting and feeling shame over own actions. To be thor-
oughly self-critical would be to lose sight of ourselves;
we have to maintain a certain level of consistency in our
own self-image in order not to go mad. However, we may also
have conflicting ideals of ourselves and have to choose
which to live up to. A brilliant example of a person con-
fronting conflicting ideals is Doris Lessing's character Kate
Brown in The Summer Before the Dark
. As the result of an
illness, Kate is dissociated from her normal self - responsible,
efficient organizer of household and business - and is thrust
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into a condition of relatively total 'freedom.* m this
condition, Kate meets Maureen, a young woman confronting
the choice between marriage and what she perceives as 'freedom.'
Maureen demands advise from Kate who refuses to respond. She
cannot, for to make the choice in the terms Maureen sets
would be for Kate to repudiate herself. She recoils from
the madness of self-repudiation and determines to temper
her(normal) self with a decree of the radical freedom she
has learned.
There may also be problems resulting from the ways in
which our emotions can stand in the way of reasoned and
healthy action. As Rawls saysi
None of this is to deny xnat our existing moral
feelings may be in many respects irrational andinjurious to our good. Freud is right in his
view that these attitudes are often "punitive and
blind, incorporating many of the harsher aspects
of the authority situation in which they were first
acquired. Resentment and indignation, feelings of
guilt and remorse, a sense of duty and the censure
of others, often take perverse and destructive forms,
and blunt without reason human spontaneity and
enjoyment. °^
The theory of cognitive development does not deny the
Freudian thesis that persons can get "blocked" at certain
stages in their development, nor does it imply that devel-
opment means that we leave all prior stages behind as we
enter new ones. We are who we have been; we do not shed
the needs of earlier stages as we progress to later ones,
although we may perhaps gain a clearer understanding of
Rawls, Theory, 489.
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those needs and a greater ability to control them as we
come to see their rootedness in a social life which we
ourselves create. Nor does the theory of cognitive devel-
opment deny the Freudian contribution to our understanding of
the unconscious. Our conscious motives do often conceal
underlying unconscious ones. Perhaps as we develop a
greater ability to reason, we are simply giving ourselves
more ways of deceiving ourselves about the purity of our
motives. That we understand the principle of respect for
persons does not mean that we might not use this principle
-to rationalize actions which serve our far more selfish
interests.
Then there are our "gut" reactions in the face of which
we are often expected to exercise great rationalitv and
70
control. These may be an especially difficult problem
in political situations where strong emotions - e.g.,
anger and hostility - come into play because our interests
- and possibly our lives - are in danger. To control these
certainly requires our having developed character traits
like self-control, will-power, and perhaps what we might
call the "habit " of being rational in the face of emotionally
71
charged situations. Our affective commitments to others -
70~. See "Robert Paul Wolff, "Marcuse's Theory of Toleration,"
Poli^Y. 6 (Summer, 197*0 »4-69-^79, for a discussion of this
problem. Wolff's example is that he would find it impossible
to perform a tracheotomy regardless of how clearly he
recognized its necessity.
71. Peters, "A Plea for Pluralism,"
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ouzusaring for them - will also support us in doing what
-we perceive is right.
III. The conditions under which moral development can succeed
In the last chapter we saw that writers in the True
Believer mode took successful moral development to be the
introjection of a variety of external demands. No one of
these demands determines action; rather conflict among them
allows a latitude of freedom necessary for autonomous
choice. The model developed here contrasts that version
of moral development with the theory of cognitive develop-
ment, a theory which assumes that development results from
an interaction between structures at the individual (micro)
and social (macro) levels. This latter version is in
partial agreement with the pluralist model developed in the
preceding chapter since it is assumed that the greater the
opportunities for varied social experience, the greater
the opportunity for moral development. The social conditions
for moral development in both models are social structures
which approximate the conditions of pluraLism.
However, there is a vitally important difference be-
tween the images of pluralism upon which each model is built.
Analysts who adopt Piaget's framework place an additional
requirement on social structures and that is that at least
some of these structures satisfy the criteria of vvhat
Rawls terms a "well-ordered society." It is not enough
for persons to be exposed to a variety of role-taking
opportunities; the form of role-taking must meet the
requirements of moral development.
While role taking in the form of sympathy often
extends more broadly than the sense of justice,
organized or 'principled' forms of role taking
are defined by justice structures.
.. .Because
the central mechanisms of role taking are justice
structures of reciprocity and equality, insti-
tutions better organized in terms of justice
provide greater opportunities for role taking
and a sense of sharedness than do unjust insti-
tutions. 72
But there are problems with this notion of justice struc-
tures. One problem is that Kohlberg may have so broadened
the concept of justice as to include every possible criteria
of the good society. If he has done so, he is open to
criticism from those who wish to retain justice as a dis-
tributive concept and differentiate it from, for example,
the concept benevolence. Moreover, if Marx is correct,
and every "justice" structure is constructed to protect the
interests of a dominant class, it is important for Kohlberg
to be clear about what differentiates his "justice structures"
from those which are exploitative. To avoid these problems,
I would rather emply the notion of 'liberated social struc-
tures, ' a phrase which I think captures the essential
features of Piaget's structures of mutual respect.
72l Kohlberg, "Is-Ought," p. 193.
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For Piaget, it is the quality of role-taking which is
vital to moral development. Quality varies with the
structure of human relationships. In relationships of
unilateral respect, persons take on the role expected of
them by those in positions of authority. The interests
of the authority remain external to the individual and
in conflict with his own interests. S/he does not have
the opportunity to act as though her/his own interests
mattered, nor can s/he take on the role of the authority
since the latter occupies a different social position.
Action is governed by roles set by authority figures. These
roles are massively real for the individual, especially for
the child whose own cognitive structure is still at the
stage Piaget describes as "nominal realism."
Now, moral constraint is closely akin to intellectual
constraint, and the strictly literal character which
the child tends to ascribe to rules received from
without bears... a close resemblance to the attitudes
he adopts with regard to language and the intellectual
realities imposed upon him by the adult. We can make
73. Kohlberg is unclear about what he means by justice
structures and how they contribute to moral development. He
seems to suggest that they are valuable because they provide
greater opportunities for role-taking, and he criticizes
Piaget* s focus on autonomy and peer group relations as
confusing the form and content of moral thought. "There
is nothing more cognitively mature to preferring a peer than
an adult." (Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 22.) What
Kohlberg has done is to misinterpret Piaget' s purpose, which
is not to predict the direction of moral development based on
a logical sequence of concept acquisition, but to understand
the conditions under which morality qua morality might develop.
««! S S
a
?
al°^ to fix our nomenclature and shallspeak of moral realism to designate on the plane ofjudgments of value what corresponds to 'nominal
+tl i?"
an
2 !v
Gn verbalism °r conceptual realism on
r£L?i«
*heoretlcal reasoning. /This realism/...esults both from a confusion between subjective andobjective (hence from egocentrism) and from the intel-lectual constraint of the adult....?2*
The implications of this perception of moral rules are
threefold
i 1) duty is heteronomous rather than autonomous
rules are "givens" and obedience to them is all that counts
2) moral rules are interpreted literally, or rather not in-
terpreted at all but simply followed; 3) responsibility is
objective; i.e., it has nothing to do with the agent's
intentions but entirely with the consequences of the act
itself and whether these consequences are treated by
authorities as "bad.
•
This heteronomous morality, however, is essential to
our development as moral beings since the conditions of its
acquisition are also the conditions of our acquiring those
character traits which undergird commitment to moral rules.
Parental constraints serve to develop children's will-power
they must control their own wants in the face of possible
punishment. These are the years of developing ego-strength
and the fact that Piaget casts development in terms of rule-
orientation ought not imply that the model excludes the
development of character traits.
T^U Piaget, Moral Judgment
, pp. 110-111.
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In relationships of cooperation and mutual respect,
persons have the opportunity to take on the roles of all
the parties involved in the interaction, and potentially
to play a part in defining those roles. We do develop
character traits which are specific to our performing
these roles well, and we develop a sense of obligation to
others who are also seriously trying to live up to their
duties. We develop a sense of commitment toward others which
constrains us from engaging in actions which would undermine
the trust and predictability which makes our lives as social
beings possible.
But our personality is more than the sum of our obli-
gations, and our feelings toward others involve more than
constraints on actions. Having the opportunity to equally
engage in activities - i.e., to play all the roles which
comprise the activity - opens us up to seeing ourselves as
75
persons among persons. Our actions begin to be defined in
terms of an appreciation of the interests of all parties; it
begins to take into account the way in which we all have a
mutual interest in the action, an interest which I would
term a "social interest." This is not the static external
interest of "society" as opposed to individual interests
j
rather it is the dynamic interest of persons who recognize
that they are potential creators of their own social life
and that this life ought to reflect and satisfy their de-
veloping needs, wants, and purposes. As we become aware
75 • There are striking similarities here with Marxist
images of communism.
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that our development is implicated in particular types of
interpersonal relations, we begin to sense that our own
interests are firmly intertwined with the development of
others as persons? we take an interest in their development as
they in turn take an interest in ours.
The moral implications of relations of mutual respect
are also threefold, 1) duty is autonomous - rules are subject
to debate and alteration; obedience to them is voluntary but
based on solidarity; 2) moral rules are open to interpreta-
tion in light of a commitment to reciprocity and egalitarian-
ism, 3) responsibility is "subjective" - we have acquired a
sense of ourselves and others as having intentions and pro-
jects and we can be held responsible for our acts.
Piaget does not argue that there are invariant se-
quences of moral development, that persons always develop
from one stage to the next, nor that the direction of devel-
opment is the same for everyone. But he does argue that
true morality can only flow from relationships of mutual
respect since in relationships of unilateral respect, respect
is for authority roles rather than for persons. For Piaget,
both the peer group and the parent-child relationship are
justice structures. But the former rests on the justice of
autonomy and solidarity, the latter on the justice of auth-
ority. If the requirements of justice - or of a liberated
social order and autonomous reasoning - include respect for
persons, then peer groups ideally better meet these.
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I want to be clear that both of these relationships
are ideal types. Neither unilateral nor mutual respect
occurs in pure form in "real-life."
irSSSJS iS neVer unadul*erated, nor, therefore,s respect every purely unilateral! the mostsubmissive child has the feeling that he can? orcould, argue that a mutual sympathy surrounds
relationships that are most heavily charged withauthority. And conversely, cooperation is never
tt
V
^
r6,
+
in any discussion between equals,
+k!
°^ th\dlsPutants can always exert pressure onthe other by making overt or hidden appeals to
custom or authority. Cooperation, indeed, seems
rather to be the limiting term, the ideal equili-brium to which all relations of constraint tend. 76
Peer groups may be adulterated by the presence of older
'children? parent-child relationships are adulterated by
77parents* awareness that children deserve respect.
Structure alone, however, cannot establish the con-
ditions for moral development. As we have seen in the
preceding section, moral development is contingent upon
the experience of certain types of reactive relationships
between persons, a. contingency which raises questions about
the part "warmth" plays in moral development. Kohlberg
7%~* Piaget, Moral Judgment , p. 90.
77. Piaget raises the question of why boys between the ages
of 11 and 13 can be so democratic in playing marbles when
real democracy is usually lacking in adult life. His answer
is that boys drop the game shortly after this age and so there
are few older boys around to impose their authority and
adulterate democracy. This condition rarely obtains in adult
life. "With regard to the game of marbles.
. .children of 11-13
have no seniors. ... Since they no longer have to endure the
pressure of play-mates who impose their views by virtue
of their prestige, the children whose reactions we have
been studying are clearly able to become conscious of their
autonomy much sooner than if the game of marbles lasted till
the age of 18. In the same way, most of the phenomena which
characterize adult societies would be quote other than they
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rejects the importance of emotions in development and
stresses the role of cognitive conflict
»
The ^ environment which provides role-taking oppor-
tunities is not necessarily a warm, loving, identi-
fication-inducing environment, and an environment
deprived in role-taking opportunities is not
necessarily cold or rejecting. A certain minimum
amount of warmth in face-to-face groups or insti-
tutions is required if a child or adolescent is to
feel a sense of participation and membership in the
group. However, the conditions for a child's maximal
participation and role-taking in a group is not that
he receive maximal affection from the group, or that
the group he organized on communal affiliation lines. 78
In a sense Kohlberg is correct to downplay the role of
affection. Rawls, for instance, would agree that as one
moves to the higher stages of development, emotional
attachments to particular persons become less and less
salient in making moral judgments. Yet Piaget and Rawls
do place greater emphasis on the role of emotional ties
79
in moral growth. For instance, Rawls claims that emo-
tional attachments of warmth, trust and friendship and
principled guilt are integral to development at the highest
stage. His three psychological laws depend upon love and
concern for others.
Piaget is more concerned to show the conditions under
which autonomous moral reasoning develops than to demonstrate
are if the average length of human life were appreciably
different from what it is." Ibi d. , p. 76.
78. Kohlberg, "Is-Ought," p. 191.
79. See Richard Ferelman, "The Development of Political
Ideology," American Po litical Sc ienc e Review 63 (September,
1969)i750-7^7, for a discussion of the role of parental
warmth in the development of political ideology. Kerelman
is the only political scientist I have been able to uncover
who utilizes Piaget* s theory to understand political social-
ization.
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logical connections between moral concepts. Piaget is
thus more concerned than Kohlberg with the development of
character traits and with the role of habituation. For
Piaget, the assumption is that all persons have the capacity
to reason, but whether persons always develop and utilize these
capacities is an altogether different issue/
9
Development
depends in part on opportunities to experience warm, egal-
itarian, reciprocal relations. But action requires the
development of such traits as will-power, consistency, caring,
dependability, reliability, compassion, etc. I would also
suggest that rational action requires a certain amount of
habituation, practise in the skill of reasoning; rational
action also requires a certain amount of character-strength.
Piaget does not imply that individuals will act in a pre-
dictable fashion when confronted with moral choices. He gives
us no tools for predicting action as Kohlberg claims to do
(from knowledge of an individual's position on a scale of
cognitive development). I would suggest, however, that
W. Cognitive development theory sheds interesting light on thecurrent debate about race and IQ. Kohlberg claims that there
S«Lr?i n?hiP between J 9 and moral development, which makessense if moral development is the ability to manipulate conceptsIf some persons lack the capacity - the IQ - to develop morally
or conceptually, there are serious social implications. Theissue is a thorny one with some interesting cases. Fight there
not be persons - the mentally retarded - who are incapable of
moral development? The boundary between those who cannot and
those who can develop will be a fuzzy one, however, as is theboundary between retardation and normality. But it is thisboundary which permits policy-making based on the optimistic
premise that persons do have capacities for moral development?
it may be that those at the borderline might benefit from socialpolicies designed to enhance opportunities for development,
despite the fact that some persons will remain incapable of
development
.
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Piaget implies that the more opportunity an individual has
to utilize the tools of autonomous^reasoning, the more likely
he or she will be to act morally. ° indeed, persons may be
able to act morally before they can reason about what they
are doing. As Alasdair tfaclntyre argues
An agent can only do what he can describe. Butchildren can often do what they cannot yet describeThis example certainly necessitates a modificationof the argument /that all action is conceptual or
avaUabi; f^iTT^' °hil4ren ^arn whafis
counl a«%£? • the? t0 learn^7 The child's actions
in ?erms of o^^lT^l"* ^ identify them as s^h
helps To Ji "
scnptions... And this example thus
what I ran Hn
a crucial point. The limits ofc do are set by the limits of the descrip-tions available to me, not those I possess at anv
?
given moment. And the descriptions available t7
I belong^!
6
°
Urrent in the SOcial groups t0 which
So, individual development rests fundamentally on social
development, and the availability of role-models does
broaden the scope of what children - and adults - can do. The
availability of role-models who act on the basis of morality
can sensitize children to moral action before they can reason.
Finally, persons need not always utilize the tools of
reason which they have acquired. Let us say, for example,
that an individual is" confronted with an authoritarian
situation. One rational response is to use the conceptual
So; This may help to account for the rigid authoritarianism
of the working class. Working class children may have
fewer opportunities, too, to develop their moral potentiality.
81. Alasdair Maclntyre, "A Mistake About Causality in Social
Science," in Laslett and Runciman, Philosophy, Politics and
Society
, 2nd Series (New York t Barnes and itable, 1962) pp.
59-60. *^
over-
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repertoire appropriate to the structured situation. However,
an individual may also rationally utilize the conceptual
tools developed in other activities to cast critical
judgment on the present activity. What I am suggesting is
that our ability to act rationally is bound up in our ability
to perceive alternatives. Although one definition of ration-
ality is always given by the situation - that action which is
situationally appropriate
- this definition can always be
ridden by looking at the situation from another perspective.
This distinction is important not only for comparing the two
models which I have explicated, but has important implicate
for political action. Persons with more highly developed
cognitive repertoires will have more options open to them.
Which option they choose is not open to prediction, but
understanding their choice and the options they perceive
does require that we share their cognitive framework. This
framework will be a composite of the following elements
t
1) An ability to conceptualize at some stage of
development (at stage 3, to give reasons which flow from the
principle of respect for persons)?
2) An explanatory theory which fleshes out the ways
in which persons are being injured (at stage 3 this will have
reference to mutual respect);
3) A strategy for change which proposes ways in which
the injury might be alleviated (at stage 3 this will have
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reference to a theory of liberated social structures).
IV. Adequacy of the two models
My intention has been to accurately but not impartially
lay out two contending theories of political action. I have
intended to show that one of these theories is more adequate
than the other. The more theoretically adequate perspective
allows us to see alternatives to which the other is blind,
while at the same time encompassing those features of human
activity accurately pictured by the first. I would now like
to develop this point more fully and to show the ways in
which the Moral Agent perspective is more theoretically
adequate than the True Believer perspective.
IV. a. The acquisition of political motives
Both the True Believer and Moral Agent perspectives
rest on the assumption that there is some relationship be-
tween social life and human consciousness and that some social
structures are conducive to human development while others
are not. In other words, each has a built-in theory of
socialization and moral development.
The True Believer perspective rests on what I have
called the induction approach to socialization. This
approach posits a pre-existing social order - institutions,
ideas, rules, morality, etc. - into which persons must be
inducted in order to become human. We have seen that
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this socialization occurs in two stages - primary and
secondary
-
and that the secondary stage is particularly
important in the development of mature, autonomous, rational
motivation. Primary socialization is rather too authoritarian
for liberals who invest a great deal in the political values
of freedom, pursuit of self-interest, and opportunity.
Secondary socialization
- where groups are open and multiple
-
permits a range of choice and a degree of autonomy not
encouraged by primary socialization.
But we have also seen that autonomous action is not
absolutely free. It is delimited by rules of the game
which are embedded in the very structure of pluralist
society and which are inducted along with other content
into xhe motivational schema of persons living in such
societies. These rules constrain political action by es-
tablishing the legitimate means for pursuing private ends
and the legitimate means for redress of grievance (as well
as defining what constitutes a grievance). They are the
rules of bargaining and compromise, within a competetive
political world, and moral-political rules like equality
of opportunity in a competitive private world. If persons
learn these rules - and develop the character traits which
make it possible (although not necessary) for them to act
on these rules - we wind up with a rational politics of
constrained egoism.
But if society is not structured, if it breaks down,
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both autonomy and the constraints of liberalism are eroded.
Under anomic conditions, persons lack conventional standards
and clearly articulated interests. They repress to a state
quite like childhood, where they suffer a need for constraint.
These non-autonomous persons may find this constraint in
political movements into which they move in one disjointed
leap. They are quite simply filled with a new moral and
ideological content which satisfies emotional needs.
There is, however, a way in which consciousness can
.change in a rational, constrained manner. Persons who
experience status inconsistencies may come to recognize that
they have an interest in pressing for change in terms of
existing moral-political rules. They may, for instance,
apply the principle of equality of opportunity to themselves
in ways they never before regarded as legitimate.
The Moral Agent perspective posits a different range
of social relations and of human motives. It encompasses the
True Believer perspective and moves beyond it in ways which
allow us to pick out features of political action to which the
True Believer theorist (and actor) is blind.
The Moral Agent perspective assumes that different
ways of seeing the world are conceptually connected, that
they develop out of each other and that some may be more
developed than others. It is assumed that persons can develop
an ability to critically evaluate the rules of their own
society in terms of developing cognitions which move beyond
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justifications already embedded in social practise.
Piaget's theory of moral development helps us to under-
stand how persons can be socialized not just to know the
content of social rules, but to understand the purposes
of rules and therefore be able to criticize those rules
which construct their present social life. We have seen
that Piaget, in contrast to the inductionists, argues that
it it not necessarily the role-taking possibilities provided
by society which encourage development but the quality of
role-taking itself. This quality varies from unilateral to
mutual respect. In relations of unilateral respect - relations
which approximate the image of socialization undergirding the
True Believer model - persons take on the roles expected of
them by those in positions of authority. Rules and roles
are givens, and conformity to them is what counts in eval-
uating persons and practises. Where there are open and plural
roles, persons do develop a type of autonomy, but it is an
autonomy which is at the nexus of other-determined roles.
In relations of cooperation or mutual respect - relations
built on mutual trust, compassion, friendly feelings -
persons have the opportunity not only to take on the roles
of all parties - an opportunity which gives them a sense of
themselves as a person among persons - but to play a part
in defining those roles. Here the IVoral Agent model moves
beyond the True Believer model. Critical consciousness rests
not on cognitions of conflicts between existing rules, but
on cognitions about the ideals of social life.
13 5
As we develop, we come to see that we have an interest
in certain types of relationships with other human beings.
We come to perceive our own development as intricately
bound up with the development of all persons and to see
that life is impoverished for all who participate in re-
lationships in which there is no respect.
81
We develop
a "social interest," an interest in encouraging social
relationships in which persons can flourish. This is an
interest which those who adopt a different theory of human dev-
elopment and those who have not yet developed a sense of
themselves as rule-makers will have great difficulty
comprehending.
Our developing sense of ourselves as persons undergirds
a morality based on respect for persons, a morality which
supports a critical perspective on existing social arrangements.
If existing social practises - including moral-political
rules like equality of opportunity - preclude the development
of human capacities, then we have reason to change them.
Having developed these capacities ourselves, we now can
perceive ways in which social practises fail to meet the
requirements of morality, which bring into relief the
injuries which are being done to persons. If we also have
a strategy for change, we have acquired a reason to act,
a reason which moves beyond the justifications for political
82
action which are already legitimated by society. The
81. We also have reason to support those early relations of
unilateral respect which undergird later development.
82. This discussion is closely related to the anomie-alienation
136
True Believer theorist is trapped in just those legitimiza-
tions, trapped by her own theory, of moral learning. The
rules of a particular society become immutable facts,
hardly open to critical evaluation when they meet the
requirements of the good society which flow from the True
Believer model. This model founders on its inability to
encompass interests which move beyond egoism and to compre-
hend justifications which flow from ideal conceptions of
social life rather than from norms already embedded in social
practise.
IV. b. Reason, passion and action
These competing theories of the relationship between
social structure and political consciousness support
differing conceptions of the relationship between reason,
passion, and political action. This in turn undergirds
differing notions of the ways in which political ideas
are held and acted upon.
controversy. Anomie theories rest on a contrast with
either
#
an organically or mechanically integrated society
which is assumed to be good since persons need social
constraint. These theories usually assume that freedom is
dangerous, or at least threatening to persons who may find
it difficult to develop individual standards of conduct
when society fails to provide these. Alienation theories rest
on the assumption that persons can develop alternatives to
their own social rules and evaluate existing arrangements
in terms of these alternatives, but the basis for radical
consciousness is always difficult to establish. Critical
consciousness, according to development theories, requires at
least some experience with non-alienated, egalitarian re-
lations of mutual respect. Out of this experience can flow
a principled morality which serves as the basis for evaluating
alienated social life, life which does not fulfill the needs
of developed persons.
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The True Believer model assumes that action flows
directly from the passions - that 'frustration* produces
revolutionary violence (keeping in mind that these passions
are rooted in particular social conditions) - or that egoistic
reasons produce action - rational action is action based
on self interest (again rooted in particular social conditions)
A political demand is rational if it utilizes the existing rule
of the game - i.e., liberal-democratic rules like equality
of opportunity
- to maximize egoistic interests. Rational
.
politics is the use of power to gain private benefits,
within the constraints of liberal rules. We expect to
find actions designed to maximize individual and group
benefits, justified perhaps by the principle of equality
of opportunity, and constrained by the rules of bargaining,
majority rule, tolerance, etc.
But what happens when political actors question existing
practises using standards of legitimacy which are not shared
by all members of society? When reasons for action offered
by political agents fall outside accepted conventions, those
who accept the conventions will tend to see actors as
83
crazy, wild-eyed fanatics, or at best Utopian visionaries.
83. Often unconventional behavior, especially behavior which
cannot be subsumed under self-interest is explained in terms
of unconscious motives rather than conscious reasons. "The
conscious reasons, which make it look like an action are re-
garded as being in some way irrelevant or illusory, an
excuse for what the man is going to do anyway. Some such
theory was advanced by Freudians who held that some reasons
for actions are rationalizations, a facade that we erect so
that we can satisfy dangerous wishes in a manner that is
socially acceptable." R.S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation
(London 1 Routledge , and Kegan Paul, 195$) , p. 59. The Moral
Agent mode does not exclude rationalization.
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"Judged by the standards and needs of the existing society
...revolutionaries are out of their minds. To the enemy
of revolution the Reason of the revolution appears to be
madness. M
In contrast to this image of the wild-eyed radical,
is the image of the mature political agent, rooted in
pluralist, conflicting roles (or at least constrained by
the roles others play), and committed to the liberal values
of 'freedom of thought, ' 'tolerance* etc. It is assumed that
such an individual will adopt ideas hesitently, although
with strong commitment, and be willing to test these ideas
in the "free market place" of the political arena. Radicals,
on the contrary, plunge themselves into an ideology without
reservation - and probably with fleeting commitment - and
instead of testing ideas in the political arena, they pull
out of politics. Their ideas are designed not to guide
political action - the pursuit of self-interest through the
use of power - but to avoid responsibility and power.
There is a sense in which all reasons rest on a back-
ground ideology which legitimizes certain demands and de-
legitimizes others. But the background to self-interested
politics is unexamined. Because of their conceptual biases,
True Believer theorists fail to see how their contrast model
- the pluralist order and self-interested politics - has
become an immutable, near "natural" fact. Any challenge
Breines, "Would you Believe?" p. 9.
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to this order, any conception of interests which moves
away from egoism (although a rare occurrence of altruism
is permissible) is mistaken? action based on such challenges
are mislead,
I have hoped to show that the True Believer model
rests on a clear ideological base, on an unquestioned
conceptual framework which blinds theorists in this tradi-
tion to alternative possibilities, alternative reasons and
85
justifications for action. Theorists in this tradition
. . .want to understand the movement without changing
their own positions. Participants know this is
impossible.
.. .To 'understand' movement ideology is
to make the conceptual switch.
. .which brings about fund-
amental or radical changes in orientation. °°
The Moral Agent perspective allows for these shifts and is
therefore a more adequate way of approaching political
ideologies. It rests on the assumption that there can be
alternative motives for action, alternative types of
interests, and that at least some of these provide the
basis for rational political action.
531 This is not to say that radical perspectives do not
distort and blind also. As Sheila Rowbotham says, "Be-
wilderment and mystery surrounded the birth of women's
liberation. It seemed to come out of an ideological lacuna
belonging neither to previous feminism nor to Marxism.
Orphan- like it had apparently sprung up from nowhere in
particular. .. .Feminists and Marxists alike were convinced
that when it grew up, and became sensible like them, it would
shed its ill-defined 'absurdities'." Woman's Consciousness,
Man's World (New Yorkj Penguin Books, 1973)$ p. ix.
86. Luther P. Gerlach and Virginia H. Hine, People, Power,
Change t Movements of Social Transformation ( Indianapolis 1
Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), p. 1?6.
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The True Believer mode has a narrower range within
which phenomena can vary. Its concept of rationality
is rooted in egoism and is linked to particular means as
the way of achieving egoistic ends. The model is correct
to link rationality with concepts like • autonomy' and
•freedom* and 'free choice' since rationality does presuppose
individual responsibility for action. However, it is in-
correct to assume that 'autonomy' necessitates egoism and
that rational choices are always in one's self-interest.
• The Moral Agent has a broader image of autonomy, and image
which sees autonomy as linked to the notion of social
being. The Moral Agent perspective assumes that since
persons' needs, wants and interests are socially and
historically specific, so too is rationality. And it
assumes that we can take an interest in the well-being
of others without being "altruistic."
Rationality is implicated in our social life. Every
society sets limits on the kind of autonomy which can flourish
and sets limits on what can be chosen. We cannot choose any
possible life and have others consider us rational. The
point is that our conceptions of rationality are socially
and historically specific and that we need to look at the
True Believer image of rationality in this light. Our
historically developing images of persons and their potential
undergirds developing images of rationality. This again is
not to say that all action is rational, or even that all
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reasons are rational in the sense of getting us what we
need in order to flourish, but simply to say that persons
do or may have reasons for action which move beyond egoism.
87
The Moral Agent model also more adequately handles the
complex relationship between reason and passion. The True
Believer perspective tends to dichotomize reason and passion,
to bifurcate them into the two models of action built into it.
?+i I
W°Ul
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U£? J° make Some addit ional comments on rational-ity, comments which are not central to my argument. Firstwhen we use phrases like
-freely chosen, ••autonomous," • fVeea
^
10
?' J tc * we m3-y become trapped in an ahistorical, indi-
'
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1C per?Pect
^
e on action. This is dangerous becauseit slides away from the notion of persons as social andhistorical beings and towards the liberal-individualisticimage of the person, an image which makes it difficult to
maintains sociological perspective on social change and on
changes m consciousness. (Another danger is to move in thedirection of social determinism - for example, technologism -
and to see changes in individual consciousness as the result
of events on the macro level alone rather than as the result
of a dialectical relationship between individual conscious-
ness and social life.)
I also want to be clear that there are "objective" tests of
rationality, tests which appear to conflict with the idea
of studying action in its social and historical context in
order to understand it. I agmee with Maclntyre that standards
of rationality are given by cultural norms, but that rationality
also involves conformity to universal logical criteria. I
would add that rationality also links means to ends. However,
since the ends of human life are socially and historically
specific, this means-ends requirement is purely formal. (See
Maclntyre, "A Mistake about Causality.")
Rational choice involves both form and content. However,
persons cannot choose what is not available for choice, and
availability flows out of the social context. The implications
for change are far-reaching since society then always limits
the content of rational choice in important ways. This
means that choice will never be absolutely rational - in the
sense of absolutely fulfilling human needs. Our needs
develop as our social life changes, and any of these needs
are likely to fall far short of some abstract ideal, an
ideal which fails to find reality in social life and which
is therefore doomed to be misleading.
Ik 2
It does treat passions, or 'wants', and feelings like
guilt, shame, obligation, etc., as rooted in our social
life, but it has a limited conception of the relation be-
tween cognition and passion which has special import for
motives like 'frustration.' The Moral Agent perspective is
better able to handle this relation - the relation, for
instance, between frustration and our ideals of social life,
between indignation and our cognitions of injury to others -
and the relation between our changing emotional and cognitive
• repertoire and our changing political purposes. Although
the True Believer perspective does link changing emotions
to different modes of political action, it has a more limited
understanding of the nature of these emotions.
The Moral Agent model also has a more adequate theory
of socialization, one which allows for critical consciousness.
The induction model of socialization is correct in putting
a great deal of emphasis on the acquisition of affective
commitments in political action. Action does require our
having the will to act; we need to have acquired the strength
of character to do what we know is right even when it conflicts
with other things we want to do. Guilt, regret, a sense
of obligation are part of moral action. But the Moral Agent
model does not exclude these elements. The theory of cog-
nitive development is compatible with an approach to social-
ization which sees the importance of a nurturant "family"
structure (although we could debate whether our nuclear
family best meets the requirements of the first stage of
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moral development) for the development of ego strength
and character traits.
Our understanding that our own actions may be under-
girded by a developing conceptual framework and by certain
affective commitments has implications for the way in which
we hold our ideas and the way in which we act. The True
Believer perspective allows for a type of self-criticism?
so too does the Moral Agent perspective. As we come to
see ideas as developing dynamically, we become hesitent
•
about truth. (My own hesitency in the face of Marxist
friends' surity of their own position is probably shared
by many; it seems to me to indicate an unwillingness to
accept any systematic program for change as the final answer.)
On the one hand, we are constrained from actions which would
undermine our image of moral personal relations - e.g., telling
lies, breaking a trust, etc. - and on the other, we are en-
couraged to engage in actions which represent our understanding
of the interrelatedness of human lives.
At the same time, we are aware that we are not always
rational agents, that we have needs - including unconscious
ones - which are rooted in our personal histories and in our
social lives in such a way that any program for action, any
political ideology which fails to take them into account is
doomed to failure or to thoroughly repressive measures.
Some of these needs are the flawed products of a flawed
society, but even though our needs are flawed, we cannot
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stand completely outside ourselves. We can only test
ideas in light of personal experience and stand as critical
agents in the face of any proposed truth. Some proposals
for change will offend our understanding of our needs;
others will express the best of our developing needs, our
needs for relations of warmth, trust, compassion and commit-
ment.
To summarize, the Moral Agent perspective is more
adequate than the True Believer perspective because it
better accounts for the development of critical thought,
because it incorporates reasons for action to which the
True Believer perspective is closed, and because it permits
us to see relationships between reasons and passions which
make more sense of what persons do when they act - in
general, because it opens us up to seeing more facets of
political action. This is not to say that the True Believer
perspective may not adequately describe a specific political
action, may not often capture the nature of a given political
justification. It is rather to say that the perspective I
support opens us up to more potential descriptions, to more
possible categorizations of human activity. I should also
argue that political action can and does fall beyond the
limits of the categories established by the True Believer
perspective, an argument which can be more clearly defended
by looking at a particular political movement, the Women's
Liberation Movement.
CHAPTER IV
THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
It should now be clear that any answer to the
question, "What do women want," is going to be trenendously
complex. What I have done in the past two chapters is to
develop two broad theories of political action and to argue
that the latter is more adequate than the former in terms
of its ability to provide answers to this question. I
•am now ready to apply these models to an understanding
of a contemporary political movement, the Women's Liber-
ation Movement, Again, it is important to be clear that
these models serve both the political analyst and political
actor. Therefore, in what follows, I shall attempt to
develop each perspective as it is used both to explain
the rise of contemporary feminism and to justify the
actions of contemporary feminists. I shall want to show
that there is a conceptual development in the Movement and
that only a theory which can adequately capture this
development will adequately account for the movement itself.
I also want to show that this development has provided more
and more adequate explanations of the position of women
in contemporary American society and more and more adequate
resolutions to the problems which confront us all. In
particular, I shall want to show that three conceptions of
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women's liberation
- 'equality of opportunity, • 'authen-
ticity,' and 'dis-alienation'
-are more and more adequate
conceptualizations of what constitutes an injury to persons
and what structural changes need to be made in order for
persons to flourish.
It The True Believer Model
I. a. The Frustrated Bitch Hypothesis
This explanation of the Women's Movement flows out
•of the assumptions of the True Believer model. Its pro-
ponents assume that women have too much freedom - indeed
are suffering the ill effects of anomie - and that the
Movement is a reaction to and an escape from freedom on
the part of immature persons. The ideas of the Movement
are treated as simple rationalizations of fears and of
frustration arising from the challenges of freedom. This
is probably the most common explanation of the Women's
Movement, at least as it is grasped by the public mind,
and most explanations in this mode are fairly unsophisticated.
They are cast in terms like 'castrating bitch, 'witch',
•irresponsible child.' But an example of this mode which
TT This ought not be surprising given Kohlberg's theory of
cognitive development. Many people in a hierarchically
organized society will see themselves as somewhere around
Kohlberg's stages 2 and 3 and will tend to see others in these
terms
.
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is quite sophisticated is Midge Decter «s much-criticized
The New Chastity and Other Arguments Ar^ nst Women's T.<w_
at ion.
On page 52 of her rather interesting critique of con-
temporary American feminism, Decter writes
t
No doubt women are far from having attained a fullparity of opportunity. No doubt they have been andcontinue to be discouraged from undertaking thepractise of certain professions. No doubt they arein many instances paid less for the work they do than
JS'
T
?
eSe are
'
however> is^es of injusticethat lend themselves not to the large-scale analysis
of a liberation movement but to the particular andpractical application of pressure against the wrong-doers.
.. .Where there is no disagreement as to what
constitutes an injustice - as there is none with
respect to issues bearing on the rights of women today -the constant vociferous harping on it tends to lead
to the suspicion that one is here witnessing thebeating of a dead horse.
In other words, argues Ms. Decter, we all know what is wrong
and we need only apply ourselves to remedying particular ills.
But the point of this dissertation is to illustrate exactly
how it is that we do not all know what is wrong, and that
each of comes to an understanding of social life which delimits
the range of things which we can and do consider wrong. What
I want to investigate here are the underlying assumptions
in Ms. Decter's work which lead her to state that we all know
what is wrong and then to reject feminist analysis which
picks out other features of social life as "wrong.
"
Women, argues Decter, are freer than they have ever
been trefore, free from both biological necessity and social
constraint. The American female "...experiences life as a
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constant process o^deciaion and so a constant assumption
of responsibility." For example> in choQsing t<>^ ^ ^
be a housewife, a woman makes a very real choice, "at any
moment, by her own volition, she might be doing otherwise,"
unlike her husband whose life is imposed by necessity. Her
worklife, once driven by the biological and social necessity
of the family, is no longer so driven, her sex life, unlike
her husband's is not driven by lust; her life is neither
natural nor social contingency but autonomous choosing.
3
The
sexual revolution has freed her from social constraint in
her sexuality; technology has freed her from biology; the
new woman is on her own. Women are now the arbiters of their
own sexual conduct. Marriage has become a freely chosen
contract for which partners bear the responsibility of
success o ailure, and child-bearing, too, is a free choice,
undetermined by either biological necessity or a limited con-
ception of woman* s proper role.
Since there were no standards of conduct, either to
obey or to violate, since she herself was to be
the arbiter and the standard, she was Dressed into a
species of self-knowledge it has been'one of the
purposes of sexual games and encounters to help her
attain to. Far from being a sexual object, as Women's
Liberation claimed, she was a sexual subject p_ar excellence
.
2. Midge Decter, The New Chastity
. (New Yorki Coward, IVcCann
and Geoghegan, Inc., 1972), p. 49.
3. One wonders what has happend to those women who need to doboth work and housework out of necessity. Decter also seems tobuy the myth that women, unlike men, do not have sex drives.
4. The idea that women are now free to pursue sex (which they
don't want anyway) ignores their loss of bargaining power in a
sexist society. Without the power to say no, has woman exchanged
repression for greater oppression in a society where she still
needs to marry in order to maintain the middle class status
to which her father made her accustomed.
5. Decter, The New Chasti ty, p. 83.
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But this freedom from standards and necessity,
"...curiously
enough... makes her anxiety the greater." She envies man
"...his blanket, unwilled, unthinking entailment in necessity.
This is the inequality between them. Were she to feel herself
so entailed, she would not feel resentful but would simply,
and with the same lack of heed and moral justification as he
does, provide herself with what she needed." It is she
who is the subject, man the object; she who is the chooser,
he who moves in a world of necessity. And it is this freedom
coupled with envy of man's rootedness in a world of necessity
which underlies the Women's Liberation Movement.
Women's Liberation constitutes a response to the
predicament of the modern woman that begins with afalsification of the nature of that predicament.
The movement says that women are subjected to a
distorted, exploitative shaping by society which
they cannot, without an overturning of the oppressed
female consciousness, escape from. Whereas the
truth is that women are for the time being caught
in a transition in which they feel themselves too
little shaped by society, its demands on them too
indefinite, their demands on themselves (or lack
of them) far too operative, and they cannot even
get their consciousness organized.
7
Lacking both social and biological guidelines, women are
left adrift, anomic women primed for an ideology which
allows them to rationalize their failure to cope with
freedom and to put the blame for their inability to cope with
and determine their own lives onto external hate objects, i.e.,
men or the system. This female escape from freedom is ration-
alized by a feminist ideology. For example, the theory of
IT. Ibid
. , p.
7. Ibid . , p. 52.
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patriarchy denies woman responsibility for her own failures;
leasbian theory and auto-eroticism provides escape from adult
sexuality and justifies it ideologically. And what Decter
interprets as an anti-child, anti-biology ideology, allows
woman to deny herself by denying motherhood.
ZFor7 women to announce that their very womanliness
results only from a bad and meritricious cultureis the expression of a deep hatred for themselves.Such an expression of self
-hatred, is indeed, ex-
actly the primary emotion that informs Women's
Liberation diatribes against the impositions of
motherhood.
.. .Denial of /sexual difference/- no
matter how nobly, or on the other hand, how triv-
ially, uttered - becomes the denial of oneself,
one's nature and one's true possibilities; becomes
in other words, the denial of life itself. 8
Now it may well be that some members of the Women's Move-
ment are compelled by self
-hatred, but this is not equivalent
to demonstrating that none are motivated by some alternative
conception of human excellence which they seek to attain
through the Movement. Rather than a denial of responsibility,
an escape from freedom, or a fear of failure, femininist
ideology may reflect mature analysis of one's personal respons-
ibilities to help create a free society where persons can suc-
ceed at being persons.
What we need to ask is why Ws. Decter cannot perceive
feminist demands as mature and rational. This inability
rests on both her acceptance of anomie theory and the
True Believer contrast model of an integrated pluralist
society where persons are constrained by the rights and duties
B~. Ibid
. , p. 180.
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accruing to roJ.es in a clear division of labor. This is
quite clear in her criticism of Feminist alternatives, and
especially in her claim that Feminists seek to avoid res-
ponsibility and obligation.
9
In general... the new liberators of women Hvp ™
selves frUn? °f oWisation ?Hlf«
e
tS2m.elves.... They do not... desire a freer soeiotvone that affords them a larger and wider varletv?f™WUnity 5 bUt rather °»e in which ?hl verjyterms 'freedom* and 'opportunity' will be rede-fined so as to conform with their desires.
..
.10
And. that is the very crux of the matter; Feminists are re-
defining the terms of political discourse and that is a
very dangerous move indeed. Moreover they are doing so
in terms of their desires. Satisfying one's desires is
quite clearly contrasted to fulfilling one's responsibilities,
living up to the obligations and duties of a relatively well-
ordered society.
Women's Liberation is cast as a demand not for new
_ 11
freedom, but for a new immaturity; not for new defin-
itions of memale roles - roles which might be more human-
izing
- but for an excuse from performing given social
roles well. Decter admits that one of the gravest problems
facing contemporary women is the need to devise new standards,
but she rejects Feminist demands as legitimate efforts to
9. Here Decter is criticizing Germaine Greer who she iden-
tifies as "one of the movement's most favored ideologists."
This identification is unfortunate.
10. Decter, The New Chastity
, p. 56.
11. Ibid., p. 142.
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develop such standards.
nnfi??
ed t0
2evise a m°rality that does not dis-qualify one from excellence is a familiar need in
world'of-be^^^ dr\re - t0 eBcape/."?hS a2uS
«?^io S£ 5
eeatting and striving where the agres-sions that create conflict have also been a neces-sary condition for the sustenance of life on earth
...is the demand... to remain children."
Again, demands to alter the criteria of human excellence
are classified as demands to avoid being judged in terms
of
-adult" accomplishment. Women's Liberation becomes
not an effort to value the personhood of women, but is cast
as a demand by women to remain little girls - avoiding
work, escaping sexuality, denying their responsibilities
in 'wiving 1 and 'mothering.'
I would suggest that the quarrel between Ms. Decter
and the Women's Movement hinges on ideals of freedom. Ms.
Decter argues that her opponents do not want freedom or
equality.
Women's Liberation does not embody a new wave of
demand for equal rights. Nor does its preoccupation
with oppression signal a yearning for freedom. The
movement turns out to be about something else al-
together; it is about, in fact, the difficulties
women are experiencing with the rights and freedoms
they already enjoy. 13
What I would suggest is that this classification of feminist
demands flows out of Decter 's own explanatory theory and
level of moral development. Lacking a conception of the
Moral Agent, the person who can critically evaluate existing
social arrangements from an alternative point of view, Decter
TF, Ibid
. , p. 56.
13. Ibid ., p. 43.
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must see the feminist critique as a result of anomie.
Indeed, one gets a clear sense that, for Decter, the basis
for a new morality already exists in the division of labor
between male and female coupled with the opening of new
opportunities for women in the man's world. But more than
this, Decter* s own sense of justice is a liberal sense? she
accepts the liberal society as a just society; with the
exception of a few minor problems which women could quite
well eradicate if they exerted themselves, there is not
much grounds for complaint. Women have benefitted from the
social arrangements of contemporary society - from marriage
as contract, from motherhood, housewifery - and they owe
men - who provide them the rights that accrue to these
roles
- certain obligations. To deny the obligation, as
Decter claims feminists do, is not to assert alternative
obligations and responsibilities, but to deny responsibility
and to assert a "...freedom not to receive that which one
needs to receive and to give that which is needed of one
but rather freedom to be relieved - and in the name of some
Ik
•higher value* - of both." Decter understands 'freedom 1
as freedom from arbitrary role assignment and she believes
that women are now so free. She understands equality as the
equal opportunity to compete for all social roles, compatible
with the biological function of maternity, and she believes
that society is moving to make this possible. In the end,
then, Decter asserts that the sexual division of labor is
W. Ibid
. , p. 180.
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fair, that society is open to moves in the direction of
freedom and equality for women, and she rejects all arguments
against this society as the immature wailings of persons
who cannot handle the freedom to choose among roles and to
compete in a man's world.
I.b. Rational feminism - liberal variant
I have argued that Decter clearly accepts the True
Believer contrast model of an integrated pluralist
society where persons are constrained by the rights and
duties which flow out of the division of labor. What I want
to argue now is that this contrast model undergirds an image
of the way in which female consciousness can change - in
which new demands can be developed - which is profoundly dif-
ferent from the image of feminist ideology as a rationalization
of the fear of freedom. This image rests on the belief that
with the breaking down of traditional sex roles, women are
now exposed to conflicting standards associated with many
different roles. It is at the interstices of these roles
where woman finds her freedom - the freedom to choose among
conflicting roles each of which provides her with both a
new self-image and a rational interest. New and rational
consciousness, then, can flow from exposure to the conflicting
role demands of a pluralist, fluid society. Two theories
which utilize these basic assumptions to explain the rise of
contemporary feminism are the theory of status inconsistency
and the theory of relative deprivation.
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The theory of status inconsistency posits that political
demands may. arise when persons experience statuses which
carry differential rewards (prestige, wealth, etc.) and
when there is an ideology which can be utilized to justify
shifting the distribution of rewards from one merit system
to another. The objective condition of status inconsistency
is linked to subjective dissatisfaction with existing con-
ditions and a demand for social change is based on liberal
democratic ideals like equality of opportunity. Thus women
can employ the principles of equality of of opportunity and of
citizenship to press for a shift in the basis of merit from
"sex status" to status as worker and citizen - the right to
15
a job and to the vote.
15. In Power and Privilege, Lenski argues that, with trad-
itional barriers to women crumbling on all sides - politics,
higher education, occupation, rights of property, divorce -
the question of women's status inconsistency has been resolved.
What barriers remain are either with woman herself - e.g.,
in her basic responsibilities in the family and in her biology
- or because there are biases against women among those in
positions of power. But these barriers cannot form the
basis of a legitimate complaint because the former are either
socially advantageous or "natural," and the latter do not rest
on legal supports and therefore cannot form obstacles to women
who exert serious effort. Women can use the legal system to
press claims against non-legal discrimination. Furthermore,
women can fulfill their need for status through an advantageous
marriage. For women, ascribed status is as good as personally
achieved status and merit for satisfying the need for self-
esteem and prestige.
Although women may not have achieved full equality in the
"...worlds of work and politics. .. .the majority of women do
not seem greatly concerned. The explanation for this apparent
paradox lies in the family system which. . .makes it possible
for most women to attain their goals through marriage as easily
as most men can attain theirs through work and political
activity. ... This probably explains why the feminist movement
has lost most of its vigor 1 for the vast ma jority of women,
the battle for equality has been won. " (p. k26 J~
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This theory has been considered especially appropriate
to an understanding of contemporary feminism since so many
feminists are women who have succeeded (or who have the
skills to succeed) and who now complain that their status
as women is unsatisfactory. One theorist who has had a
tremendous impact on the way the Women's Movement has been
perceived and who uses the theory of status inconsistency
as a tool for explaining feminist consciousness is Betty
Friedan.
Friedan' s key assumption is that autonomous persons can
and do develop under existing social arrangements, or, at least
that there is no serious conflict between conventional standards
of achievement and ideal standards of autonomous moral action.
However, woman's socialization can get in the way of her
achieving these standards.
The purpose of socialization, according to Friedan, is
The assumption is that women's statuses are no longer in-
consistent; a successful businesswoman need not think of
herself with a sex status lower than her occupational status.
Married women who get their status from husbands need not
feel that this is inconsistent with their sex status. Ob-
viously the problem for Lenski is that he does not see a sex-
caste stratification system but only stratification in terms of
production and consumption which could give rise to demands
for equality (it is interesting that he inherits this problem
from the socialist part of his "synthesis"). The whole issue
of women as a "class" or "caste" is ignored since women's legal
status is now (assumed to be) equal to men's, and there are no
power relations involved.
Lenski' s book appeared in 1966 shortly before the revival of
American feminism. It is Jelling that his theory of status
inconsistency did not predict this revival. I would suggest
that he failed because it is not possible to predict what
choices persons will make about the standards of excellence
they might wish to attain to. Nor could Lenski predict be-
cause he failed to see existing power relations and discrim-
inations which flow out of these relations.
15?
•^.development of autonomous persons, persons who have a
•'firm core of self, or 'I," who have an individual identity.
l^oral development requires a transition from the outer-direct-
edness of conventionality to the inner-directedness of
autonomy. Autonomous women, Friedan argues drawing from
Abraham Maslowe's notion of self
-actualization
...prefer to be treated "Like a person, not like awoman." They prefer to be independent Stand ontheir own two feet, and generally do not care forconcessions that imply they are inferior, weak or that&C?w\Jake Care ° f them^lves. This is not toimply that they cannot behave conventionally. Thev do
'
« do'not take
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°r desirab?
- e any reason, but theyt e ordinary conventions seriously..!.Rules per se generally mean nothing to these women.It is only when they approve of the rules and can seeand approve of the purpose behind them that they will
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stronS' Purposeful and do live
arrived at!!?.
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6Se rUlGS autonom™s and personally
This passage has the ring of Moral Agency, but I want to
point out some essential differences between it and the
image of morality developed in Chapter III, differences which
place Friedan* s conception of morality within the boundaries
of the True Believer contrast model. We need to consider what
standards Friedan.' s autonomous woman might use to critically
evaluate conventional rules, especially those rules which
define her role as woman, and we need to consider how Friedan
pictures the development of critical consciousness.
For Friedan the standard for evaluating female rules is
the standard of human excellence already embedded in existing
Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New Yorki Dell
Publishing, I963), p. 293.
17. Ibid
. , p. 307.
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social practises. It is the standard of manliness. High
dominance women are more like men - "Above all, the high
dominance woman was more psychologically free - more autonomous,"
and exhibited more of the traditionally "male- character traits/
8
Nost women lack these qualities, their socialization insures
the forfeiture of^a mature self which is not biologically but
culturally male.
If the standard of excellence is already given, women's
exclusion from achieving these standards constitutes an injury.
Since women are socialized to choose between their humanness
as self-actualizers and their femaleness as biological beings
-
child-bearers
- female socialization is the denial of human-
ness. Priedan argues that this
-humanness" is a high order
T6\ Ibid
. t p. 308.
i9% Sw?y?? Goldberg's The Inevitability of Patriarchy (NewYork, William borrow, 1973 ) is an attempt to "prove" thatfeminism is doomed to fail because women's ability to succeedi^
+
petlti °n
i
S
+
limited ^ lack of the maiehormonetestosterone. Patriarchy is biologically necessary and doesnot constitute an injury. While Mr. Goldberg may be correclthat feminists have not paid adequate attention to biology,he fails to consider what the implications are of positing anon-competitive, non-hierarchical society as the goal. Goldbergalso deploys the emotional needs thesis to explain wh^ womenare so willing to adopt untenable positions. "That even afew academic intellectuals have accepted the feminist analysis
with its illogic and its misrepresentation of fact is explicable
only in the terms of emotional necessity. It is intellectuallydefensible in no terms at all." (p. 134) And in a footnote onthe same page, "The political ideologue never did care aboutideas, logic, or the integrity of intellectual pursuit. Thelayman who seeks rationalization for emotional necessity has
always embraced the most improbable explanation for as long
as it catered to his needs while he demanded of the unpalatable
theory a proof that the very nature of scientific theory precludes."
20. Socialization, not power relations, is the source of
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"need," and she explains the plight of modern woman as the
frustration of this need. m positing the male virtues
as needs, and in arguing that these needs are frustrated for
women, Friedan casts the male virtues as universally human
arid implies that any good society will be so constituted as
to promote the masculine virtues - the "will to power,"
-self-
assertion," "dominance," and "autonomy." Some of these traits
are those we would hope to find in all mature persons, and
Friedan takes the negative bite out of others by denying
that they imply "...aggression or competitive striving in
the usual sense " But one might well wonder in what
sense they are to be taken, especially in light of the stra-
tegy for social change which flows logically from the assump-
tions that these are the traits to be nurtured.
Before we look at this strategy, however, we need to
see how the idea of sex-role socialization supports a theory
of rational changes in consciousness. Friedan wants to show
how women can become aware that their human needs are not
injury. There is no attempt to investigate either the
notion of patriarchy or the institutions of capitalism in
terms of female oppression.
21. While I do not want to criticize Maslowe's needs theory
here, it is important to see that Friedan ignores the social
nature of needs - that certain aspects of femaleness become
needs also, needs which any program for social change cannot
ignore.
22. Friedan, The Feminine Mystique
, p. 299.
. .
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*eing met. At first it seems that this awareness arises
from the frustration of needs which results in a "disease
center or else atrophy of the person. But "diseased" or
sick persons seldom change themselves, or at least they
seldom choose healthy means. For Friedan it is women who
have experienced growth in some sphere of their lives who
make rational demands for social change. This assumption
is compatible with both the True Believer and Moral Agent
models, but when we investigate the type of growth experience
Friedan picks out, it is apparent that her theory of changing
consciousness is based on True Believer assumptions. Women
who demand change have experienced the status inconsistencies
which can undergird a critical evaluation of some social
practises, but only in terms of other practises already
embedded in social life.
These are educated women who are individualized in their
educational experiences, separated out from the class of
women and permitted some sense of achievement, only to find
that when school is done and they resume their female role
they must become "...an anonymous biological robot in a
docile mass." These women, strong in their individualism,
assertiveness, achievement orientation, however, are able to
say an unequivocal "no" to the housewife image. "Something
24
very strong in a woman resists the death of herself." And
in this "no" is implied a "yes," a yes to new individual life
23^ Ibid., p. 296.
24. Ibid., p. 297.
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plans which combine career and marriage, competition in a
roan's world as well as rootedness in woman's. These women
make demands for social arrangements which will alow them
to "...compete then, not as a woman, but as a human being,"
demands which make it possible for them to pursue careers, to
achieve high status in an existing stratification system.
Social change occurs first on the individual level -
individual women seeking careers - and then moves to the
political
- groups of women demanding the establishment of
those conditions which permit them to achieve individually.
"Not until a great many women move out of the fringes into
the mainstream will society itself provide the arrangements
for their new life plan." Not until women enter the
world of work - particularly the professions - will society
provide for day care, for child care on the campuses, for
maternity leaves, etc., for those institutional reforms which
permit women to compete on equal terms with men in all the
things men do. The strategic goals for the Women's Liberation
Movement, then, are to establish those conditions of equal
opportunity under which women are no longer handicapped by
their female sex roles. (What is interesting about Friedan's
strategy is the rather blatant ignorance of the fact that
working class women have always worked and that society
has seldom provided them with the social arrangements for
which Friedan now calls.)
25~. Ibid.
, p. 361.
162
^
A related theory of changing consciousness is the
theory of relative deprivation. In an article entitled "A
Feminist Analysis of Relative Deprivation in Academic Women,
-
Judy Long Laws attempts to utilize this theory to explain
how professional women come to perceive inequities in their
status as professionals and the kinds of demands which flow
from this perception.
While the theory of relative deprivation does differ
from the theory of status inconsistency in important respects,
they are quite similar. The most important point of similarity
is the assumption that persons seek pleasure and avoid pain
and that one pleasure is self-esteem and prestige. The theory
of relative deprivation assumes that a person's "...relative
gratification or deprivation results from social comparison,"
and that "...social comparisons are made in such a wav as to
26
avoid pain and provide pleasure." Like the theory of
status inconsistency, the theory of relative deprivation
assumes that the impetus for social change lies in comparisons
with standards of excellence already existing in society. The
criteria for what is worth having are already established by
social practise. Whether Laws consistently maintains and
adequately defends this position will be considered in a moment.
Laws develops a typology of four postures which academic
26^ Judy Long Laws, "Feminist Analysis of Relative Deprivation
in Academic Women," The Review of Radical Political Economics 4
(July, 1972), p. 107.
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women might adopt when confronted with the dilemma of
social comparison. These comparisons can be either individual
or group based
- e.g., they can compare themselves with fellow
male academicians, female students, housewives, etc. If,
for example, the academic woman compares hereself with
housewives, by the "laws" of motivation outlined above,
so long as the academic woman does not see herself as a
member of this group, "...the result is a feeling of
personal gratification and of superiority to the deprived
group. Both these feelings militate against the woman
-professor's perceiving similarity and solidarity with
other women and contributes to her resistance to the Women's
Lib appeal to 'sisterhood.'" Should she compare herself
to women students, the academic woman should feel herself
relatively advantaged in terms of academic achievement since
the "laws" of comparison will lead her to make judgments
which provide pleasure - in this case, the judgment that she
is better than other people. Comparison is motivated by
ego-gratification and precludes "class" solidarity.
Academic women faced with discriminatory practises,
however, may compare themselves to academic men, and this
may produce feminist consciousness. This depends on which
of four possible comparisons are made. Laws' "Token" is
really a male in women's clothing. She sees herself as an
"exception" and compares herself only with men. Since she
accepts male norms of achievement, she does not feel deprived
27. " IbldTT P. 109.
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if she or other women experience discrimination. The "Old
Feminist" also accepts male standards, and she too does not
feel deprivation. Her response is to accept the challenge and
beat men at their own game, she rejects completely her status
as a woman. The "Pussy Cat" is politically immobilized be-
cause she totally accepts male norms, but unlike the Token
she does not think of herself as an exceptional case, nor
does she want to outdo men like the Old Feminist. She is
a non-achiever who legitimizes discrepancies in status by
focusing on the rewards of non-power - typically the "benefits"
of avoiding responsibility.
The "Women's Liberationism is also achievement oriented,
but on Feminist terms - e.g., her standards of scholarship
are not the traditional standards of her discipline but the
standards of Feminist scholarship. Her reference group -
that group with which she compares herself - is other Fem-
inists, not male academicians. But we need to ask whether
this choice of standards and of reference group is consistent
with the theory of relative deprivation. I would argue that
it is only if we very. loosely construe relative deprivation
to include deprivation in terms of some ideal standard as
well as in terms of existing standards and groups.
The key element in the first three types is the legitimacy
of existing standards. The Token, the Pussy Gat, and the Old
Feminist feel relatively deprived in terms of these standards,
but their response to this feeling can hardly be said to be
unfiltered through cognitions, particularly cognitions of what
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constitutes an injury. The Women's Liberationist adopts
alternative standards through which she perceives existing
practises as injurious. The distinction between the Women's
Liberationist and those women who accept existing standards
as legitimate is very useful, but Laws has not clearly
explained how it is possible for women to come to adopt
alternative standards. She has made a rather large step
away from the theory of relative deprivation, a step not
grounded in a theory of how persons can come to adopt standards
not already legitimated by social practise.
Laws argues that social distance (anomie) can help
to account for this shift.
For academic women to develop a sense of deprivation
aua women.
. .clearly two sorts of changes are required*
(1) an increase in the felt distance from the grouo
of male colleagues, and (2) an increase in the sense
of similarity or shared fate with other women. 2 °
But might this increasing distance be explained as a rational
decision to choose alternative standards rather than an
instance of anomie? It seems to me that the experience of
deprivation in terms of a social category (sex) must be
filtered through an ideological perspective which includes
some notion of solidarity with women, and it is this per-
spective which ought to form the focus of analysis rather
than being snuck in through the back door and explained in
terms of avoiding pain and feeling pleasure. Why, for
instance, should a woman who gains pleasure from being an
exception suddenly shift to the less sure pleasures of
W. Ibid ., p. 116.
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identifying as a woman? Laws' answer is that she is avoiding
the pain of being rejected by men and gaining the pleasure
of self esteem in "rap groups" and this explanation of
female solidarity has plausibility. But it is both a cir-
cular and jopst hoc explanation which in the end itself
requires explanation. Women shift their identification
to avoid pain and receive pleasure. How do they know that
identifying with women will accomplish this? (Indeed, it
may raise tension, anxiety, frustration, etc.) Certainly
they can only know this insofar as the choice of reference
group is theory imbued. One's choice of reference group,
then, is not determined by expected pleasure or pain, but is
at least in part directed by our cognitions. That is, it is
a choice based on one's perception of the kind of person one
wants to be and the kind of social life one wishes to be
implicated in. Of course, we expect to find this pleasurable.
Why one woman perceives practises like unequal pay or
unequal rank as legitimate and another regards them as illeg-
itimate requires investigation into the issue of legitimacy.
Questions of identification (reference group) and Feminist
scholarship need to be treated as involving more than the
pursuit of pleasure. It seems to me that the whole notion
of Feminist scholarship rests on the capacity to criticize
existing norms. Moreover, Feminist scholarship must spring
in part from woman's need to understand herself as a woman,
a need which itself rests on prior identification of oneself
ons
s
16?
as a woman rather than as an academician for whom biological
differences are irrelevant. It is this identification as
a rational process involving cognitions and theorizing
29which needs more thorough examination.
Finally, we need to come to grips with the ways in which
these theories of status inconsistency and relative depriva-
tion affect the analyst's ability to
-see" other explanati
of contemporary Feminism and alternatives to liberal proposal
for social change. If we look at a 1973 article by Friedan
entitled, "Up from the Kitchen Floor," we can see that for
Friedan, at least theory and program seriously limit her
sympathy with other branches of the Women's Movement.
In that article, Friedan traces her own development
since the publication of The Feminine Mystique
, the hos-
tility she faced from other women, overcoming her own
29. It is interesting that Laws applies her theory onlvto academic women. Certainly academic women do most keenlvexperience inconsistent statuses - as women and as pro-fessionals. But how, then, does the consciousness of non-professional women get raised? Perhaps Laws* theory is
useful for pointing out the difficulties of raising women's
consciousness since housewives, for example, have few persons
with whom to compare themselves. Since they generally sharefew attributes with their husbands - in the way that academic
women share attributes with academic men - on what grounds
can they use men as a reference group and feel relatively
deprived as women? Perhaps we have highlighted an importantproblem m consciousness-raising, but Laws still ignores the Jfact that many non-professional women do participate in the
Movement. Moreover the Movement does make demands that movebeyond equal pay, affirmative action, etc. It is necessary,
I think, to make the comparisons between demands for new
standards of academic proficiency and demands for non-hier-
archical organizations, for example, and demands for equality
with men. Both demands question existing practises in ways
that equal pay for equal work and affirmative action do not.
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fear of being alone and getting a divorce, her developing
sense that society needed to change if women were to change,
and her establishment of N.O.W. But after this review of
her private and political actions, Priedan gets down to
the nitty-gritty of the article, a scathing criticism of
radical women,
-...those who preached the man-hating sex/
class warfare /and whp7 threatened to take over New York
N.O.W.
,
and National N.O.W.
, and drive out the women who
wanted equality, but who^also wanted to keep on loving their
husbands and children." She links these radicals with
CIA subversion, accuses them of power-tripping, and finally
describes Radicalesbians as "...merely acting out sexually
their rebellion and resentment at being 'underneath' in
society generally, being dependent on men for their personal
definition." Merely "acting out" frustrations - the
liberal categorizes the radical as a True Believer.'
Now it may well be that Lesbian women are acting out
their frustrations and that some Radical Feminists hate men,
but what I want to suggest is that Friedan is not open
to seeing this frustration and hatred as a legitimate
response to what Radicalesbians and Radical Feminists regard
as a male-dominated caste system. Friedan gives the very
distinct impression that anyone who comes out in favor of
30^ Betty Friedan, "Up from the Kitchen Floor," New York
Times Magazine
. March 25, 1973, pp. 32-3.
31. Ibid
. , p. Jk.
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Lesbianism must be driven bv an in„u^a+uxx oy illegitimate
"pseudoradical
infantilism." (i think that it is interesting that
Friedan's list of those to be castigated does not include
a single Marxist, although Millett and Firestone do move
in that direction. Either Friedan does not know that
Marxist Feminists exist, or she does not consider their
analysis worth any attention.)
For Friedan, much has been accomplished in the ten years
since the publication of The Feminine Mv.t^ ,,.. Indeed( at
a recent N.O.W. conference, she called for an end to the
Women's Movement and asked for a movement of men and women
together. Now this is an admirable goal - this goal of
human liberation
- and one which meets the requirements of
the Moral Agent mode - but it is a stance few Radicalesbains
or Radical Feminists could adopt at this juncture in history.
33
Because they approach the women's problem from radically
different theoretical perspectives, Lesbians and Radical
32r Midge Decter provides us with the contrast to pseudo-
radical infantilism. This is her image of the mature political
agent, committed to liberal values, adopting ideas hesitently,
although with strong commitment, and willing to test theseideas in the "free market place" of the political arena. Such
an agent is like Decter' s description of the early Feminists
who "...were forced not only to demand the vote, but to estab-lish in theory their right to it, as they did their right to
be educated, to own property, to run for public office, or to
sue someone in a court of law." (p. 52) Today's Feminist
plunges herself into an ideology without reservation and
pulls out of politics 1 ideas do not guide political action but
serve as a means for avoiding responsibility and power.
33. Compare this with the position Sidney Abbott and Barbara
Love express in Sappho Was a Right-On Woman (New Yorki Stein
and Day, 1973) » "Under present conditions, a Feminist may
well ask 1 Is heterosexuality a valid life-styeli Feminists
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Feminists and Friedan can scarcely communicate. Unwilling
to accept
-
or even to consider - the possibility that men
might have power over women, Friedan focuses on the eradi-
cation of continuing discriminatory practises that impede
woman's achievement in the male sphere. Her theory of
status inconsistency is not a theory of power, there are no
power relations which prevent the shift from femaleness to
••humanness." Neither capitalism nor patriarchy are considered
as possibly providing the structural underpinnings to the
"problem without a name." Lacking a theory of power, Friedan
casts Radicalesbians as pseudoradical infants and ignores
Marxist analysis entirely.
Friedan* s castigation of radical women flows from
her fear that the media will identify the Movement with
these individuals rather than with its "responsible" members,
and that identification with man-hating will drive other
women away. There is validity in Friedan »s position - few
women can afford to adopt man-hating as a practical life
posture (and man-hating may not be part of a developed moral
point of view) - but to castigate those on the outer fringe
as infants and CIA agents makes a mockery of political
ideology and serves to drive a wedge between left and center
of the Movement, playing on women's fears of their own
who cannot tolerate traditional male dominance have a good
reason to see heterosexuality as masochistic and Lesbianism
as rational." (p. 152)
3^. Whether this power takes the form of a sex-class or
sex-caste system is one of the more interesting debates taking
place in the Movement on the level of explanatory theory.
171
sexuality. What we ought to do is to look carefully at
Radicalesbian analysis (and the Radical Feminist tradition)
in terms of both explanatory theory and level of moral devel-
opment. As I shall indicate below, there are problems with
the analyses on both counts, but I suggest that because they
move beyond liberalism, persons like Friedan are bound to have
trouble coming to terms with them and to reject them out of
hand.
I.e. Bitchiness as a justification for feminism
While it is hardly likely that any political activist
would define her own actions as the irrational outburst of
frustrated desire, there are those who do justify their
feminism as an assault on the social constraints which limit
"authentic" human activity. If ividge Decter's critique of
contemporary American feminism rests on the belief that women
are suffering the ill-effects of anomie, then Germaine Greer's
The Female Eunoch is a glorification of anomie as a radical
alternative to the constraints of liberal society and as a
35
route to "authenticity."
Greer's conception of liberation flows out of an image
of the autonomous person and a view of the proper relation
between persons and society which is indebted to the True
Believer model, while at the same time arriving at a radically
35. This discussion of Greer ought not to be taken to
imply that there are no pure Hoffer-type True Believers in
the Women's rovement. What I want to do here is to illuminate
the ways in which fundamental theoretical assumptions delimit
political strategies and conceptions of liberation.
1?2
different image of 'liberated' life. Essentially what
Greer does is to throw out the contrast model of liberal
rationality and bourgoise conformity and opt for anomic
freedom.
Greer's model of the autonomous person is one in whom
mind and body, reason and passion, thought and action are
united. She is critical of any separation of these elements
of human personality, especially separations which appear in
the male-female dichotomy. What is interesting, however, is
.
that Greer clearly thinks that all ocial constraints maintain
this separation, despite her appearing to suggest a radical
alternative.
Anything which separates mind and body, reason and
passion, thought and action constitues an injury to persons.
The male-female polarity constitues such an injury. This
polarity is the product of culture and socialization. Woman
is deeply embedded in a conventional social order which de-
humanizes her. For instance, in learning a language, woman
learns the weapons of self-abuse? language constructs for
her a reality of shame and self-loathing. Faced with this
abuse, woman abdicates even conventional responsibility
and retreats to an asocial world of phantasy - a private
woman's culture in which resentment becomes a way of life,
in which frigidity and verbal assault become the real weapons
in a battle of the sexes. Yet it is these women, women
who destroy both their men and themselves, whom Greer
expects to free themselves.
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The question is how is a radical transforation of
woman's consciousness to take place. Unfortunately, her
socialization codes poorly for her becoming an authentic
actor. The Female Eunoch is a de-sexualized person, civil-
ized, repressed, if sexual energy is lefe, then civilisation
is death, socialization the destruction of persons
. Com.
pared to the child's existence, the socialized adult's life
is clearly impoverished.
&%?S£j&£ ^ryt°hS°LS sees-conscious of his egc when some wish ol'his is not
J I 1 of the eS° is to reiect reali+v +aadopt an inimical and anxious attilude ?o it 5*1.
n!
°*
,
J foste^ d 1n
" "r culture. tc71^^-TT^r-basis of o_ur_g£oistj,c morali ty, which acts not f„iunderstanding and feeling th/repSrcSssions or acUng
thP
C0™lty because of the continuity between^
selfSited S^f*-^ & laWS agd restrictionsb j.i -imposed in a narcissistic way.3o
Greer here offers a useful critique of conventional morality,
but her argument is undermined by her theory of moral devel-
opment. In the first stage of development, according to Greer
the child introjects parental values in order to get what s/he
wants. In the second stage, children - especially male child-
ren who are more encouraged to break from parents - develop
independence and some level of autonomy; Greer even goes so
far as to mention the importance of group activity in the
development of male children. For girls, however, the only
W. GeFmaine Greer, The Female Eunoch (New Yorki Bantum
Books, 1970), p. 71. (Underlining mine.)
174
free experiences are in school, and while these do create
contradictions and possibilities, the effects of freedom
are largely eradicated during puberty when social pressures
result in internalized repressive norms. The Female Eunoch
is created.
Lacking a theory of moral development which moves beyond
repression and the creation of egoism, Greer can only offer
women a solution which requires that they step outside their
socialization and refuse to obey their own internalized
constraints. "Eternal Eros is imprisoned now in the
-toils of the sadomasochistic symbiosis, and if we are to
o o
rescue him and save the world we must break the chain."
Now there do seem to me to be certain problems in this
"chain-breaking," especially for the deeply repressed Female
Eunoch. But Greer thinks she has resolved any tensions by
pointing to the remnants of childishness in women. This is
important since it is the child - and not the mature adult -
who provides Greer with her contrast model of the free agent
(with a touch of rationality added).
Greer's notion of "womanpower" rests on this faith in
woman's childlike, passionate nature. Since her socialization
is more limited than males - because she is more isolated
37. It is important to note the distinction between repression
and oppression. Repression is something one does to oneself
- albeit within the context of a social life; oppression is
something someone else does to you - it implies politics,
or power relations.
38. Greer, The Female Eunoch
, p. 99.
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from social life
- she retains a degree of contact with a
world that more rational males have lost. Although "...
woman's oceanic feeling for the race has little opportunity
for expression," this quality - which is dampened down and
perverted into male egoism - is what a humanist revolution
can be built upon. Freeing woman from social constraint
frees up the "natural instinct" for humanity which under-
girds Greer's dream of a more communal social life.^
Greer seems to want things any number of ways at the
same time. Woman is destroyed by her socialization -
de-sexualized
- but she is salvageable by alienation from
social life. Greer sees hope in woman's isolation in the
nuclear family, isolation from the social pressures which
lead men to conform to the reality principle, isolation from
development as a social being. But Greer ignores repression
in the family and the intricate ways in which family and
culture, work-family-culture, sex and family are interwoven.
Her focus on sexuality as the energizing force in Women's
Liberation ignores the non-sexual aspects of human life and
female personhood. She ignores the relation between familial
repression and oppression in the economic sphere, and the
possible ways in which sexual repression - which may indeed
produce a sexual division of labor - is implicated in other
human activities - socialization of children, work-life, etc.
In other words, Greer ignores politics.
W. Ibid . , p. 115.
This assumes that persons have a natural instinct for
community and that this instinct can be freely pursued.
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Her faith in woman's passionate nature undergirds
Greer's rejection of politics and Feminist analysis in
favor of doing one's own thing, of
.'acting freely." Greer , s
sweeping indictment of the Women's Movement rests on the
anarchistic, individualist conception of autonomy which she
deploys to justify her own flouting of convention and con-
straint. She is critical of analysis which she argues arises
from a warped experience, which is "...devised by minds
diseased by the system......
1
But one wonders if Greer
really means to argue that some sort of truth, or objectivity,
is possible if one frees onself from social constraint, if
one de-socializes oneself.
If analysis
- and I would insist, the emotions - flow
out of one's life experiences, then feminist analysis must
flow out of the warped human experiences of women. I fail
to see how Greer herself has been freed from her own peculiar
life experiences. She is admittedly an exception - and rather
proud to be one - a woman trained as a man, able to "get
ahead" to "make it" in both senses of that phrase in a
man's world. While she does seem to develop an analysis of
woman's condition and to offer a strategy for changing that
condition
- women should form solidarity groups organized
around foodshopping, laundry and childcare C), reject violence
and all forms of male behavior - but one gets the vivid
impression that these suggestions fail to take root in
Greer, The Female Eunoch
. p. 316.
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Greer's own life. Her own personal experiences surely
lead her to treat these suggestions as secondary to the
primary thrust of liberating women by "...replacing...
compulsiveness and compulsion by the pleasure principle....
The essence of pleasure is sponteneity.
.. .^hich7 means
rejecting the norm, the standard that one must live up to
^2and establishing a self-regulating principle."
But there are tremendous problems with this suggestion.
First, Greer .lacks an explanation of how women can free
•themselves to be spontaneous; her understanding of woman's
•oppression is inadequate. There are statements like*
"Women must reject their role as principal consumers in
the capitalist state." Yet no links are drawn between
consumption, capitalism, and sexual repression. Greer
argues that "Women must have room and scope to devise a
morality which does not disqualify her from excellence, and
a psychology which does not condemn her to the status of a
spiritual cripple...," but one wonders how the pleasure
principle is to serve as a guide to the new morality. It
seems that Greer must move in the direction of hedonism -
like the child whose wants (or pleasures) are thwarted by
parental demands and who rebels against parental injunctions,
Greer's autonomous agent rebels against social constraint
in pursuit of her own wants. But if our "wants" are somehow
rooted in our social life, how can they be pure and "authentic?"
W. Ibid
., p. 3^7.
43. Ibid . , p. 119.
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Haw can they form the basis for truly human activity? Surely
children are not always kind, considerate and humane, why
assume that the child-like woman will be?
Civilization must be rejected; women are called upon to
begin all over again, as if they could, under anomic con-
ditions. Normlessness becomes the condition of human
•freedom,' the first requisite of moral action is rejection
of all existing moral injunctions. But once existing norms
are rejected, how is one to construct a society within
.
which authentic action is possible? (Note that Greer has
no criteria for deciding which, if any, existing moral
injunctions might be worth retaining.) Greer suggests that
such a society could be built on love, defined as follows.
The proper subject for love is one's equal, seeing
as the essence of love is to be mutual, and thelesser cannot produce anything greater than itself....
It is the only foundation for viable social structures,because it is the manifestation of common good. 44
This passage sounds a good deal like the respect for persons
which undergirds the Moral Agent model, but, while Greer is
careful to show how love becomes perverted in patriarchal
society, she is not terribly cautious in her description
of the type of social arrangements which would allow love to
flourish. Her vision of a Calabrian commune is complete
with peasant family performing maintenance and child-care
duties thus freeing up her "brilliant" women friends to both
reproduce themselves and remain liberated from child-rearing.
W. Ibid .', p. 330.
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Certainly there are problems with this image of the liberat
life, especially for the "local family who work house and
garden.
Greer fails to show what these love relations will
look like; will they be relations without conflict, relati
in which there is no need for principles of choice be
all wants are so harmoniously conjoined? How will the?
love relations ramify into the economy, how will they form
the basis for an unexploitative economic life? What is the
relationship between the personal and the political for
Greer? How is love to re.ioin the polarized sexes? (The
assumption that the sexes are polarized is open to critical
scrutiny; one wonders how persons can be minds without
bodies, reasoning and impassionate
,
etc.) Greer argues that
love will bring "...the cunt into its own..." and "...humanize
the penis, take the steel out of it and make if flesh again."
Despite her cast igat inn of women, despite her own sense
of superiority to other women, Greer sees woman as more
human than men, and therefore proposes feminizing power
hungry males. This is an interesting proposition, but one
which does not rest firmly on an image of the social arrange-
ments under which this could occur.
Greer's argument for a new woman, for a new moral it
y
(and for a new man) is both ahistorical and asocial - it
assumes that woman can stand outside her culture and develop
£5T TbidT, p. 338.
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something entirely "new" and "free" and thoroughly un-
constrained. Morality is total freedom; there is no sense
of obligation, no sense that persons' wants may conflict
and that we may need some criteria for choosing among them.
Greer's failure to explicate a new morality lies in her
attempt to couple an unalienated notion of personhood with
a hedonistic, relativistic morality. This combination will
just not wash since it fails to flesh out the conditions
under which unalienated personhood can be achieved. Nor
does it lay out guidelines for choosing among social institu-
tions *nd for justifying political actions. Women should
just do their own thing.
Germaine Greer has not been hedged in by social con-
vention; she prides herself on her fortuitious escape from
woman's loti "...a Negro who cannot do the lindy-hop or
46
sing the Blues...." Nor has she suffered sex discrimination
in non-sexual spheres. "As an academic, I daresay I have
found /an alternative to the drudgery of woman's work./ I
do receive equal pay. I was appointed in preference to male
competition and nothing can prevent me from being promoted in
4?
the natural course of events." Greer is her own best
approximation of the autonomous person - flouter of convention,
flaunter of her sexuality, unmarried, undisciplined, and
rather scandalous. One may well wonder how applicable this
model is to the average British - or American - housewife.
W. Ibid
. , p. 111.
P. 139.
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To summarize, theorists in the True Believer mode
fail to adequately comprehend the Women's Movement because
they lack both an adequate explanation of woman's oppression
and a fully developed moral perspective 'from which to
criticize existing social practises. Theorists like Germaine
Greer begin to understand that there are power relations in
our society which need to be understood, and she is critical
of existing moral rules; yet she lacks a developed perspective
from which to arrive at an alternative morality. She is at
once progressive and retrogressive. She emphasizes the
.freedom side of morality or autonomy to the extent of
loosing sight of the person as a social being with obliga-
tions and commitments to others, a being who requires certain
kinds of human relationships in order to grow and flourish.
Theorists like Decter and Friedan err in the opposite direc-
tion, emphasizing the obligation side of morality to the
exclusion of critical consciousness. Both accept an explan-
atory theory which sees societies ranging between anomic
chaos and integrated pluralism, an explanatory theory which
blinds them to alternative possibilities. Decter and Friedan
also lack a theory of power relations, a theory which could
link socialization to the distribution of burdens and
benefits.
II. An alternative image of rational feminism
The F'oral Agent model outlined in Chapter III provides
the theoretical foundation for an approach to political
action ana an understanding of the Wcnen-a ,,;ovement which
i-
-re fruitful than the accounts offered above. Although
Proponents of these accounts wo uld claim to incorporate the
argents of each of the others. I would argue that the Moral
Agent m0del aids us in making up for the deficiences of the
True Believer model, deficiencies which have to do with
understanding the distinctions made in goals and justificationg
of feminist action. The approach to political action which
I have labeled the Moral Agent model assumes that feminism
varies with historical time and place, that motives and the
language in which motivation is couched changes also, and
that motives are not abstract and universal but rather develop
over time. This model also provides a framework for an
understanding of how the image of rational action outlined
above itself flows from the theorists' own ideological commit-
ments and stage of moral development.
I want to suggest that the Moral Agent model is a more
fruitful approach to understanding the Women's Movement be-
cause it does several important things. First, it rests on
a social and historical perspective on ideology, and on
persons. Second it flows from a more adequate explanatory
theory. And third, it is rooted in a more developed morality.
No social movement can be explained by a one-dimensional
theory. Different motivations and justifications can be found
in any movement both during the same historical period and
as the movement develops over time. One needs to understand
these changing justifications - as they find expression
in movement ideology
- to understand the changing nature of
48
the movement. Some form of a verstehen approach needs to
be adopted in order to understand a social movement since
very different actions and very different futures flow out
of different actors' conceptual frameworks. If a group of
persons engages in action, they must have ideas - unless one
wants to argue that political action is a product of material
forces alone. I have assumed that this is not the case.
Out of different feminist critiques flow different
strategies for social change; these critiques in turn flow
out of different life experiences which produce different
understandings and evaluations of sex oppression. If the
analyst does not share these understandings and evaluations,
s/he is necessarily going to commit mistakes in categorization
(so long as the actor is not engaged in pure rationalization).
S/he will misconceive the action because his/her categories
will guide perception in terms of his/her own understanding.
Now it may well be accurate to portray some feminists as
seeking to escape from freedom, or, on the contrary, as
seeking to redress inequalities within the confines of an
established procedure for deciding the legitimacy of claims.
But this cannot account for those feminists who may be
developing new moral ideas - who may be extending the notion
of 'liberation' in new directions, not out of anomy but out
48. For a defense of verstehen as an empirical methodology,
see Arthur diQuattro, "Verstehen as an Empirical Concept,
Sociology and Social Research 5? (October 1972)i32-4l.
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of having experienced egalitarian relationships and
snnng developing meanings. Of the modes of explanation
of political action which were developed in Chapters II and
III. I would argue that the second is the more fruitful
since it permits us to see and understand actions to which
the first is blind.
To meet the requirements of the Moral Agent mode
of analysis, an explanation of Feminism has to do several
things. It has to treat persons as social and historical
beings whose needs change over time, and who have the
capacity for development - who can, in freedom, create
themselves. It needs to treat persons as having feelings
and ideas, some of which are more developed than others,
but all of which are part of being human. It has to treat
persons as capable of entering into egalitarian relations,
relations which are rewarding and liberating for all
parties - as capable of having social interests and moving
beyond alienation. And it has to treat persons as having
both the capacity for feeling indignation when others are
injured, and for feeling warmth and trust. In other
words, the explanation needs to treat persons from the
moral point of view described in Chapter III.
"$91 A pamphlet published by the Women's Liberation Basement
Press clearly points up the importance of restructuring
human relationships in order for women to develop their con-
sciousness. "The Small Group, Three Articles by Lynn O'Connor,
Pam Allen, Liz Bunding," (Berkeley! Women's Liberation Base-
ment Press, no date). The small group plays a vital role in
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Explanation in the Moral Agent mode also develops
an alternative image of 'liberation' based not only on this
developed moral perspective but on an explanatory theory linked
to the idea of alienation. Although it would require another
dissertation to do justice to the notion of 'liberation' I
use here, I would like to rest my case for an alternative
image of liberation without too much argumentation on the
Marxist concept alienation. The alienated person is one
who is separated from her species being - for example, a
women, privatized and individualized in a home which is no
longer a relationship of social beings but is more and more
a fragmented, individualized, alienated relationship, is
an alienated being. Alienation is another way of describing
non-reciprocal, inegalitarian, egoistic relationships. In
contrast, the dis-alienated person is a cultural being,
a social being who creates herself consciu through action
rather than being created by physical or economic need. She
is autonomous, de-individualized and social, as contrasted
to self-interested and privatized. The image of the liber-
ated woman is a person in whom culture and the expansion of
human activity or choice supercedes nature through trans-
formations of all spheres of woman's oppression and exploit-
ation, making possible an autonomous, social life. If Piaget
is correct, this dis-alienution requires reciprocal, egal-
itarian, social relationships. Human liberation involves
a developmental tool in the Movement. See also Pamela Kearon,
"Power as a Function of the Group," Notes. 2nd Yearf pp . 108-110.
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the realization of female liberation through the eradication
of all oppressive and exploitative conditions.
What we could ask now is what exactly is it that make
for female alienation in our society, it is around thi
question that many of the hottest debates in the Women'
Movement have revolved, particularly debates between Marxists
and Radical Feminists. I am not so much interested in
the fine points of this debate - although this is certainly
essential in terms of developing an adequate explanatory
theory
- as I am in developing a sense of the way in which
Feminist ideas have developed dialectically over time.
What I propose to do now is to look at several Feminist
analyses in terms of whether they satisfy the requirements
of the Moral Agent mode. Each of the analyses laid out
below moves beyond explanation in the True Believer mode,
but I shall suggest that some remain relatively inadequate
as examples of the Moral Agent mode, either because they
fail to adopt an adequate explanatory theory or to rest
on a fully developed moral perspective, or both.
50^ A reader might note that I have not included any of
the classical Marxist statements on women's oppression or
any contemporary Trotskyite statements. This is an intentional
oversight. Had I been primarily concerned with explanatory
theory, both would have been included. But since my primary
concern is with the dialectical development of Feminist
ideas today, I selected material which was both contemporary
and which presented problems in both explanatory theory and
level of moral development. Marxist perspectives are covered
in my treatment of Juliet Mitchell. I am more interested
in patterns of ideological change than I am in specific
explanatory theories.
18?
The Radical Feminist branch of the Women's Movement
does move in the direction of meeting these requirements
especially as it moves beyond liberal equality of opportunity
to an understanding of the relationship between patriarchy
and alienation. The alienation which flows out of patriarchy
and which is embedded in sex roles finds its expression in
woman as "other; •- unable to name herself and to engage in
freely chosen activity.
While I do not want to suggest that Radical Feminism
is a monolithic political position lacking in internal debate
and controversy, I think that Shulamith Firestone's The
Dialectic of_Sex is the classic statement of this position.
Firestone's book is an attempt to synthesize Marx and Freud.
She begins with the Marxist notion of alienation as separation,
but she finds the roots of this alienation not in production
but in reproduction, in sexual dualism. Out of this bio-
logical dualism flows an ideological superstructure which is
also divided into two spheres - the female Aesthetic Mode
and the male Technological Mode - and a division of labor
into men's work and women's work. Both ideology and work-
life are a reflection of the biological dualism which for
Firestone produces woman's oppression.
Woman's reproductive capacity is the root of her
oppression. In order to achieve female liberation* then
reproduction must be brought under control. To do this,
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women must sieze control of the Technological mode and use
it to end the oppressiveness of child-bearing and the
alienated life built upon it.
But Firestone also offers what she claims is a Freudian
interpretation of the family as the source of the "pshcho-
dynamics of power." This psychodynamics
, which is also
rooted in the biological division of labor, gives rise to
all power relations
- age, race, class, etc. To end
oppression, then, women must work to eradicate the bio-
logical family. Biology is doubly damned.
What we need to ask is whether this analysis is an
adequate expression of the Moral Agent mode. I think that
there are several glaring problems which prevent classifying
Firestone as a Moral A*ent theorist. First, Firestone lacks
a clear image of the person as social and historical being.
Biology is abstracted out of social relations and assumes
the status of first cause; it has no history, no social
specificity. Reproduction is always oppressive. Since
women are always biologically female, they appear as static
images in history. Changes in female oppression occur
through the mechanism of technology rather than through
31
the conscious intervention of human actors. This tech-
51. Firestone calls her theory a "dialectic of sex," a
problematic identification with Marxist epistemolo^y at best.
Juliet Mitchell criticizes her for being far more a "material-
ist" than an historical materialist, far more a dualist than
a dialectian - both valid criticisms.
nologism creates problems for Firestone's ,
^
r understanding
oe
"
id60l0Sy
^
S0°ial Change
-
A"h0
-
h
a s attempt to iUustrate the development of feminist
apical Feminism, there is an unresolved tension here. The20th Century resurgence of Feminism is cast as »... the
inevitable female response to the development of a tech-
nology capable of freeing women from the tyranny of their
sexual-reproductive roles
- both the fundamental biological
.condition itself, and the sexual class system built upon,
and reinforcing, this biological condition."
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But if
feminism is a reqr>nn<? 0 + n + usponse to technology, how is it to capture
technology for its own dutou^? u„,.purp ses.- How are purposes determined?
In her move away from female oppression and towards a
concern for the oppression of all perSons, Firestone reduces
all oppressions to one form - the psychodynamics of sexual
power. She rejects socialist analysis as "not radical
enough" because it fails to root oppression in sexuality
(indeed, this is an inadequacy of classical Marxism), and
because "...it does not relate the structure of the economic
class system to its origins in the sexual class system, the
model for all other exploitative systems, and thus the tapeworm
that must be eliminated by any true revolution. " m pressing
the Feminist call for a move from the "personal to the political,"
B^tafBoo£8?
h
l9ynrr3ir e Dial6CtlC °f (NSW York '
53. Ibid., p. 37.
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Firestone defines the personal as both the model for the
political and as the cause of the political. She is not
really clear which it is to be, nor is she clear on how the
sex and political class systems interrelate dialectically.
Her analysis is uni-dimensional and mono-causal rather than
one which captures the complexity of human existence. She
has reduced life to biology, for example, she offers a rather
lengthy discussion of racism in which she reduces racial
oppression to
-sexism in the family of man." Here she reaches
out to Blacks in an attempt to understand the linkages between
various forms of oppression, but she does it in a way which
delegitimizes important differences among these. This is a
naive "totalism.
« To say that oppressions are linked is not
necessarily to say that they all flow from the same source,
and that is what Firestone has done.
Finally, Firestone has problems with the requirement
of respect for persons, for their capacity as feeling,
responsible agents with the potential for development. It
seems to me that any argument which rests on technology does
two things - first, it denies human beings a central place
in history, a responsibility for their lives; second, it
denies them the rich, varied and often painful feelings they
experience in a life whose problems are not always amenable
to technical solutions. Are the problems which confront
5^. Juliet Mitchell in Woman's K:;l.ate (New York i Pantheon
BbokB, 1971) t uses this term" to denote an analysis which
expands upon one form of oppression as the root of all others.
191
women as persons resolvable solely through a technology which
eradicatesthe biological roots of oppression? To argue that
they will is to ignore the fact that woman is more than a
biological being. She is the person who has had primary re-
sponsibility for child-rearing and this is more than a biolo-
gical function. It is a role which has profound implications
not only for women but for children as well. Women have had a
unique relationship to children and this has created needs (I
want to be terribly clear that this need is not "maternal in-
stinct"), needs which any proposal for social change must
take into account.
We need to ask whether Firestone's proposals adequately
deal with these needs, including children's needs for the con-
ditions which promote their development. Firestone »s technolo-
gical solution seems to usher in an era of baby farms and child-
rearing by "experts." She argues that children are oppressed
by patriarchy
- economically and physically dependent, deprived
of their sexuality, repressed in their daily lives, but will
technology and entry into work-life resolve these problems and
encourage their flourishing as full human beings? Firestone
says that ghetto kids are freer - freer in their sexuality,
which is "groovy" but is sexuality all there is to human devel-
opment? Firestone has failed to come to grips with either
woman's or children's needs regarding child-rearing.
And her theory of sexual 'liberation' raises serious
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questions as to where men will be in the liberated society.
One wonders whether Firestone sees men as having a capacity
to develop, and therefore deserving certain types of treatment.
Firestone does not want for women what men now have - she does
not want equal opportunities to achieve in a man's world,
indeed, the man's world - i.e., the capitalist class sytem -
is vehemently rejected as a reflection of man's need for power.
But does she want men? At first reading, it seems that the
goal is the reintegration of the male-female duality into
a unified whole
- "...reintegrating the personal with the
public, the subjective with the objective, the emotional
with the rational
- the female principle with the male."
55
But one is left with a nagging feeling that Firestone thinks
men essentially unsalvageable, that they are inherently
flawed.
Unlike economic class, sex class sprang directlyfrom a biological reality i men and women were
created different, and not equally privileged.^6
Aside from the dubious assumption that privilege is biological
and not social, we need to ask, if oppression is so clearly
rooted in biology, must one eradicate biology before one can
elminate any of the forms of oppression, and, if male privilege
is biological, is there any basis for rational discourse
between male and female in the process of change?
In arguing that biology causes oppression, Firestone
verges on an argument quite similar to Steven Goldberg's in
55^ Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex
, p. 210.
56. Ibid.
, p. 8.
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except that she thinks
that Culture can supercede Nature if women organize to
gain control of technology. Indeed at one point Firestone
does say that men cannot love - perhaps because of "...Male
hormones??" Because she works from a natural dualism,
Firestone cannot account for how it might be possible to
humanize the male. If maleness means power and femaleness
means non-power, how are the non-powerful to achieve power
and what effects might this have on the presently powerful?
•
How can the female principle humanize the male principle
when both are biologically determined? A dichotomized
world does not carry within it the seeds of either its
own destruction or development.
A logical extension of Firestone •s position is the
58
Radicalesbian alternative. If the psychodynamics of
power accurately accounts for man's power hunger, and
if the family is rooted in biology, since we have neither
the technological means of eradicating biology nor the pol-
itical power to control and determine technology, female
liberation can be achieved by no longer relating to men.
A Feminist politics is necessary only where there is
59power, and there is power only where there are men. Con-
sider the following long passage from Jill Johnston's Lesbian
Nati on.
W. Ibid. , p. 135.
58. Not all Radical Feminists adopt Lesbianism. There has
been much debate in the Movement as to whether Gay Women are
a radical Feminist vanguard, whether one needs to be Gay in
order to be a Feminist, whether Lesbianism is necessarily
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Reparations. Child Carp anH n
Rights. The victims are people beinf ^°rti °n(women are still down) and ?hedeba?f is about*shortening their sentence somehow i %lr>°+7 ,
cLsfast^alel^^ ^ain (hi°s g^!* 9
was relatively remote TLHh^V 3 a~ ^victim
practical problems in a woman's society. My message
relate iT.lnTo
a11™"" womeTif
•
Alienation 8nd oppression are rooted in a male-dominant
sexual dualism. Without men, women would suffer no injuries,
there would be no political issues because biology would not
be implicated in power relations. Without men, women could
enjoy authentic, loving, egalitarian relationships/
1
Thus,
the Radicalesbian position. But is this a pseudoradical,
infantile position as Friedan suggests in her offenseive
against the Lavender Menace? That depends on whether the
position flows from a developed moral perspective and rests
on an adequate explanatory theory.
Unfortunately, Johnston falls short on both accounts.
Although she is critical of Greer's blatant heterosexuality,
radical.
59. Or where Lesbians pattern their relations on the hetero-
sexual,
Schuster! 1973)?°?'. ^
sbian Nation, (New York, Simon and
61. Whether Lesbian separatism is a political position is
debatable. Decter may be correct in chastizing Lesbians for
But
seems
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Johnston often sounds very much like Greer. She, like Greer,
is at once progressive and retrograde. She proposes Lesbian-
ism as the only route to true equality - "The lesbian is the
woman who has experienced real equality in relationships in
which no party has the biological or social advantage which
characterizes heterosexual coupling"
62
- as the means for ab-
olishing sexism in truly egalitarian peer relations.
63
Johnston's focus on equality, on peer group relations,
tacked on to an account of a rather uninvolved, uncommitted,
inegalitarian personal life.
Perhaps Johnston is at a point of transition from
one mode of consciousness to another, but she has not yet
made the transition a way of organizing her own life. More-
over, her explanatory theory - which I would argue flows
directly from her life-long lesbianism, her realesbianism -
inadequately accounts for women's oppression and also estab-
lishes a view of men which fails to treat them as persons. "It
is difficult to conceive of an 'equal' sexual relationship between
two people m which one member is the 'biological aggressor.'"
being anti-political. But if one engages in political struggle
to establish the conditions for female love, then Lesbianism"
is strongly political. Moreover, if politics is broadened to
include egalitarian, participatory and liberating activity,
then Lesbianism may be political in this sense.
62. Johnston, Lesbian Nation
, p. 157.
63. Ibid
. , p. 178.
64. Ibid
., p. 154.
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Even with liberal reforms, "There'll still be a man. And
biology is defintely destiny.
Johnston has felt her own oppression most vividly as
a biological being, or, rather, as an individual in
rebellion against her biologically determined identity.
Out of this felt oppression flows an analysis which sees
persons almost entirely as biological creatures, Man's
biology leads to evil, woman's to good. Eradicate male
biology, eradicate evil - a simple solution to the world's
woes which flows from an inadequate explanatory theory. But
this is not to say that Johnston is a pseudoradical infant.
Rather, I would argue that she is struggling with a terribly
difficult transition from her own individual sense of sexual
oppression to an understanding of human oppression. Nor
would I label her a man-hater. Her position viz men is more
like the righteous indignation which arises when we see
someone as responsible for injuring us. Yet one wonders
whether she thinks men could avoid doing this injury. Homo-
sexual men can; Gay men have abrogated their male prerogatives
and their position of power. So at least some men are capable
of developing, at least in the direction Johnston sees as
development. But can men and women develop in heterosexual
relationships? Johnston certainly claims not.
I think Johnston's great failure lies in her explanatory
theory. Her move has been from gayness to feminism and
her political theory is couched in these terms. By defining
W. Ibid ., p. 175.
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woman totally in terms of her sexuality, Johnston fails
to make important links with other modes of oppression and
to work out a political strategy for change.
In a sense, Johnston is right when she says, "We don't
have to have anything to do with men at all. They've taken
excellent care of themselves.
.. .The liberation of women is
„ 66for women, not for men." Certainly, women have to avoid
a naive altruism and certainly there are problems in
working with men for female liberation. No group which has
been advantaged by inequality is going to readily give up
its prerogatives, especially when these satisfy deep-seated
psychological needs. Moreover, female liberation does have
something to do with women acting for themselves, but we have
already seen that such action can move beyond egoism and
6?
towards social interests. Feminist consciousness does
have to begin with woman's oppression, and woman's oppression
is at least in part rooted in personal life, but Johnston's
Ibid.
, p. 177.
67. Female liberation does have something to do with women
no longer defining themselves in terms of men, no longer
serving men and no longer allowing men to name them, to give
them their identity. ' But as Anne Koedt points out, Radical-
esbians continue to define woman in terms of who she sleeps
with, no big change from heterosexual definitions. The goal,
argues Koedt, is personhood, not homo-, hetero- or bisexuality.
68. The phrase the "personal to the political" is extremely
fuzzy indeed. It simply demands clarification. For example,
Johnston implies that sex relations are power relations - the
is the political. Moving from the personal to the political,
then, is understanding that one's inability to cope is not
a personal problem but one rooted in a sex-caste system.
Juliet Mitchell uses the same phrase to describe the move
198
dualism is too simple
- man is bad, woman is good. Glori-
fication of the victim inevitably fails to account for the
negative effects of oppression on persons.
Woman is more than a sexual being. Johnston's analysis
is non-contextual; there is no image of woman at work, no
attempt to understand the relationship - if any- between
woman's sexual alienation and her alienation as worker,
either house-private or job-public. Without this context,
it really does look like men and women have nothing in common,
.
no shared alienation (although even this is experienced
from different sexual perspectives). The personal may be
the political, but there is still a world of work and
public activity into which the personal feeds, a world of
power, inequality, burdens and benefits, a world which
vitally affects women.
Nor is there any consideration of woman as mother,
of the particular relationship woman has had to socialization
and the needs that this creates in both mother and child.
Johnston has a tendency to define needs as biological.
If technology has made reproduction outmodes, if we don't
need men because they just aren't as essential to reproduction
as we thought all along, what happens to men, what is the
relationship between mother and child? If needs are
social and historical, Feminism has to come to grips with
from consciousness of sex-private oppression - which she agrees
is the first oppression women sense - to political conscious-
ness or an understanding of the public-power relations within
which sexual oppression is embedded. These are quite differ-
ent interpretations and make for confusion in Feminist discourse
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needs which are embedded in parenthood and with hetero-
sexuality as a need deeply embedded in all of us who are
not "non-political" or realesbians.
Looking for first causes is always problematic. Cer-
tainly work life is vital to women, Lesbianism becomes a
more viable life style (as most Lesbian activists are
well aware) as women have opportunities to enter occupations
which pay enough to support themselves and their children.
Equal pay cannot be irrelevant to Lesbian women, nor is it
possible to win the struggle for equal pay through separatism,
unless one establishes totally self-supporting Lesbian work
collectives. This has been done in several places, but I
wonder how viable these can be on the mass level. We need
to get clear on the relationship between woman's public work
and her need for a man to support her and her children. We
cannot avoid this issue by passing off woman's need for man
as biologically outmoded. We also need to get clear on how
people become heterosexual. They do, and this presents
problems for any Lesbian strategy. We do have heterosexual
needs, which - regardless of their no longer having biological
roots, which is debatable - are needs nonetheless.
If the Radical Feminist and Radicalesbian perspectives
fail to meet the requirements of the Moral Agent mode both
in terms of explanatory theory and the requirements of
morality, is there an analysis which does meet these re-
quirements?
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A^ossible candidate is Alice Rossi's eonceptien of an-
drogyny or her "hybrid model of equality.-
70
Rossi's p iea i
for a move beyond separate spheres for males and females and
beyond equal opportunities for women in the man's sphere, and
to an androgynous personhood. This personhood combines the
human qualities found in both males and females.
sexes. This assumes the traditional concetrtion* r>f
ofwoitr and . femi«ine are inappropriate to the kind
oLZrl "L IZ* ln in thS SeCOnd half of the twentieth
IS^ir^teo°^?!ed W"h thS^ i^raaf^onal
Since it is sex-role socialization which stands in the way of
androgyny, Rossi's call is for the re-socialization of persons
into those character traits which would make it possible
for them to develop their full human capacities.
Unlike Friedan, Rossi does not take the standard of
human excellence to be male. She rejects the idea of equality
as woman's entry into the man's world.
^assimilation model <-°f equality/makes an assumption
that the institutional structure of American society,developed over decades by predominantly white Protestant
males, constitutes the best of all possible worlds.
Whether the call is to blacks or to women to join white
69^ Alice S. Rossi, "Equality Between the Sexes t An Immodest
Proposal," in Robert Jay Lifton, ed., The Woman in America(Bostoni Beacon Press, 1964); pp. 98-l*Fn
70. Alice S. Rossi, "Sex Equality i The Beginnings of Ideology,
in Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, ed., Toward a Soc iology
of Women (Lexingtoni Xerox, 1972), pp. 3^-353.
71. Rossi, "Equality Between the Sexes," p. 99,
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ogy accept
men in the mainstream of American society, bothracial integration and a feminist ideol ?the structure of American society as it now existsThe assimilation model rejects the psychologicaltheses of innate racial or sex differences implicitin most versions of the pluralist model, but itaccepts the social institutions formed by theascendant group. fi J
Woman is biologically different from man, but her particula
capacities ought to be recognized and valued while some
compensations might need to be made in order for her to
develop fully in all spheres of human activity. But recog-
nizing and valuing sexual differences is carefully dis-
tinguished from separate spheres, from what Rossi calls the
"pluralist model of equality," and which is similar to the
call for separate but equal educational facilities for the
races. The standard of human excellence is not male? rather
men have much to learn about their own personhood and have
-been equally injured by the pluralist model.
Rossi also works from a social and historical per-
spective on women. Biology has not always oppressed women
in the same way. Rather the biological role of mother has
taken on a new status in contemporary society. (One would
wish that Rossi had developed this understanding more thor-
oughly and had dealt in more depth with the relationship
between capitalism and biological oppression. This
would clear the way for a more adequate understanding
of the power relations which undergird sex-role social-
W. Rossi, "Sex Equality," p. 351.
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nation).
"What has not been seen is the general point
that for the first time in the history of any known society,
motherhood has become a full-time occupation for adult women.-
It is not biology or motherhood per se which oppresses women,
but the social definition of woman as biological being, as
mother. Full-time motherhood is injurious to women, it is
injurious to children, and it excludes men from their full
humanity. (Again, Rossi fails to consider who might benefit
from this arrangement.)
Rossi, then, seems to satisfy the requirements of a
developed moral perspective. Her arguments for female lib-
eration are baeed on respect for persons as social and histor-
ical beings. But she clearly lacks on explanatory theory of
how she came to this position and this in turn colors her
image of the ways in which others 'perceptions of themselves
and society can be altered and serve as a base for social
change. Rossi combines a developed moral point of view with
an inductionist approach to socialization, and this will not
do as analysis in the Moral Agent mode.. For example, she
argues that women who now challenge existing roles have been
profoundly influenced by their fathers.
It is possible that those women who have led ex-
citing, intellectually assertive and creative lives
did not identify exclusively with their traditional
mothers, but crossed the sex line and looked to their
fathers as model sources for ideas and life commit-
ments of their own. This is to suggest than an
exclusively same-sex identification between parent
TT* Rossi, "Equality Between the Sexes," p. 106.
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and child is no necessary condition for either
mentally healthy or creative adults. 7^
This image of the way in which healthy, creative adults
may develop undergirds Rossi's claim that female liberation
can only be achieved if children are exposed to new role
models, models which expand their self
-conceptions beyond
traditional sex role stereotypes. This view of changing
consciousness supports her call for greater male participation
in the lives of their children and for more open role-social-
ization in the schools. Yet it fails to come to grips with
how critical consciousness is possible. Is cross-pressuring, or
exposure to male roles, enough to induce a critical perspective
on social roles? Rossi's theory of socialization is rather
more a variant of status inconsistency theory than a theory
of radical criticism. Altering role models may help break
down rigid sex-role identifications, but one wonders if this
is all there is to critical consciousness. We have seen that
the Piagetian image of socialization also depends on exposure
to a variety of roles, but the important step is to move
beyond role-taking to role-making. It is this step which
requires critical consciousness, an ability to critically
evaluate social roles and rules from the moral point of
view, and makes possible demands for a more radical form
of mutality and egalitarianism than role-choosing can permit.
Finally, Rossi has failed to develop an adequate under-
standing of the power relations which undergird sex-role
W. Ibid., p. 133.
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socialization, and the interests which are served by this
socialization. She begins to move in this direction in her
critique of pluralist ideology which "...often disguises
a social system in which one group dominates - the upper
classes (white Anglo-Saxon Protestants) - and minority
ethnic, religious or racial groups are confined to the
lower classes." And she begins to make links between
work life and sexism.
!^°eS American soc iety persist in maintainingerroneous myths concerning female sexuality, con-trary to research evidence, as it does in,
women to believe their children's development
requires their daily attendance upon ?he^ again
li2T?+£ 0 reSear? h evidence? I believe thfanswer
llll ? i
hG econo™lc d emand that men work at per-8
lZ
e
l
3
°J^ efficiency and creativity.
in which ?L ? ? i hlS re(l uires a s °cial arrangementthe family system serves as the shock-absorbing handmaiden of the occupation system. ?6
Rossi also recognizes that there are social handicaps
like race and class, but she has not investigated the links
between these and the handicaps of sex. She has not anal-
ized whether these phenomena are part of all industrial
societies or whether they are particular to capitalism.
Rossi, then, fails on the level of explanatory theory - in
her explanation of critical consciousness and in her explan-
ation of the sources of injury to women and to persons.
75~. Rossi, "Sex Equality," p. 3^9.
76. Ibid., p. 350.
77. "Women in Science i Why so Few," in Constant ina Safilios-
Rothschild, Toward a Sociology of Women (Lexington i Xerox.
1972), pp. IIH-I53:
205
In her treatment of ideological development and in her
explanation of female oppression, Juliet Mitchell moves be-
yond Rossi's explanatory inadequacies. Yet at the same time,
Mitchell maintains a developed moral point of view, although
some of the elements require more development.
Mitchell gives central place to ideological change in
her discussion of contemporary Feminism. Only through anal-
ysis of the legitimizing functions of ideology, she says, can
one begin to understand how persons alter their lives and
circumstances. Ideology is a determinant in our lives, as
important to understanding social change as is the economic
substructure of classical Marxism. "The dominant ideological
formation is not separable from the dominant economic one,
but while linked, it does have a certain degree of autonomy
and its own laws." Understanding social change requires
taking seriously this ideological autonomy and these "laws"
of development,
Mitchell's own explanation of ideological change is
identified by the short-hand phrase "the role of contradiction.
At first inspection, her theory of contradiction appears to
have much in common with Lenski's theory of status incon-
sistency. Women who experience different opportunities in
different spheres of their lives - e.g., the opportunity
for sexual freedom as contrasted to a limited occupational
freedom - may make demands for freedom of choice in areas
now closed. Or, using the language of relative deprivation,
W. Mitchell, Woman's Estate
, p. 156.
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women who have the same education as men will expect the
same social rewards and feel deprived when these are not
forthcoming.
At first, Mitchell claims, the contradictions of cap-
italism are recognized by middle class women through the
medium of bourgeois ideology.
Itt^l ideology of equality. .. overt discriminatory
lots not\»T ^ 3 ??Ck ' The egalitarian ideology
•illu2?^55 fapKb?tween the 'reality and the
SY
il usion offered, but on the contrary, is the wayin which both the discrimination and 'the opposition
£Li?^?-l1VeJ' The belief in the rightnels and the
thSS S 1^! 0? t^t1ity that WOmen sh^e has enabledem to feel 'cheated' and hence has acted as aprecondition of their initial protest. 79
Rebellion is at first a demand for simply more of what
80people already have? it is quantitative. The women's
rebellion initially asserts liberal values - the cult
of individuality, of subjectivity, of personal freedom
and choice, of doing one's own thing. First a demand for
equality of opportunity, the Movement moves in the direction
of subjective liberation a la Germaine Greer. But this dir-
ection is a false one since it is a bourgeois consciousness
manipulable for capitalist purposes.
Late capitalist ideology precisely urges one to be
free in faith, personal and individual emotion, and
to think that one can be this without a socio-economic
transformation.
Emotions cannot be 'free' or 'true* in isolation; they
are dependent today on a social base that imprisons and
W. Ibid ., pp. 40-41.
80. Ibid
. , p. 154.
20?
determines them. The liberation of emotionalitv
nn f*ransfRation that apparently takes place
'
o its own (withm the superstructure alone) isimpossible. Indeed, the belief in its possibilityis an ironic self-parody . 81 li
But how does bourgeois consciousness transform itself into
radical consciousness; how does equality of opportunity or
doing one's own thin* become the equality of respect for
persons? Mitchell describes this transformation as a
change from the 'personal* to the 'political,' a move
from subjective feelings of oppression, through individual
' and group solutions, through "totalism, « to a unified
analysis of oppression in all its forms, and to political
solutions. This transition requires new conceptualizations,
new cognitions.
HHT, p. 38. Note the treatment of emotions as social.
82. Jean Elshtain's typology of Feminist strategies is usefu]here. Elshtam argues that Feminist strategies are of threetypes
- personal (solutions at the individual level), sub-
systemic (working it out in the family), and systemic (rangingfrom legal rights to demands for a radical restructuring
of society). This is a fruitful way of looking at the changefrom the personal to the political, but one which runs intoproblems in clarifying the difference between reform and
revolution. What we need is some way of distinguishing
between a reactionary and a progressive change - one that
is on the road to liberation and one that buys off dissident
elements thus making capitalism, for example," operate more
efficiently. There is also the problem that even a reactionary
reform which pays women more - it is easier for capitalism
to provide more pay than it is for it to provide more meaning-
ful work - makes life somewhat easier for those who receive
even limited benefits. One's judgments on these matters will
in large part determine what actions one decides to support.
Jean Elshtain, talk at a "Working Conference on Women,"
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, January 25, 1974. See
also Sheila Rowbotham, Wj)man^s_C_onsciousne3s
, Man's World for a
discussion of some of the difficulties in staking out a
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These new conceptualizations may come from other
political movements. Since the Women's Movement does not
take place in a cultural vacuum but in a pluralist society,
there is opportunity to borrow from the experiences of
others
-
from "...the 'politics of experience,' the spontanist
methods of anarcho-syndicalism and the Situationists, the
separatism of Black Power, the socialist theory of the unity
of all oppressed peoples, the concept of itself as a grass-
roots, potentially mass movement" is developed. Women have
to be ready to utilize these more radical analyses, however,
and this is where Mitchell runs into some trouble.
Mitchell explains this readiness in terms of the
middle class woman's training and experience in manipulating
ideologies. She argues that in a pluralist society, one in
which there are numerous contradictions, different spheres
present radically different possibilities for freedom.
Change may come about when persons become conscious of these
contradictions and when ideas which flow from one can be
utilized to criticize the other. To give two of Mitchell's
own examples j Our society permits a great deal of freedom
in the sexual sphere, and the idea of sexual freedom does
contradict limits on freedom in other spheres. But the
transference is not so simple as, say Germaine Greer thinks
it is. Mitchell does not believe that freeom automatically
ramifies into other spheres; sexual freedom, for instate is
position on equal pay for equal work.
83. Mitchell, Woman' s Estate
, pp. 13-14.
eaE1 ly adapted to a consuraption an, fu„ ethic, compatible
with capitalism. Second, bourgeois marriage is a free
contract entered into by legal equals, but once married,
women are immersed in a radically unequal division of labor
-
between home and "work,.. male and female - which contradicts
the equality of the marriage contract, and in radically unfree
sexual relations which contradict the freedom of romantic love.
These contradictions form the basis of a dialectical process
of change.
Middle class women are the first to become aware of
these contradictions because they have had the greatest
exposure to liberal ideology and because they have been
educated to manipulate ideologies. Demands for social change
flow out of the needs to which bourgeois ideology gives rise.
85
But Mitchell has yet to demonstrate how it is possible, or
likely, that women who are trained to manipulate the con-
cepts of bourgeois ideology will learn the concepts of a06
radical ideology. Does she mean that the language of social
change is a simple extension of the ideals of liberal society?
There are parts of Mitchell's discussion which suggest this?
e.g., her discussion of revolutionary demands as demands
for what people already have only bigger and better. If this
^ IbidT, p. 147
85. The ideology of the family - individualism and privacv -gives rise to needs which the family cannot meet.
86. Indeed, there may be negative consequences of libernl fem-inism. Middle class women may get what they want and reinforce
much of the status quo.
87. Mitchell, Woman's Estate
, p. 154.
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If this is a variant of the Marxist "quantity into quality-
thesis, it needs further development.
Mitchell sometimes seems to be arguing that radicalism
is a simple unification of the liberal values freedom and
equality, and that the language of liberalism can be used
to express radical demands. Yet at the same time she gives
us examples of several ideological developments in American
feminism which can hardly be interpreted as liberal ideas -
consciousness-raising (which does not take persons' wants
as givens but assumes that persons can be moved to new levels
of awareness through the revolutionary practise of "speaking
88bitterness" in words normally repressed by society); male
chauvinism and male supremacy (theories of sex-caste power);
sexism and patriarchy (also theories of sex-caste and sex-
class power); feminism (a call for a radical restructuring
of social relations); separatism (the need to organize
around specific oppressions without falling back on self-
interest); collectivity and no-leadership structures (re-
jection of the implicit assumption that hierarchy is inevitable).
One wonders if these are ideas that analysts in the True Be-
liever tradition would find credible.
However, Mitchell's idea that change flows out of exist-
ing social arrangements is compatible with the case I have
developed. Changed conceptions of justice or of liberation
do flow out of bourgeois conceptions, at least in a bourgeois
W. Ibid
. , p. 62.
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society. Moreover, Mitchell is quite clear that radical
and bourgeois consciousness differ in terms of their recog-
nition of interests.
Mitchell argues that at first feminist consciousness
is self-interested. It flows out of the particular position
of women in capitalist society and makes demands for women.
Radical
- or political consciousness - on the contrary,
"responds to all forms of oppression."
If we simply develop feminist consciousness we willget not political^ consciousness, but the equivalent
oi national chauvinism among Third World nationsor economism among working class organizations;
simply a self
-directed saze, that sees only theinternal workings of one segment; only this seg-
ment's self-mterest. 90 h
Once feminist consciousness begins to seek an understanding
of oppression as it finds meaning in a total social context,
it moves beyond group interests to solidarity with all
oppressed groups. This conceptual move is Mitchell's con-
tribution to a developed moral perspective from which to
understand the Women's Movement as it transforms itself
from interest group to radical social movement, from ego-
istic group interests to the interests of persons in a just
social order. While there may be problems with Mitchell's
formulation of feminist ideology and with her analysis of
the move from the personal to the political, the approach
W. IbldT
, pp. 33-35.
90. Ibid.
, p. 94.
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remains one of the best examples of the r.'oral Agent mode
available in terms of this move beyond egoism and toward
social interests.
Mitchell's explanation of changing consciousness is
different from the one I support but the two are compatible.
She does have some suggestions as to how moral consciousness
might ^develop, but unfortunately she does not expand upon
them. She discusses the role of consciousness-raising
groups in the development of class consciousness and "total-
92
ist" ideology. In the small, non-hierarchical group,
women probe their personal oppression; out of this comes
an awareness that they are oppressed as women
, and analysis
of the roots of this oppression follows. But why the small,
non-hierarchical group? Is this simply a rhetorical stance?
Mitchell is weak here and would be considerably adided by
a developmental hypothesis. To understand how women's
interests can develop without being diverted either by
altruism (Friedan has recently come out against Women's
Liberation and taken the stand that N.O.W. should fight for
"human liberation") or "class" interest (certain radical-
Lesbian positions which give men up as unsalvageable )
,
requires a deeper analysis of the small group and these
non-hierarchical relations, a more clearly developed hypo-
thesis about how women, working together in egalitarian
91. It would be interesting to see where her Freudianism
would lead her. Unfortunately, her second book, Psycho-
analysis and Feminism (New York» Pantheon Books, 197^) is
also disappointing.
92. Fitchell, Woman's Estate , p. 59.
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relationships, may develop a consciousness that society
impoverishes life for all persons and not just women.
I want to add an important caveat at this point and
that is that the small, non-hierarchical group need not
always contribute to human development. In discussing
Piagefs focus on the peer group, many of my students
point out that peer groups often have informal leadership
structures, or even informal tyrannies - the big boys and
the bullies. And as Jo Freeman has so cogently argued,
93structurelessness can often devolve into oligarchy.
This "tyranny of structurelessness has been noted and
reflected upon by Movement members. It is indeed a prob-
lem; women bring the problems of the wider society with
them to the small group and these can produce "ego-
tripping" and petty tyranny. Yet consciousness of this
dilemma of small group organization can lead to the estab-
lishment of procedures designed to avoid the worst excesses.
Nor should it be implied that the idea of no-leadership
structures has not been seriously thought through or does
not require further analysis. Problems have arisen here as
women develop leadership skills within the movement itself;
often these women are rejected by other Movement members.
There is no doubt that part of developing a moral perspective
on female liberation involves working out these issues of
937 Jo Freeman, "The Tyranny of Structurelessness," The
Second Wave 2 ( 1972 ) : 20-25 . 42
.
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informal oligarchy and the appropriate role of leadership
in egalitarian relationships.
Mitchell has not dealt with either of these issues,
yet she has contributed much to this moral perspective.
Her own feminist ideology moves beyond individualism and
self-interest to social interest, beyond equality of
opportunity or hedonism to an alternative justification
of feminist action. And her understanding that the pro-
gress of the movement is a transition from the personal tc
the political, from the "instinctual" to the "rational" seems
to capture the idea of cognitive development I have been
exploring in this dissertation - the move to new levels
of reasoning can answer to the conflicts between one's
needs as a person and the constraints of the existing
social order.
In one sense Mitchell's analysis is compatible with
the True Believer model. The "instinct of oppression"
is the result of status inconsistency. The True Believer
analyst can follow this argument and can also follow
Mitchell into her discussion of individual anarchism.
But once Mitchell moves to analysis of the Women's Move-
ment as a critique of the limits of bourgeois ideology
and posits alternative modes of social organization
coupled with alternative moral constraints - the con-
straints of reciprocal, non-alienated feminist consciousness
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the True Believer analyst is bound to cry either "Utopianism"
or "Ideology:- since the notion of interests upon which the
alternative rests is alien to him or her.
Mitchell's analysis of the difficulties of raising
women's consciousness is excellent. Her understanding 0f
women's treatment of work life and the implications of
this for class consciousness is a fruitful insight into
the problems of raising the consciousness of working class
women. So long as women enter the work force as individuals -
to satisfy personal or family needs - they will continue to
remain outside social relationships and consciousness
will remain at a low level. Women's consciousness "...is
determined outside the labour force; outside a situation
of potential class-consciousness - it is determined in the home.
Within this home there are inherent contradictions, but so
long as the home remains a privatized and individualized
experience it cannot by itself provide the basis for political
95
consciousness. Women who have the opportunity to
W. Mitchell, Woman's Estate, p. 181.
95. Whether the family is a humanizing or de-humanizing
institution is highly debatable. Some Feminists (e.g.,
Susan C. Bourque and Jean Grossholtz, "Politics as an
Unnatural Practise! Political Science Looks at Female
Participation," Pol itics and Society k /Winter 197^/i225~
266) argue that women are more developed morally than men
because of their rootedness in the family. Others find
this proposition dubious at best on grounds similar to
Mitchell's and with which I agree. The issue, however,
is somewhat ill-met since it rests on different con-
ceptions of morality. Indeed, women may have more "moral"
character traits because they engage in social relations
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participate in social relations will lead the feminist
revolution since they will face and perceive the contra-
dictions between the reality and ideal of the family.
But they will need an ideology to frame these contradictions;
therefore, middle-class women, committed to realization of
the bourgeois ethic for themselves and their families will
by most likely to perceive these contradictions. For
example, the ideology of the family, with its claims to
whicFare~more loving, more personal,warmer - but that depends
?raSs
VleWS moralit
^
as involving only character^it like compassion, or whether other traits like imDer-sonality discipline, etc. are central. On the other hand,
W?^a 7 - S a f,°rm ?? masoning and if reasoning involveshaving experienced egalitarian relationships, can a family
situation provide these relationships?
The tension between these two nositions comes out clearlvin Rowbotham's Wojnanjs Consciousness, Tan's V/orld. She arguesthat m some ways the family is a better world because it isnot caught up in the depersonalization of an industrialized,
capitalist society. It is the site of love, warmth, humanism,
and as such mitigates the evils of capitalism and makes lifebearable. "The family is a place of sanctuary for all thehunted, jaded, exhausted sentiments out of place in commodityproduction. Chased out of the dominant mode of production
where there is no room for emotion, such characteristics aslove, tenderness, and compassion assune a mawkish guise from
confinement.
.. .But this distortion of human relations still
represents the only possibility of personal life." (p. 59)Yet at the same time woman confined in the family is de-prived of the social relations out of which political
consciousness develops. "The non-recognition of women's
labour in the home leaves them with no sense of value as
a group at all." (p. 69) Consciousness cannot be organized
around nothingness. Privatized within the family, woman is
"...rather like those mental patients and prisoners who are
terrified to live without the safe and known routine of
their institution.. This is our kind of 'institutionalization.'
(p. 79) Certanly this is not a firm foundation upon which
to built an autonomous morality.
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individualism and privacy is recognized by the middle class
woman as a contradiction to the way she experiences the
family and this gives rise to new consciousness. However,
this analysis could be aided by an understanding of the
ways in which different life experiences lend themselves
to moral development, especially since working-class women
too immediately experience the contradiction between
family ideology and family reality. With a developmental
hypothesis, we could begin to get at some of the difficul-
ties in raising working-class consciousness not only in
terms of the primary identification of working-class women
in the home - for this identification also holds for most
middle class women - but in the nature of the social rela-
tionships which working-class and middle class women
experience. The radicalism of the early trade union
women might then be understood as flowing not only from
their excusion from the wife- mother-role, but from their
opportunities for egalitarian relationships with other women
in a work life structured somewhat differently from today's
96
assemly line. And -the focus of much contemporary feminist
9o~i It would also help to account for the very radical
position of women's trade uniions in the 19th Century,
especially as compared with the middle class movement
which arose out of the abolitionist movement. Indeed,
one might well wonder where we would be now if 19th
Century feminism had picked up on the ideas coming out
of trade-unionism rather than those of liberal abolitionism.
See Emma Goldman's Living H"y Life (New York, Dover Publi-
cations, 1970) 1.
219
literature on personal rather than on work life is given
theoretical support if it is here and not in work life
that women experience some real freedoms - freedom in
education, in control of sexuality and reproduction, and
some real equality and sociality in relations with other
women through the Women's Movement. And it is these re-
lationships which establish the cognitive base for perceiving
the contradictions inherent in family and work life.
The theory of contradiction, with its focus on the
middle class woman at the nexus of bourgeois social con-
tradiction, is open to serious criticism from both left
and right. Yet it remains a serious attempt to explicate
a changing ideological framework for politi-a 1 acting a»H
as such begins to meet the requirements of the Moral Agent
mode. It is an attempt to understand how ideology can
move beyond democratic-liberalism to an alternative conception
of a just social order, and it is also a clear illustration
of how one can understand and interpret less developed
conceptual frameworks from the perspective of a more devel-
oped one.
Mitchell's concern for human freedom also satisfies
the requirements of the Moral Agent mode. Woman, argues
Mitchell, is unfree insofar as she is alienated - i.e,
separated from her species being, from creative, purposive
responsible activity - and she is alienated because her
biology has become her definition.
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Unlike her non-productive status, her capacityfor maternity is a definition of woman. But it\ is only a physiological definition. Yet solong as it is allowed to remain a substitute foraction and creativity, and the home an area of
relaxation for men, women will remain confined tothe species, to her universal and natural condition. 97
Woman is alienated in reproduction so long as her capacity
for reproduction confines her to "...her universal and
natural condition," removes her from the realm of choice
and activity. She is alienated in her sexuality so long as
there is a necessary link with reproduction. She is alien-
ated in the socialization of children because "...her bio-
logical 'destiny* as mother becomes a cultural vocation...."
Biology undergirds woman's alienation only insofar as it
is implicated in a specific social and historical reality.
The biological function of maternity has been "...a univer-
sal, atemporal fact, and as such has seemed to escape the
98
categories of Marxist historical analysis," but now that
technology has made biology a potentially historical cat-
egory, culture can supercede nature. Women now have the
opportunity to develop in the realm of freedom, a realm
which, while based on a technology which puts biology
under her control, requires conscious intervention in his-
tory. Change is not accomplished through the deux ex
machina of technology, but rather through woman's rational
understanding of the way in which her oppression operates,
97T Fitchell, Woman's Estate
, p. 109.
98. Ibid.
, p. 107.
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particularly the way in which the structures of the family
interrelate with the structures of capitalism. At present,
woman is denied her personality through her definition as
biological being
- she is denied significance as a social,
cultural, and historical being capable of creating herself
through human activity. But she can gain personhood by
corning to grips with this definition and challenging its
roots in the unity of the family as a social stucture.
The four elements of women's condition cannot merelybe considered each in isolation; they form a struc-
ture of specific inter-relations.' The contemporaryfamily can be seen as a triptych of sexual, repro-ductive and socializatory functions (the women's
world) embraced by production (the man's world) -
precisely a structure which in the final instance
is determined by the economy. The exclusion of
women from production - social human activity -
and their confinement to a monolithic condensation
of functions within a unity - the family - which is
precisely unified in the natural part of each
function, is the root cause of the contemporary
social definition of women as natural beings. Any
emancipation movement must still concentrate on
the economic element - the entry of women fully
into public industry and the right to earn a living
wage.
.. ./But/ reproduction, sexuality, and social-°
ization also need to be free from coercive forms
of unification 99
Woman's freedom requires a move away from the natural and
towards the social and it is this move which undergirds
her potential equality as person.
We have to read into ritchell somewhat to see what
she envisages as an egalitarian society, but her socialist
stance does require a leveling of income rather than equal-
ity of opportunity to enter into the competition for present
99. Ibid., pp. 149-150.
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rewards. Persons deserve a "living wage." They also
deserve equal opportunity, but these are not opportunities
for positions in the existing stratification system, but
rather opportunities to develop their full human capacities.
This requires that they be implicated in the kinds of personal
and public activities which encourage development. And
that can be done only by ending the division of labor be-
tween male and female - males in the public sphere of work
(although women are obviously there also, but most often
doing "women^s work"), and women in the private sphere of
•the family.
100. Whether the division of labor between male and female
is inherently alienating is debatable. It seems to depend
on whether men and women have natural capacities to perform
certain kinds of work, and this is exactly the thesis that
Mitchell criticises. But even if work is linked to biology
and genetics (the parallel is the relation between IQ and
the ability to perform in middle class functions) it seems
to me that we can criticize an inequality which utilizes nat-
ural capacities as the basis for rewards, especially since
societies always do value some achievements more than others.
Natural capacities to peform those things which a particular
society values ought not be linked to greater desert as a
person. However, this opens up a can of worms which I need
not deal with in this dissertation.
Another problematic issue is whether entry into work-life
(the public sphere) necessarily adds to woman's development.
Socialists assume that work-life is essential to the devel-
opment of political consciousness j radical feminists do not
agree since women experience their primary oppression in
the family. Mitchell's theory of contradiction is an attempt
to work out the relationship between work-life, family and
consciousness. Another interesting approach to this issue
can be found in Rowbotham's Woman's Consciousness, Tan's
World
,
which also attempts to understand the ways in which
a female consciousness rooted in the family creates problems
for raising female consciousness in the public sphere. It
223
In part this division of labor is eroded by attacking
the family as a monolithic fusion of structures. Rejecting
the socialist call for "abolition of the family" as "...
maximalist in the bad sense, posing a demand which is merely
a negation without any coherent construction subsequent
101
to it," Mitchell calls for alternatives to the mono-
lithic fusion of sexuality, reproduction and socialization
in the family.
^Equality/ will not come from its /the family's/
administrative abolition, but from the historical
differentiation of its functions. The revolutionary
demand should be for the liberation of these
functions from an oppressive monolithic fusion.
...What we should seek for is not the abolition
of the family, but the diversification of the
socially acknowledged relationships which are
today forcibly and rigidly compressed into it.
This would mean a plural range of institutions -
where the family is only one such institution,
and its abolition implies none.^02
Mitchell does not attack the functions these structures
perform - people have sexual needs, they do need to re-
produce, and children need to be socialized (her concern
for children's socialization is clearly in contrast to
Firestone's solution that children be brought into the
public sphere; Mitchell, however, has not developed the
relationship between male liberation and socialization and
Rossi could help her out here). What she attacks is woman's
seems to me that work life is productive of radical conscious-
ness to the extent that it does encourage social relations,
and that the same is true of private life.
101. Mitchell, Woman's Estate
, p. 150.
102. Ibid
. , p. 151.
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immersion in the family which is a realm of unfreedom.
Female liberation means expansion of the realm of choice
within the context of a social order which can satisfy
human needs in the four areas of production, reproduction,
sexuality and socialization. To ignore needs in any
structure is to fail to liberate women; to focus on one
structure as the key to female liberation is to ignore
the dialectical relationship among structures.
As we have seen, Mitchell works from the assumption
that persons can develop interests which move beyond egoism
and a political consciousness which, by recognizing the
relationships among these four structures, can commit them
to the liberation of all oppressed groups. (She is, un-
fortunately, not specific about where racial oppression
might fit in; her focus is on sex and class.) The
task for feminists is to organize around woman's specific
oppression, but any solution to this oppression, embedded
as it is in a capitalist structure, must move in the direction
103. Mitchell does not provide an analysis of the links
between class oppression, racism, agism, sexism, etc., but
these issues are being worked out in the Women's Tovement.
Of particular interest are the formation of new feminist
organizations by women who are at the nexus of these
various systems of oppression - Black women, working class
women, older women. It seems clear to me that one's ex-
planatory theory establishes the basis of solidarity among
these women and the sorts of actions one engages in as an
expression of that solidarity. For example, Black and
white women can join together on abortion reform only to
the extent that Black women do not see abortion as an
attempt at genocide, or only so long as white women per-
ceive that Black women might have legitimate reasons to
suspect this possibility.
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of making links between woman's oppression and working
class oppression. The Movement thus moves beyond middle
class demands for equality of opportunity to an under-
standing of the inter-relatedness of oppressions, to
solidarity amongst the oppressed.
Finally, Mitchell's critique of the family is clearly
rooted in an alternative conception of human relationships
- relationships seen from the moral point of view. What is
alienating about the family is not only that it denies
woman her personhood, but that it provides a false equality
and freedom within the context of capitalist productive
structures, when there are possibilities for real equality
and freedom in all social relations. Women's liberation
is not liberation for women; freeing women from the unitary
structure of the family frees them from the task of holding
together a unity which is destructive to all its members.
The family... has an economic and ideological role
under capitalism. Roughly, the economic role is
the provision of a certain type of productive
labour-force and the arena for massive consumption.
This is specifically capitalist. The economic
function interacts with the ideology requisite to
produce the missing ideals of peasant, feudal
society; a place to equally and freely enjoy private
property. xu+
But this ideology (in the Marxist sense) is mystifying -
it hides the reality of inequality and unfreedom under
capitalism, and encourages "...the increasingly disruptive
105
individualism of its members." It inhibits freedom and
104. Mitchell 1 Woman's Estate
, p. 155
•
105. Ibid
. , p. 153.
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equality in work-life, sexuality, reproduction, and soc-
ialization and supports a generally de-humanized life for
all.
Mitchell has adequately dealt with what might be
termed the top-side of dis-alienation, the side of freedom
and equality. But we need to consider a bottom side of
liberation, the side where we find emotions and persons
as historic individuals. Mitchell does begin to deal with
the emotions in the final chapter of Woman's Estate when
she considers the ways in which oppression marks those
who are oppressed, makes liberation a serious struggle.
The difficulties that confront us are not just the
opposition of the system we are confronting, but
also its influence. It is this latter difficulty
that I
(
think we are in danger of ignoring. The
conditions of our oppression do condition us....
You cannot inhabit a small and backward world
without it doing something to you. 105
But the writer who has perhaps best captured the difficul-
ties of liberation is Ingrid Bengis, especially in her
treatment of the relationship between liberation and
personal history.
The rational mind is capable of making astounding
leaps. I can espouse communism one evening and
radical conservatism the next. I can theorize
about the future of the family from dusk until
dawn. I can create and destroy whole new systems
of thought, systems of being, systems of living,
allwithin the course of a dinner conversation^
Similarly, I can create and re-create 'new women'
to suit the perspective of the period. What I
3.06. Ibid
. , p. 162. "To recognize that we are the victims
of our own masochism is our political beginning." Howbotham,
Woman's Consciousness
, p. 42.
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- cannot do, however, is become the person each
decade newly assumes I ought to be. I cannot
be the completely feminine woman of the fifties,
the emancipated, sexually free woman of the sixties,
and the militant, antisexist woman of the seventies.
I cannot ignore the fact that my own life has un-
folded slowly, that it has been a part of all those
trends and none of them. I cannot ignore the fact
that essentially the same me has persisted
throughout the upheavals, throughout the analyses
of historical circumstances and evaluations of
what a woman's life ought to be. °'
Understanding that we are the same person throughout the
process of social change carries with it important impli-
cations for what we might demand of social change. We
•might expect that change will better satisfy those needs
we do have, that altering social relations will better
provide for the fulfillment of what we perceive as our
needs. Here Bengis provides an insight which is rare in
Feminist analysis, an insight which has to do with our
felt need for commitment, for the stable relationships
which form the underside of dis-alienation.
Still, the need for continuity, for love, for
something with at least enough solidity to make
permanence seem possible, even if it usually
isn't attained, persists. No matter what our
concepts of freedom are, there is no way to
ignore the simple fact that it takes a long time
to get to know someone, to understand their
strengths and weaknesses and coordinate them
with your own, to balance the weight of closeness
and separateness, to arrive at some degree of
sexual openness. The prospect of repeating the
process over and over again is exhausting, even
for a fertile imagination. 108
Tb?. Ingrid Bengis, Combat in the Erogenous Zone (New Yorkt
Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 203.
108. Ibid., p. 237.
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Here the language is of sexual relations, but remove the
sexuality (although this would be some part of any liber-
ated human relationship), and I think that we have a
remarkable image of the kinds of constraints that human
109
needs place on human relationships. This passage is
lent support by Piagefs theory of human development, a
development which requires careful nurturance in an
atmosphere of warmth, commitment, stability; it in turn
gives us reason to be critical of any proposals for
absolute freedom a la Germaine Greer.
A good society would provide stable, mutual relation-
ships which would nurture development over time. These
relationships might be especially important at the two
extremes of the human life span - in our early years when
warm, loving "parents" are essential to the growth of ego
strength and our ability to care for others, and in our
old age when we need strength and support in the face of
death. We are social and historic beings then in this
very individual sense. We have a memory and we have a
future; and our relations with others are a vital part
of the past and future.
109. Bengis posits human 'needs' for love, warmth, com-
passion, for emotional expression through 'authentic',
human relations. But it is not clear whether she views these
•needs' as universal or as cultural specific. She is rather
clear that their fulfillment is frustrated by male-female
power relations. See Zillah Eisenstein's discussion of
Bengis' conception of needs in "Connections Between Class
and Sex 1 Moving Towards a Theory of Liberation," paper pre-
sented at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political
229
Our ability to comprehend and be attracted to new
ideas is also affected by our individual historicity.
Ideas are held by real people with real needs
. Some of
these needs are the flawed products of a flawed society
and stand in the way of our rationality. When our images
of ourselves are warped, it is difficult for us to com-
prehend what an •authentic 1 self might be or to develop
images of others which could serve as the foundation for
solidarity. But, even though we are flawed, we cannot
stand outside ourselves; we can only test ideas in the
light of personal experience and stand as critical agents
in the face of any proposed truth. Some of our personal
experiences will lend themselves to rational evaluations,
to autonomous criticism based on more developed needs;
other experiences point up needs with which proposals for
change must come to grips. Our feelings and our needs
are the final criteria for the validity of an idea - not
in the subjectivist sense but in the sense that any proposal
for change must take into account the needs, wants and
purposes which persons do have. Radical proposals for
change expand these needs to incorporate unfolding capacities,
but unless these capacities are rooted in real needs, wants
and purposes, we are engaged in Utopian ism.
Some proposals for change will offend our understanding
of our needs; for example, my students often react quite
Science Association, Women's Caucus Panel, New Orleans,
Louisiana, September '+-8, 1973. (Mimeographed •
)
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negatively to Firestone's technological solution to child-
bearing. It seems quite inhuman to them, and indeed it is
in light of their understanding of their own, quite human,
needs. Bengis' discussion of abortion is to the point -
abortion reform appears to understand woman's need to
control her own body, but in treating abortion as a simple
medical technique somewhat akin to a tonsillectomy, the
state ignores' woman's need to have shared in a meaningful
human relationship. "Will /abortion/ change the fact that
for many women, the adaptation to the physical fact of
being aborted, requires another adaptation. .. a sense of
110
separation from the life of her body." In her mind
woman needs the child as proof of her man's faithfulness;
to undergo an abortion, she must separte herself - her body
- from these real needs, inauthenticate herself. (One
solution is to provide alternative support institutions
which is what feminist abortion counselling is all about.)
Our feelings are implicated in our ideas and actions.
Some of these feelings stand in the way of rational thought
and liberation. Bengis writes
t
What I discovered in the midst of my drive toward
emancipation was that sex, love, hurt, and hate
were the real stuff I was made of; that fairness,
rationality, and the willingness to share or give
away what one had never been sure of possessing
in the first place, were all secondary character-
istics, carefully cultivated to be sure, but capable
of collapsing the moment stronger passions reared
110. Bengis, Combat
, p. 68,
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their heads.
m
Yet this ability to feel, to respond to others in anger,
hurt, resentment and love is part of who we are and must
be understood. Persons do not transform themselves rad-
ically; they remain the same person as they move to diff-
erent levels of self- and social awareness. It is a constant
struggle to maintain our better image of ourselves and to
maintain our morality in the face of situations which give
rise to real fears, insecurities, anxieties and jealousies.
But personalaity and morality also depend on these capacities
to feel. Persons may carry with them the baggage of old
emotional repertoires into new relationships, new modes
of sociaUife, but some of these will be liberating while
others will serve as barriers to development. We are
historic beings; we are always the same person even as we
develop.
Bengis and Mitchell seem to me to capture the image
of changing consciousness implicit in the Moral Agent model.
The essence of moral action lies in awareness that we have
needs, that others are implicated in these needs, and that
we satisfy our needs - as well as create new ones - through
our social life. There are possibilities and responsibilities
for evaluation, for struggle and for change. Awareness of
these possibilities grows out of the conditions of moral
development - opportunities for egalitarian human relationship
111. Ibid
. , p. 201
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coupled with an explanatory theory which fleshes out the
notion of persons and of injury and gives substance to a
critical perspective on one's own society and the possibil-
ities for flourishing within it.
The Moral Agent mode of analysis lends support to actions
which promote institutional changes designed to promote egal-
itarian, reciprocal relationships and expansion of the realm
of freedom for women (and other oppressed persons), and estab-
lishing community. Often Moral Agents will engage in
actions proposed by other groups - e.g., child care and
abortion reform - but these actions are justified in the
broader context of human liberation rather than as a means
of simply freeing women from the family so that they may
achieve in the professional world.
The Moral Agent cannot be doctrinaire in her defense
of liberation. Aware of the ways in which ideas develop,
113
she cannot propose any final solutions. As we end one
alienating relationship, we sense a need to end others -
demands change in a dialectical process of consciousness-
raising, new needs, new demands for social change. Social
transformation is a dynamic process. And we cannot predict
the outcome of this process since the dialectic moves in a com-
plex manner. To know this lends a hesitancy to the way we
112. Having lived in a relatively small town for over a
year now, I have some doubts as to how clear radicals have
been in their conception of community. Although it can
enrich human relations, it can also be frighteningly
intrustive.
113. I have always been impressed, yet put off by the
propose our strategies, gives us a tremendous sense of
responsibility to be constantly re-evaluating, re-form-
ulating our ideas and strategies.
absolute assuredness of my Trotskyite friends that they
have found the solution to all the world's woes.
CONCLUSIONS
In the past three chapters I have attempted to
explore two profoundly different images of human action
and the implications of each for our understanding of
contemporary American Feminism. If I have net looked at
specific actions, this is because I have thought it adequate
to investigate possible justifications of these actions
and the complicated relationship between explanations of
human oppression, moral judgments and the emotions. The
next task is obvious - it is to look at the actions of
women in the real world of politics and to see how these
various justifications are deployed in the process of
social change. I have hoped to lay the groundwork for
that endeavor.
If, as Peter Winch suggests, the social theorist is
an observer who is trying to understand what is going on
in the world she sees, she has to inside the conceptual
framework of those who are involved in action. She need
not act herself on these beliefs, these moral notions, these
emotions, but she does have to have them; i.e. she must be
able to use them to guide her own action even though she
chooses not to. The theorist who is at a different level of
cognitive development, who operates from a different con-
ceptual framework, will fail to understand what action is
about. Her social theory can point out gaps in the explanatory
theory used by the activists, her theory can even be in-
strumental in moving them on in their own cognitive devel-
opment. But the theorist and the activist are at cross-
purposes if there is no shared sense of what the action is
about. Theory may then perhaps explain failure without
sharing concepts in the action framework, but to explain
the attempt requires understanding the framework within
which the actor moves and thinks.
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